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date: 16 November 2019

(p. 469) Index

(p. 469) Index

absolute aperspectivity, 310
action. See also akratic action
explanation of, 242–43
and its relation to belief and desire, 347
akrasia, 240–41, 245, 255n2. See also akratic action
akratic action, 240–43. See also akrasia
explanation of, 243–45
irrationality of, 245–46, 255
and representations, 244
Socratic, 245
strict, 241–43, 256n10
unorthodox, 245–46
altruism, 291–92
one-way, 291
reciprocal, 291–92
amoralism, 115
amoralist skepticism, 115
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 67–68
antirealism, 364
Aristotle, 344, 357–58
on anger, 213
on the relations between language, thought, and rationality, 356–57
and the role of emotions in practical reasoning, 207, 216–17
Arrow's Possibility Theorem, 387
assumed aperspectivity, 310
assumed objectivity, 310
backward induction, 198–99
and the Bottle Imp, 266–67
and the prediction paradox, 267–68
Bayesianism, 5, 125, 132. See also Bayes's theorem; belief, conditional; confirmation; Problem of Old Evidence
and additivity, 134
and conditional normalization, 134
and conditioning, 134
and internalism vs. externalism about rational belief, 152–53
and inverse probability, 135
and learning, 146–49
and logical consequence, 135
and normalization, 134
and ordinal invariance, 148–49
and pragmatism, 140
and probability, 134
and subjectivism, 149–53
and the Thesis of Graded Belief, 134
Bayes's theorem, 135, 367–68
belief. See also degrees of belief; motivationally biased belief
categorical, 132
conditional, 133
FTL model of, 252–55
motivationally biased, 245
reflexive, 268–70
belief-change, 34
and theoretical rationality, 34
belief-formation, 32–33
as a response to experience, 32–33
benefit principle, 407–10, 416, 416n7
and the death penalty, 409–10
and the kidney lottery, 410
Bennett, Jonathan, 356
(p. 470) Bentham, Jeremy, 260
Bernoulli, Daniel, 273
bias, 246–47, 312. See also under simplicity
motivational, 245
bootstrapping problem, 230–32, 235
Bottle Imp, 266–67
bounded agents, 390–92
bounded rationality, 385–86, 392
Brandt, Richard, 61–63
and cognitive psychotherapy, 61
and proceduralism, 61–63
Bratman, Michael, 230–31, 390
and the bootstrapping problem, 230–31
Buridan, Jean, 269–70. See also Buridan's Ass
Buridan's Ass, 270–71
cheater detection hypothesis, 292–95
Choice implies preference,” 270
Clifford, W. K., 247
cognitivism, 209. See also judgmentalism
about the emotions, 209
coherence, 27–29, 50, 241
and agency, 347–48
of desire sets and weak Humeanism, 88–92
as a mark of theoretical rationality, 30
as a source of theoretical rationality, 28
and wellgroundedness, 28
coherentism
about rationality, 33
commitment, 428, 429
rationality of, 388–90
commitment problem, 214–15
common knowledge, 190
compulsion, 244
conceptual coherentism, 30
and its implications, 30–31
conditional rationality, 397
conditioning
Jeffrey, 146
simple, 146
Condorcet's paradox, 274–75
confidence threshold, 252–53
confirmation, 143–46
and Bayesianism, 143–46
and difference measures, 144
hypothetico-deductive model of, 144
and the likelihood ratio, 145
confirmation agent, 366
confirmation bias, 251–52, 378
conjunction fallacy, 281
Conjunction Principle, 285
conjunction problems, 280–81
conservatism, 50, 54
and its role in theoretical reasoning, 54
consistency
internal, 125
probabilistic, 135, 142
constrained maximization, 429
contractarianism. See contractualism
contradiction in conception test, 103
and strict (narrow, perfect) duty, 103
contradiction in the will test, 103
and wide (imperfect) duty, 103
coordination game, 238n27
coordination games. See games, coordination
Darwin, Charles, 318n2, 419, 421
