Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 18 May 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter revisits the role of legal enforcement in sovereign debt markets. The conventional view is that the law of sovereign immunity denies creditors effective legal remedies. To many observers, weak legal enforcement is problematic, for effective legal remedies would facilitate credible repayment commitments. Though substantially correct, this perspective is also flawed. The assumption that creditors lack effective remedies implicitly treats sovereign immunity as a set of mandatory rules. In fact, sovereign lenders can and do bargain for greater enforcement rights. When courts enforce these bargains, legal remedies gain potency. Yet potent remedies need not improve the functioning of debt markets. Courts can create effective remedies against sovereign debtors only by imposing significant costs on third parties. Many loan debt contracts are drafted so as to maximize these externalities. The important question—given short shrift thus far—is whether the credibility-enhancing virtues of legal enforcement justify the costs.

Keywords: sovereign debt, sovereign immunity, reputation, legal enforcement, pari passu

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.