Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 15 May 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This article is about the philosophical problem of intentionality. Neo-Darwinian selection theory can be used to solve the problem. The norms that apply to mental representation can be reduced to functional norms. The theories that are based on this idea are known as teleological theories of mental content. The philosophical problem of intentionality is related to but different from the psychological one. Ordinary functionalism is presented as endorsing two main theses: mental states and they are individuated by their “functional roles.” Teleofunctionalism endorses both analogous and homologous psychological categories. The reason that teleofunctionalism holds as a theory of mental content is that content is normative. A second motivation for teleosemantics is the nature of cognitive neuroscience as it forms a bridge between the natural sciences and the so-called interpretive fields of inquiry. The aim of the teleosemantic theories sketched above is to explain how content is determined in terms of nonmental phenomena.

Keywords: intentionality, functionalism, mental, neuroscience, teleosemantic

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.