Davidson, Donald, 344
and the argument from holism, 358–59
and the argument from surprise, 360
and the argument from the concept of belief, 359
and the argument from the concept of error, 360–61
on the dependence of thought on language, 358–62
(p. 471)
on motivationally biased belief, 248–50
and the paradox of irrationality, 255
decision theory, 4, 125. See also Expected Utility Theorem; Prisoners' Dilemma
axioms for, 158–160
and the good for persons, 170–72
and moral goodness, 172–75
and morality, 156
degrees of belief, 34, 132–34, 139, 153n2
and confidence measures, 133–34
and convexity, 142
and normality, 142
deliberation
correct, 112, 121, 123
procedurally rational, 111, 123
rational, 117–20
substantively rational, 111
Dennett, Daniel, 321
and the intentional stance, 321, 355
Descartes, René, 358
desire
irresistible, 244
strength of, 243–44
dinosaurs, 365–67, 371
Discrimination Principle, 145–49
domination, 191–92
iterated, 192
strict, 191
weak, 191
dual processing theories, 297
Dutch Book Argument, 135–41
diachronic, 147–48
and the requirement of coherent extendibility, 137
Dworkin, Ronald, 412–14
economics, 380–81
idealizations in, 295–96
and instrumental rationality, 386–87
macro-, 380
micro-, 380
and rationality as maximization of personal utility, 383–85
and rationality as maximization of self-interest, 382–83
emotion, and practical reasoning in science, 370–72
emotional strategies, 214–17
and the commitment problem, 214–15
and the Prisoners' Dilemma, 216
emotions, 206. See also cognitivism; emotional strategies
belief-based views of the, 213
causal/historical approach to the, 211–14
evaluative accounts of the, 207–8
as evaluative affects, 220–21
evolutionary account of the, 214
and perspectival rationality, 211, 216
as reasons for action, 217–19
and representational rationality, 210–11
social constructivist views of the, 214
as somatic markers, 208, 216–17
toward fictions, 258–59
entropy, 151–52
epistemic enablers, 29–30
vs. epistemic grounds, 29–30
epistemic neutrality, 310
epistemic rationality. See theoretical rationality
epistemic self-regulation, 297–98
equilibrium, 8. See also Nash equilibrium
focal point, 192
Pareto-dominant, 192–93
perfect, 201–2
proper, 202
sequential, 200–201
equilibrium point, 424
equilibrium refinement, 428
error costs, 252–54
Euthyphro, 112
evaluation, 243
evolution
normative significance, 419, 434
and rationality, 417–18
social, 427
evolutionarily stable strategy, 422, 425
evolutionary generalism, 426–27
evolutionary psychology, 287–88
evolutionary rationalism, 420–21
expected utility, 132, 138, 156–57, 408
and causal decision theories, 263–64
and evidentialist theories, 263
(p. 472)
principle of maximizing, 260
subjective, 132
Expected Utility Theorem, 160, 172
explanation agent, 368–70
expressivism, 74n15
externalism, about reasons, 112, 119–23
facts
moral, 115, 127
normative, 119–20
falsification agent, 366–67
feminism
classical, 302–4
different voice, 302, 304
and rationality, 301–2
strong critical, 302, 304–18
finite state machines, 432
folk theorem, 204, 431–32
formula of autonomy (FA), 105, 107–8
formula of the end in itself (FEI), 105–7
formula of the kingdom of ends (FKE), 105
formula of the law of nature (FLN), 105
formula of universal law (FUL), 98–99, 105–7
as an indirect standard for guiding action, 102
and the charge of formalism, 104
forward induction, 202. See also backward induction
Foss, Jeffrey, 249–50
foundationalism, 33–34
vs. coherentist theories of rationality, 33
free-rider problem, 227–28, 234–35
Frequentist Hypothesis, 288
Friedrich, James, 253–54
games, 185–86
cooperative vs. noncooperative, 187
coordination, 192–93
extensive form, 196–203
