Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 29 June 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This article explores eight related claims: persons are not merely rational, but possess full reflective rationality; the single overarching normative requirement that rationality places on persons is to achieve overall rational unity within themselves; beings who possess full reflective rationality can enter into distinctively interpersonal relations, which involve efforts at rational influence from within the space of reasons; a significant number of moral considerations speak in favor of defining the person as a reflective rational agent; this definition of the person has helped to distinguish personal identity from animal identity; although it is a platitude that a person has special reason to be concerned for its own well-being, it is not obvious how best to account for that platitude; groups of human beings and parts of human beings might qualify as individual persons in their own right; there is a sense in which the normative requirements of rationality are hypothetical.

Keywords: reflective rationality, rational unity, interpersonal relations, personal identity, animal identity, normative requirements

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.