- The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security
- About the Editors
- Foreword: U.S. National Security for the Twenty-First Century
- Introduction: Shape and Scope of U.S. National Security
- America’s Foreign Policy Traditions
- National Interests and Grand Strategy
- U.S. Foreign Policymaking and National Security
- Civil-Military Relations
- The Presidency and Decision Making
- The National Security Council: Is It Effective, or Is It Broken?
- The National Security Process
- Intelligence and National Security Decision Making
- Congress and National Security
- Diplomacy, the State Department, and National Security
- Development Assistance: Rationale and Applications
- Understanding and Improving U.S. Financial Sanctions
- The Political Economy of Security
- Budgeting for National Security
- Military Force Planning and National Security
- Military Operations and the Defense Department
- Alliances, Military Basing, and Logistics
- Homeland Security
- The United States and Iran: Challenges of Deterrence and Compellence
- U.S. Nuclear Strategy: The Search for Meaning
- International Cyber Conflict and National Security
- Encryption Wars: Who Should Yield?
- Space and National Security
- Human (In)Security
- Climate Change and Environmental Security
- Political Violence
- Women’s Participation in Political Violence
- International Terrorism
- Threats and Dangers in the Twenty-First Century
- International Rivalry and National Security
- Interstate Rivalry in East Asia
- The Transatlantic Security Landscape in Europe
- U.S. National Security in the Western Hemisphere
- Epilogue: Five Lessons for National Security Policymakers
Abstract and Keywords
One component of military policy in particular lies at the very crossroads of strategic planning and structural arenas of policy. This is force planning, the interactive, intertemporal art intended to ensure that deficiencies in today’s force structure are being corrected while preparing for a future that may resemble the present or differ from it in unexpected ways. While force planners must think about what the future security environment might look like, what technologies might be available, and how future forces might leverage these emerging technologies to meet the challenges of a future security environment, they must always be cognizant of domestic structural factors. This chapter argues that a force planner must always be guided by a coherent strategic logic. Structural factors can never be eliminated, but a strong strategic rationale can minimize them.
Mackubin T. Owens is the Dean of Academics and Professor at the Institute of World Politics and Editor of Orbis. He is the author of Abraham Lincoln: Leadership and Democratic Statesmanship in Wartime (2009) and US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (Continuum Press, 2011) and coauthor of US Foreign and Defense Policy: The Rise of an Incidental Superpower (Georgetown pg xviiiUniversity Press, 2015). From 1987 to 2014, he was a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. Previous to that, he served as National Security Advisor to Senator Bob Kasten, Republican of Wisconsin, and Director of Legislative Affairs for the Nuclear Weapons Programs of the Department of Energy during the Reagan administration. He is also a Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, where as an infantry platoon and company commander in 1968–1969, he was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star medal. He earned his PhD in Politics from the University of Dallas, an MA in Economics from Oklahoma University, and a BA from the University of California at Santa Barbara.
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