normal form, 186, 196
repeated, 203–5
sub-, 196
game theory, 182
economic evolutionary, 426
evolutionary, 424–27
Gauthier, David, 163–69, 389, 416n6
and the bootstrapping problem, 230
and constrained vs. straightforward maximizers, 164–65
and contractualism, 163
and his Lockean Proviso, 168–69
and Hobbes's Foole, 163–64
and Minimax Relative Concession points (MRCs), 166
gender, 305
and objectivity, 307–16
as psychosocial, 307–8
as relational, 308–12
as symbolic, 305–7
gender norms, 309–12, 318n4
genetic algorithm, 426, 429
God's Utility Function, 420
group rationality, 372–77
epistemic and practical, 373–74
Harsanyi, John, 162, 175. See also Harsanyi's theorem
Harsanyi's theorem, 175–79
Harvard Medical School problem, 282–83, 288
Haslanger, Sally, 309–12
heuristic of personification, 419
Hobbes, Thomas, 161–62
Hobbes's Foole, 163–64
Hume, David, 4, 75–92, 357
and emotions as necessary for practical reasoning, 217
on the possibility and rationality of theoretical and practical reasoning, 77–82
and the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, 353–54
and proceduralism, 59–61
and the relationship between the theoretical and practical domains, 272
on the relationship between the theoretical and practical domains, 77
Humeanism, 75–76. See also proceduralism (p. 473)
moderate, 82–86
radical, 76–82
weak, 86–88
Humean rationality. See Humeanism
hypothetical imperatives, 96–97
to be rational, 340
pragmatic, 96
technical (also rules of skill), 96–97
incoherence, 27–29
as a defeater of theoretical rationality, 28–29
inference, 31–32
non-belief-forming, 32
inference to the best explanation, 368–69
instrumentalism. See proceduralism
internalism. See also rationalism
about reasons, 111–18, 123
and acquiring through rational deliberation, 117–18
belief, 114
Bernard Williams's, 111–12
moral, 113
moral belief, 114
and psychological states, 112–13
interpretation, 350–55
holistic constraints on, 350
radical, 350–51
truth theories and radical, 352
irrationality, 113
rational, 340
James, William, 247
jealousy, 254
Jeffrey, Richard, 263–64
and game theory, 264
and William Newcomb's problem, 263–64
judgment
decisive, 241, 245–46
probabilistic, 280–82
judgmentalism, 209
and rationality, 210
Kant, Immanuel, 4, 93–108, 358
on autonomy vs. heteronomy in ethics, 97, 107–8
and categorical imperatives, 97–99
and hypothetical imperatives, 96–97
and maxims, 94–96
and persons as reflectively rational beings, 327
and practical reason as emotionless, 217
and the principle of hypothetical imperatives, 96
on private (heteronomous) reasoning, 101
on public (autonomous) reasoning, 101
and theoretical vs. practical reason, 93–94
and the vindication of reason, 100–101
Kaplow, Louis, and S. Shavell, 405–6, 408
Kirkpatrick Lee, 254
Korsgaard's internalism requirement, 117
Kunda, Ziva, 251
language
and thought, 357–61
thought, and rationality, 343–44
law and economics movement, 399–401
legal actors, 402–4, 414
Leibniz, Gottfried, 270
liar paradox, 269–70
Lloyd, Genevieve, 305–7
Locke, John, 357
on personal identity as distinct from animal identity, 328–30
and persons as reflectively rational beings, 327–28
and the prince and the cobbler, 329–30
Lockean Proviso. See Gauthier, David
MacKinnon, Catherine, 308–17
maxims, Kantian, 94–96
and how they are known, 95
and their relation to practical reasoning, 94–96
McClennen, Edward, 390
Mele, Alfred, 243, 246, 253–54
modular rationality, 429
(p. 474) Moore, G. E., 268
moral expressivism, 115
moral noncognitivism, 115
moral realism, 127
motivated irrationality, 240. See also akratic action; motivationally biased belief; self-deception
motivation, 243, 256n7, 256n11, 256n15
externalist, 123
Humean theory of, 116–17
