- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates
- Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will
- Fatalism
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?
- Free Will Remains a Mystery
- Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues
- Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility
- Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism
- Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism
- Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
- Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples
- Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
- Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency
- Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
- Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth
- The Bounds of Freedom
- Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem
- Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion
- Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism
- Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will
- Do We Have Free Will?
- Neurophilosophy of Free Will
- References
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article takes an experimental approach to the question of whether we have free will, with special reference to the role consciousness plays in free voluntary action. It shows that voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical charge in the brain (the “readiness potential”), which begins several hundred milliseconds before the human subjects become consciously aware of their intention to act. This suggests that the volitional process is initiated unconsciously. Some philosophers and scientists have been tempted to conclude that willed actions are determined by unconscious forces and hence that our awareness of conscious control is illusory. However, it is argued that there is still a role for consciousness in controlling the outcome of willed actions, since consciousness can veto the act once underway. Thus, free will is not necessarily excluded, though novel neuroscientific findings place constraints on how free will could operate and how we are to make sense of it in terms of current research on the brain.
Keywords: consciousness, conscious will, voluntary action, volition, brain
Benjamin Libet is Professor in the Department of Physiology at the University of California, San Francisco. He received a Ph.D. in neurophysiology, supervised by Ralph Gerard (founder and Honorary President of the Society for Neuroscience). Libet also worked with K.A.C. Elliott on brain metabolism and with Sir John Eccles on synaptic mechanisms. In 1958 he began a series of highly influential experimental studies in human subjects relating brain activities to the appearance or production of conscious experience. Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94143–0444.
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- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates
- Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will
- Fatalism
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?
- Free Will Remains a Mystery
- Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues
- Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility
- Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism
- Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism
- Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
- Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples
- Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
- Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency
- Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
- Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth
- The Bounds of Freedom
- Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem
- Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion
- Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism
- Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will
- Do We Have Free Will?
- Neurophilosophy of Free Will
- References
- Index