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date: 19 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines philosopher G. E. Moore's thoughts and arguments against skepticism. It explains that Moore wrestled with issues of knowledge and skepticism throughout his career, examining and responding in several influential essays to various skeptical arguments. It describes Moore's response to one form of skeptical argument and contrasts it with two alternative approaches, relevantism and contextualism. It evaluates whether Moorean response to skepticism stifle epistemological inquiry and discusses Moore's denial that skepticism is epistemically possible in the sense that it is reasonable to believe that skepticism is true.

Keywords: G. E. Moore, skepticism, knowledge, relevantism, contextualism, epistemological inquiry

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