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date: 05 March 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This article considers the response of relativism to radical skepticism. It analyzes two different versions of relativism, one about truth and one about justification, and evaluates whether common sense would stand in need of some defense. It argues that the “relativist about truth” holds a deeply implausible view which in a sense defends common sense but only at the cost of abandoning common sense. It also discusses the structure of the radical skeptic's argument and the validity of relativism about truth as a response to the radical skeptic.

Keywords: relativism, skepticism, truth, justification, common sense

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