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date: 08 May 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines the application of the closure principle in responding to skepticism. It discusses the nature of mathematical closure and its application in the context of contemporary epistemology and examines the dispute about the truth of closure principles in epistemology and the role alternative possibilities play in a proper understanding of the nature of knowledge. It also discusses the history of denials of closure and the defenses of closure in relevant-possibilities epistemology.

Keywords: closure principle, skepticism, truth, epistemology, alternative possibilities, relevant-possibilities epistemology

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