motivationally biased belief, 4, 245, 250–51
agency view of, 247–48
anti-agency view of, 247–48
motivational strength, 242–44
myopic choice, 425
Nash equilibrium, 187–95, 421–22, 425, 428
refinements of, 195–96, 199–203
naturalistic fallacy, 419
norms of fairness, 428
norms of rationality vs. norms of credibility, 312–18
objectivity
distance, and aperspectivity, 314–17
and gender, 307–16
and weakly vs. strongly gendered norms, 311
optimizing, 415n4, 419–21
other-regarding desires, 62–63
Ought implies can,” 127
ought(s), subjective view of, 124–25
paradox of irrationality, 255
Pareto optimality, 382
Parfit, Derek, 68–69
and the irrationality pill, 340
Pascal, Blaise, 260
Pears, David, 248–50
perceptual consciousness, 42n5
personhood, 324, 326–28
and accountability, 328
neo-Lockean vs. animalist view of, 330–34
and prudential self-concern, 328, 331–34
and reflective rationality, 324, 326–28
phronimos, 121–23, 126
Plato, 241, 245, 358
Plato's Euthyphro, 112
Posner, Richard, 402–4, 411–14
practical irrationality, 135–36
practical neutrality, 310
practical rationality, 3, 57–58, 259–60, 345–46. See also proceduralism; rational practical deliberation; substantivism
and reasons for action, 72–73
practical reason
and science, 370–72
practical reasoning, 45–46, 243. See also wishful thinking
and emotional development and functioning, 206
practical reasons
and normative vs. motivational force, 110–11, 122
practical reason(s), 64
internal vs. external, 64
prediction paradox, 267–68
Prediction Principle, 143–44
preference
group, 274–75
and rational choice, 183
transitivity of, 139, 274, 346
trichotomy of, 139
preference ordering, Amartya Sen on, 226
preference ordering (ranking), 138, 184–85
principal agent problem, 432–33
principal of hypothetical imperatives, 96
principle of coherence, 351, 355
principle of correspondence, 351–54
principle of mathematical expectation, 132
Prisoners' Dilemma, 8, 265, 389–90, 420
and the Bottle Imp, 266–67
and emotional strategies, 216
and the sequential decision problem, 233
probabilistic agent, 367–68
probability
Bayesian view of, 125
conditional, 134
(p. 475)
epistemic vs. objective, 56n3
objective, 124–25, 150–51
subjective, 125–26
Problem of Old Evidence, 144–45
problem of time-inconsistent preferences. See rule-guided behavior
proceduralism, 57–59, 111. See also Humeanism
Bernard Williams's, 63–67
Hume's, 59–61
instrumental vs. noninstrumental, 59
Richard Brandt's, 61–63
substantivist objections to, 69–72
in terms of rational criticizability, 59
in terms of reasons, 59
procedural rationality, 386, 391–92. See also proceduralism
pure practical reason, 118
pure vs. mixed strategy, 186
puzzle of Ever Better wine, 261–62
quantization, 396
Quine, W. V., 344
Quinn, Warren, 67–68
Radford, Colin, 258
rational actor psychology, 400–401, 404–8, 415
and liability vs. no-liability regimes, 405–8
rationalism, 113
rationality. See also group rationality; practical rationality; science; theoretical rationality
bounded, 385–86, 392
conditional, 397
epistemic, 247
and evolution, 417–18
full, and correct deliberation, 112
full reflective, 321
and language, 350–57
perspectival, 211
and psychology, 279–80
representational, 210–11
standard picture of, 285, 298n2
and thought, 344–50, 356–57
rationalizability, 190
rational practical deliberation, 63
rational unity, 322–23
as a condition of personal identity, 334–39
Rawls, John, 161–62
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, 120
“Reason implies can,” 121–22, 127
reasoning, theoretical vs. practical, 48–49
reasons
epistemic, 46
exclusionary, 225
externalism about, 112
moral, 116, 118–21, 127
nonepistemic practical, 46
practical, 117
prudential, 118–21, 127
