Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 04 July 2022

(p. iv) Copyright Page

(p. iv) Copyright Page

Copyright Page

  • Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
  • It furthersthe University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
  • and educationby publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
  • Oxford UniversityPress in the UK and certain other countries.
  • Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
  • 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
  • © Oxford University Press 2020
  • All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
  • stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
  • without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
  • or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with
  • the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning
  • reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the
  • Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.
  • You must not circulate this work in any other form
  • and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
  • Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Portmore, Douglas W., editor. Title: The Oxford handbook of consequentialism / Douglas W. Portmore. Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2020. | Summary: “This
  • handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to
  • consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what’s happening
  • in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future
  • research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as
  • deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it’s more than just
  • one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that
  • the goodness of an act’s consequences is something that matters even if
  • it’s not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories
  • will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good
  • consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the
  • better that act’s consequences the moral reason there is to perform it.
  • Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning
  • consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For
  • instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated
  • is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act
  • would have or the consequences that it could have-if, say, the agent
  • were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it’s reasonable
  • to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for
  • normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is
  • the only thing matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of
  • many things that matter (as non-consequentialists presume)”—Provided
  • by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020018288 (print) | LCCN 2020018289 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190905323 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190905347 (epub) | ISBN 9780190905354 Subjects: LCSH: Consequentialism (Ethics) Classification: LCC BJ1500.C63 O94 2020 (print) | LCC BJ1500.C63 (ebook)
  • | DDC 171/.5—dc23 LC record available at ebook record available at
  • 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
  • Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America