- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates
- Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?
- Free Will Remains a Mystery
- Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues
- Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility
- Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism
- Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism
- Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
- Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples
- Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
- Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency
- Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
- Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth
- The Bounds of Freedom
- Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem
- Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion
- Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism
- Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will
- Do We Have Free Will?
- Neurophilosophy of Free Will
Abstract and Keywords
This article presents a novel position on the issue of free will and compares this position to other more familiar ones. It consists of two radical theses: fundamental dualism and illusionism. Part 1 presents the three questions on the issue of free will and then briefly states reasons that libertarian free will is impossible, and hence reasons that we need to be concerned with compatibilism and hard determinism. Part 2 sets out the first of the two radical proposals, a fundamental dualism according to which we have to be both compatibilists and hard determinists. Part 3 presents the second proposal, illusionism, which claims that illusion on free will is morally necessary.
Saul Smilansky is a professor at the department of philosophy in the University of Haifa, Israel. He is the author of Free Will and Illusion (OUP, 2000) and 10 Moral Paradoxes (2007), and numerous articles on free will and normative ethics.
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