the scope of, 257–58
Reflection Principle, 147–48
relativism, Bernard Williams's, 120–24
replicator dynamics, 426–27, 429, 431
representations, 244
representative heuristic, 286
reproductive fitness, 422, 434
resolute choice, 236n12, 429
rule-guided behavior, 222
compatibilist account of, 224
and constraint models, 228
error theory of, 224
fundamental dilemma concerning, 223–24
and the problem of time-inconsistent preferences, 227
and resolute choice models, 228
revisionist theory of, 225
rules, 222–35
sadism, 115
salience, 251–52
satisficing vs. optimizing, 261, 386, 390–92
Scanlon, T. M., 72–73
Schelling, Thomas, 264
science, 363–65
goals of, 364–65
(p. 476)
and practical reason, 370–72
and rationality, 363
the rationality of, 377–79
scientific consensus, CCC model of scientific, 373–76
scientific realism, 364
second-order reasons. See reasons, exclusionary
selection task, 280
self-control, 240–41, 244–45. See also akratic action
self-deception, 247–49, 250, 256n14
straight and twisted, 254–55
Sen, Amartya, 226
sequential decision problem, 232–34
sex ratio, 25, 421–24
Sharpsteen, Don, 254
Sharvey, Richard, 267
Simon, Herbert, 261, 385–86, 391
on satisficing vs. optimizing rationality, 261, 386
simplicity, 50–54
and inductive bias, 52
and its role in theoretical reasoning, 51–54
and measures of, 52–53
practical reasons as sensitive to, 53–54
Skyrms, Brian, 161
Slote, Michael, 261, 392
and Ever Better wine, 261–62
Smith, Adam, 382
Sober, Elliott, 419
social contract theory. See contractualism
social dilemmas, 420
social epistemology, 313–18
sociopath(y), 115
St. Petersburg Paradox, 273
subgame-perfect equilibrium, 26, 200, 237n24, 430. See also Nash equilibrium, refinements of
subjective motivational set, 63
substantive rationality, 386, 391. See also substantivism
substantivism, 57–59, 67–69, 111
arguments for, 67–69
in terms of rational criticizability, 59
in terms of reasons, 59
vs. proceduralism, 69–72
“Sure Thing” Principle, 139–40
Surprise Principle, 144
temptation, 245
theoretical rationality, 3, 17–18, 345. See also coherence; incoherence
basic sources (grounds) of, 18–31
and belief, 18
beliefs vs. dispositions to believe, 35–36
closure principles for, 37
and cognitive integration, 40
and consciousness, 23
and consistency, 259–60
degrees of, 39–40
and fallibilism, 25–26
global, 41
and inferential grounds, 31
limitations on, 36–37
and memory, 21–22, 42n9, 42n10, 42n16
and perception, 19–21
of persons, 39–41
practical authority of, 38–39
and reason, 23–24
and reasonableness, 40
and reasoning (inference), 24–25
the scope of, 35–39
and testimony, 27
theoretical reasoning, 45–46. See also wishful thinking
and logic, 46–48
relevance of practical considerations to, 49–50
theory evaluation, 366–67
TIT-FOR-TAT, 431–32
Tooby, John, and L. Cosmides, 288–89, 291–92, 295
(p. 477) tragedy of the commons, 420
truth, as a goal of science, 364
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, 280–82, 284, 286–87, 289, 299n3, 299n4
ultimatum game, 428–30
utilitarianism, 415
act-, 399–401
utility, 157–58, 382
comprehensive, 393–95
generalization of, 396–97
maximization, 393–97, 404–11, 413–14
as representing preference, 383–85
utility agent, 370–71
utility function, 183–85
valence, 371, 375–77
value, finite vs. infinite, 261
vividness, 251–52
“washing out” theorems, 149–51
weakness of will, 240, 256n12, 271–72, 346. See also akrasia; akratic action; self-control
William Newcomb's problem, 263–64
Williams, Bernard, 63–67
on external reasons, 64
and internalism, 111–12
on internal reasons, 64
and moral relativism, 120–24
and proceduralism, 63–67
wishful thinking, 48–49
and its relevance to practical and theoretical reasoning, 48–49, 55