is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University and a member of the Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science. His primary research interests are in moral philosophy and moral psychology, particularly supererogation, the nature and ethics of admiration, and the ethics of fame. He also has research interests in applied ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of sport. He is currently working on a project investigating the nature, ethics, and value of admiration, funded by an NWO Veni grant. For up-to-date information about his research, visit http://alfredarcher.weebly.com/.
Calvin C. Baker
is a PhD student in philosophy at Princeton University. His work focuses on ethics, Buddhist philosophy, and global priorities research.
is Dean of the College of Arts and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph. Her research focuses on contemporary normative ethics, including feminist ethics. A recent area of focus for her work is children’s rights, parents’ rights, and issues of family justice. She’s also written and published about micro-inequities, the climate issue in philosophy departments, the moral significance of fashion, and the badness of death.
David O. Brink
is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. His research interests are in ethical theory, history of ethics, moral psychology, and jurisprudence. He is the author of Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T.H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), and Fair Opportunity and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2021).
is Assistant Professor in Population-Level Bioethics, Philosophy, and Environmental Health Sciences at Rutgers University. He works on issues in philosophy, politics, and economics. Current research includes global ethics and international institutions, population-level bioethics, sustainable development and climate change economics, and reasons for action in collective action situations.
is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, and Research Fellow at the Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm. His primary interests are in moral philosophy broadly conceived. Most of his research is on topics in normative ethics, including consequentialism, utilitarianism, population ethics, climate ethics, prudence, and well-being. In metaethics, he has done work on noncognitivism, the (p. x) nature of intrinsic goodness, and the normativity of mental states. More recently, he has done work on moral uncertainty. He has coauthored a book on this topic entitled Moral Uncertainty, to be published by Oxford University Press (release date February 2020). He has also written a book on utilitarianism, entitled Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum, 2010).
Richard Yetter Chappell
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. His primary research interests concern the defense and development of consequentialism, effective altruism, and robust normative realism. Chappell blogs at www.philosophyetc.net about these and other philosophical topics. He has published widely in journals, including Noûs, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophical Quarterly, and was coawarded the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress 2013 Young Ethicist Prize.
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He has published widely in ethical theory, practical ethics, and the philosophy of death and dying. His books include Suicide: The Philosophical Dimensions (Broadview, 2011), Understanding Kant’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2016), and Grief: A Philosophical Guide (Princeton University Press, expected 2021). He is the editor of several scholarly collections, including Immortality and the Philosophy of Death (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights (Routledge, 2017), The Future of Work, Technology, and Basic Income (Routledge, 2019), and The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2020). He is the founder of the International Association for the Philosophy of Death and Dying and the coeditor of the textbook Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge, 2020). His current research addresses paternalism, assisted dying, and topics related to work and labor.
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. His research focuses on agency, ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. He is particularly interested in the relationship between libertarian free will and a variety of issues in ethics, including ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and the actualism/possibilism debate.
is Dean’s Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. He generally works in normative ethics, at the intersection of the personal good, morality, and practical rationality. He has also worked on metaethics and has written essays on the moral philosophy of David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and John Stuart Mill.
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and Professorial Fellow at the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at St. Andrews. Her research is primarily focused on normative ethics, metaethics, and moral psychology. She is the author of several books, the most recent being Consequentialism (Routledge, 2012).
(p. xi) Hilary Greaves
is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Global Priorities Institute at the University of Oxford. Her main research interests concern issues in moral philosophy, decision theory, and economics, with a special focus on issues that arise in the course of considering how an altruistic actor might most cost-effectively do good. Her published work includes articles on moral uncertainty, population ethics, discounting, and theories of well-being and of interpersonal aggregation.
