- [UNTITLED]
- Dedication
- Contributors
- Introduction
- The Pyrrhonian Problematic
- The Problem of the Criterion
- Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents
- Hume's Skepticism
- Skepticism about the External World
- Skepticism about Induction
- Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions
- Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism
- Religious Skepticism
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses
- Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism
- Kant's Response to Skepticism
- Reid's Response to the Skeptic
- Peirce and Skepticism
- Moore and Skepticism
- Austin's Way with Skepticism
- Wittgenstein on Certainty
- The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism
- Ascriber Contextualism
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology
- Closure and Alternative Possibilities
- Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma
- Externalist Responses to Skepticism
- Internalist Responses to Skepticism
- Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
- Disjunctivism and Skepticism
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article considers the response of relativism to radical skepticism. It analyzes two different versions of relativism, one about truth and one about justification, and evaluates whether common sense would stand in need of some defense. It argues that the “relativist about truth” holds a deeply implausible view which in a sense defends common sense but only at the cost of abandoning common sense. It also discusses the structure of the radical skeptic's argument and the validity of relativism about truth as a response to the radical skeptic.
Keywords: relativism, skepticism, truth, justification, common sense
Peter J. Graham is associate professor of philosophy at the University of California, Riverside.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
Please subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.
For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.
- [UNTITLED]
- Dedication
- Contributors
- Introduction
- The Pyrrhonian Problematic
- The Problem of the Criterion
- Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents
- Hume's Skepticism
- Skepticism about the External World
- Skepticism about Induction
- Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions
- Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism
- Religious Skepticism
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses
- Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism
- Kant's Response to Skepticism
- Reid's Response to the Skeptic
- Peirce and Skepticism
- Moore and Skepticism
- Austin's Way with Skepticism
- Wittgenstein on Certainty
- The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism
- Ascriber Contextualism
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology
- Closure and Alternative Possibilities
- Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma
- Externalist Responses to Skepticism
- Internalist Responses to Skepticism
- Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
- Disjunctivism and Skepticism
- Index
