- The Pyrrhonian Problematic
- The Problem of the Criterion
- Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents
- Hume's Skepticism
- Skepticism about the External World
- Skepticism about Induction
- Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions
- Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism
- Religious Skepticism
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses
- Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism
- Kant's Response to Skepticism
- Reid's Response to the Skeptic
- Peirce and Skepticism
- Moore and Skepticism
- Austin's Way with Skepticism
- Wittgenstein on Certainty
- The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism
- Ascriber Contextualism
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology
- Closure and Alternative Possibilities
- Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma
- Externalist Responses to Skepticism
- Internalist Responses to Skepticism
- Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
- Disjunctivism and Skepticism
Abstract and Keywords
This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.
Duncan Pritchard is chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh.
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