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Singapore Management University. He has published several articles on the structure of moral theories such as consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He writes about ethics, practical rationality, metaphysics, and about the connections between them. He is the author of two books: On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects (Princeton University Press, 2009) and The Limits of Kindness (Oxford University Press, 2013).
is Emeritus Professor at University of Reading and a Senior Research Fellow at Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at University of Oxford. He has published on a wide array of topics in ethics but is best known as the author of Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality.
is the Sexton Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, The Claremont Colleges. His research focuses primarily upon ethics, particularly the debate between consequentialists and their critics, but he has also published in metaethics, action theory, and the history of ethics. He is the author of Beyond Consequentalism (Oxford University Press, 2009) and of over two dozen articles. His current project is to demonstrate that the central arguments for consequentialism are grounded below ethics, in outcome-centered theories of actions and attitudes, and to challenge the case for consequentialism at this deeper level.
is Emeritus Professor at The Australian National University. He works in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and the philosophy of language. His books include Conditionals (Blackwell, 1987), From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford, 1998), and Language, Names, and Information (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, where she has taught since 1992. Her work has focused on the nature and significance of intimate relationships and how that significance ought to be reflected in moral theory. She is the author of Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons (Routledge, 2008), The Evil Within: Why We Need Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2018), and Friendship and Social Media: A Philosophical Exploration (Routledge, 2019).
Tyler M. John
is a PhD student in philosophy at Rutgers University–New Brunswick. His main areas of research are distributive ethics, political philosophy of the long-term future, and animal moral, legal, and political philosophy. He is a coauthor of Chimpanzee (p. xii) Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief (2018) and of articles appearing in Ethics and Economics and Philosophy.
is Assistant Professor at Boston University. He works mainly at the intersection of ethics and cognitive science. His published work can be found in Ethics, Noûs, and Philosophers’ Imprint. In recent years he has written about moral learning, moral luck, and moral disgust. He is currently writing a book with Richmond Campbell about moral evolution and moral progress.
is a Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. She works on topics across moral and political philosophy, applied ethics, and social ontology, including climate ethics, corporate responsibility, collective agency, and radical feminism. Her first book Not in Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable for Their States’ Actions? came out with Oxford University Press in 2019.
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek
is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Łódz, Poland. She is a hedonistic utilitarian. Her main research interest focuses on the philosophy of Henry Sidgwick and Derek Parfit, as well as the concept of well-being and pleasure. Together with Peter Singer she wrote two books: The Point of View of the Universe (Oxford University Press, 2014) and Utilitarianism—A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017). Apart from academic work, she is keen to convey philosophical ideas to a wider audience, giving lectures and writing for popular magazines on how to live a good life.
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Southern Methodist University. Her main research interests are in theoretical and applied ethics, and she is particularly interested in how our attitudes and commitments affect what it makes sense for us to do. She has published papers about promises, vows, endorsements, and resolutions, as well as about a variety of topics in bioethics, and is currently working on a project about the ways in which it is wrong to make it harder for others to fulfill their obligations.
is Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Georgetown University. Her primary fields of interest are international and domestic justice, moral psychology, nationalism, war, and higher education. Her book Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty was published by Cambridge University Press in 2014. With Robert Fullinwider, she coauthored Leveling the Playing Field: Justice, Politics, and College Admissions (2004); she is the editor of Democracy and the Mass Media (1990). For the last several years she has been teaching philosophy at Jessup Correctional Institution in Maryland and at the D.C. Jail in Washington.
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. Previously, he taught Politics, Philosophy, and Economics at UNC Chapel Hill, and held a Bersoff Fellowship at NYU. He works on issues at the intersection of normative theory, normative ethics, political ethics, and the ethics of economics.
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She works on ethics, moral responsibility, and feminist philosophy. She is the author of Ways To Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2019).
(p. xiii) Joseph Mendola
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska—Lincoln. His research interests include ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of four books: Human Thought (Kluwer, 1997), Goodness and Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Anti-Externalism (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Human Interests (Oxford University Press, 2014).
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. He is primarily interested in issues in ethics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. His research focuses on formal and philosophical questions at the intersection of these fields concerning how best to model what we ought to do, what we ought to believe, and how we ought to reason.
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder, where he has taught since 2007. Prior to that, he taught at Southern Methodist University and Rice University (before being allowed out of Texas for good behavior). He works both on ethical theory and on issues in applied ethics. In ethical theory he has published extensively on consequentialism, in particular defending a scalar version of the theory. His book Morality by Degrees: Reasons without Demands (Oxford University Press, 2020) articulates and defends the scalar approach. In applied ethics he has published many articles criticizing the common practices of raising animals for food and using them in experimentation, including the widely reprinted “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” (Philosophical Perspectives, 2004). He also runs marathons, with somewhat less success than Eliud Kipchoge, and writes, directs, and acts in the theater, with somewhat less success than Kenneth Branagh.
