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date: 17 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

There has been a marked resurgence of interest in the study of time and temporality in the political science discipline. Scholars working within the tradition of comparative historical analysis have explored what might be termed “objective” temporal processes, tracing causal relationships that unfold slowly through long periods of time and analyzing “critical historical junctures” with enduring social effects. Meanwhile, scholars influenced by developments in behavioral economics and social psychology have devoted increasing attention to the problem of “subjective” time: how time is perceived differently by actors with varying psychological profiles and risk appetites. To date, these two literatures have developed largely in isolation from one another. Thus there has been comparatively little attention paid to the problem of explaining the origin and persistence of collective interpretations of political time. In this context, returning to the study of political ideology can help link the objective and subjective approaches to political temporality.

Keywords: ideology, temporality, psychology, institutionalism, Max Weber

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