- The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security
- About the Editors
- Foreword: U.S. National Security for the Twenty-First Century
- Introduction: Shape and Scope of U.S. National Security
- America’s Foreign Policy Traditions
- National Interests and Grand Strategy
- U.S. Foreign Policymaking and National Security
- Civil-Military Relations
- The Presidency and Decision Making
- The National Security Council: Is It Effective, or Is It Broken?
- The National Security Process
- Intelligence and National Security Decision Making
- Congress and National Security
- Diplomacy, the State Department, and National Security
- Development Assistance: Rationale and Applications
- Understanding and Improving U.S. Financial Sanctions
- The Political Economy of Security
- Budgeting for National Security
- Military Force Planning and National Security
- Military Operations and the Defense Department
- Alliances, Military Basing, and Logistics
- Homeland Security
- The United States and Iran: Challenges of Deterrence and Compellence
- U.S. Nuclear Strategy: The Search for Meaning
- International Cyber Conflict and National Security
- Encryption Wars: Who Should Yield?
- Space and National Security
- Human (In)Security
- Climate Change and Environmental Security
- Political Violence
- Women’s Participation in Political Violence
- International Terrorism
- Threats and Dangers in the Twenty-First Century
- International Rivalry and National Security
- Interstate Rivalry in East Asia
- The Transatlantic Security Landscape in Europe
- U.S. National Security in the Western Hemisphere
- Epilogue: Five Lessons for National Security Policymakers
Abstract and Keywords
Security is relative. No state is ever fully safe, just as no individual is ever completely free from danger. However, when U.S. security is considered next to that of any other state, it is hard to reach the conclusion that Washington faces much serious danger. The United States is simultaneously the safest and most fearful of all the great powers of the twenty-first century. This chapter discusses some of the structural and psychological factors that led to the overestimation of danger so common among U.S. analysts and policymakers. Why is it that many serious observers continue to believe that the current era is so dangerous, and even look to the past with a sense of nostalgia? Why do we fear so much?
Christopher J. Fettweis is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, international relations, and national security. His most recent books are Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in US Foreign Policy and Making Foreign Policy Decisions. He received his PhD from the University of Maryland.
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