Douglas W. Portmore
is Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he has also written on blame, well-being, moral worth, posthumous harm, moral responsibility, and the nonidentity problem. He is the author of two books: Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2011) and Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford University Press, 2019).
Melinda A. Roberts
is Professor of Philosophy at the College of New Jersey and recently completed a Laurance S. Rockefeller faculty fellowship at the Princeton University Center for Human Values. Both a philosopher and a lawyer, she is the author of Child Versus Childmaker, Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons and a number of articles in the areas of population ethics (including the repugnant conclusion and the nonidentity problem), procreative ethics (including wrongful life and reproductive technologies), and climate ethics. She continues to have an interest in developing a person-based form of consequentialism that functions well for both the evaluation of choices and of outcomes.
is Clinical Associate Professor of Environmental Studies, Affiliated Professor of Bioethics, Medical Ethics, and Philosophy, and Director of the Animal Studies M.A. Program at New York University. He works primarily on bioethics, animal ethics, and environmental ethics. His coauthored books Chimpanzee Rights and Food, Animals, (p. xiv) and the Environment are currently available from Routledge, and his book Why Animals Matter for Climate Change is currently in contract with Oxford University Press. Jeff is also on the Board of Directors at Animal Charity Evaluators, the Board of Directors at Minding Animals International, and the Executive Committee at the Animals & Society Institute.
Holly M. Smith
is Distinguished Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Rutgers University and Distinguished Research Associate at The University of California, Berkeley. She has also held appointments at Tufts University, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Michigan, the University of Illinois-Chicago, and the University of Arizona. Her publications principally focus on topics in normative ethics, moral decision making, the theory of moral responsibility, and biomedical ethics. In Making Morality Work (Oxford University Press, 2018), she explores how moral theories should accommodate the errors, ignorance, and misunderstandings that impede us as moral decision makers. Her current projects propose new strategies for weighing the stringency of deontological duties, and for identifying and evaluating an agent’s alternatives in the context of normative theories.
is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. He is the author of From Valuing to Value (Oxford University Press, 2017), founding coeditor of the Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy series, and coeditor of the blog PEA Soup. His primary research project focuses on the question of what makes things valuable. He is especially interested in whether, and to what extent, it is our attitudes toward things that make them valuable for us.
is an economic demographer and development economist. His research areas include the health, growth, and survival of children in developing countries and population dimensions of social well-being. Dean is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin, is a visiting economist at the Economics and Planning Unit of the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi, is a founding Executive Director of r.i.c.e. (a nonprofit that works for children’s health in India), and is an affiliate of IZA, of the Institute for Futures Studies, and of the Climate Futures Initiative at Princeton University. With Diane Coffey, he is a coauthor of the book Where India Goes: Abandoned Toilets, Stunted Development, and the Costs of Caste (2017); he is the author of Air: Pollution, Climate Change, and India’s Choice between Policy and Pretence (2019). His research is supported by an NIH Population Scientist career grant.
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Seton Hall University. He specializes in normative ethics, applied ethics, and the philosophy of death. In normative ethics, he primarily works on the actualism/possibilism debate, having recently coauthored the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019) entry on the topic as well as “How To Be an Actualist and Blame People” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (2019). In the death literature, he focuses on axiological questions about death’s badness. Recent publications include “A Dilemma for Epicureanism” in Philosophical Studies (2019) and “Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem” in Ratio (2018). In applied ethics, he works on issues related to global poverty and questions about (p. xv) the ethics of historical monuments. Publications in applied ethics include “Sometimes There Is Nothing Wrong with Letting a Child Drown” in Analysis (2015) and “A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments” in Oxford University Press’s Ethics Left and Right (2020).
is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at The University of Melbourne. His research focuses mainly on social and political philosophy, epistemology, and the interconnections between the two.
is Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, and President of the British Society for Ethical Theory. His research focuses on consequentialism (especially collective forms of consequentialism), well-being, and normative reasons for action. He has also written on other topics in moral and political philosophy, including egalitarianism, meaning in life, and the actualism-possibilism debate. He is the author of two books: Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation (Routledge, 2008) and Taking Utilitarianism Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2019). (p. xvi)