- Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion
- Assertion and the Declarative Mood
- Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion
- The Belief View of Assertion
- The Indicativity View
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category
- Assertion among the Speech Acts
- Promising and Assertion
- Threats, Warnings, and Assertions
- Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions
- Hedged Assertion
- Bullshit Assertion
- Slurs, Assertion, and Predication
- Proxy Assertion
- Can Groups Assert That P?
- Assertion and Convention
- Testing for Assertion
- Assertion and Mindreading
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?
- Assertion and Fiction
- <i>De Se</i> Assertion
- Assertion and the Future
- Assertion and Modality
- Assertibility and Paradox
- Assertion and Testimony
- Assertion of Knowledge
- Asserting Ignorance
- Assertoric Quality
- Austin on Asserting and Knowing
- Formal Models of Assertion
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action
- Moore’s Paradox and Assertion
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms
- Silencing and Assertion
- Social Identity and Assertion
- Ethical Dimensions of Assertion
- The Norm of Assertion and Blame
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Abstract and Keywords
This article details three threads of philosophical work that focus on and illuminate the differences that social identity makes to an agent’s ability to use assertion. These threads include the literature on testimonial injustice, the literature on illocutionary silencing, and the literature on extracted speech and epistemic exploitation. Testimonial injustice occurs when an agent is unfairly restricted in her ability to transmit knowledge by testifying (typically by using an assertion). Illocutionary silencing occurs when an agent is kept from successfully making a speech act like an assertion at all. Speech is extracted when a speaker’s speech is unjustly elicited or when her speech is used to perpetuate injustice against her. This can also constitute epistemic exploitation, which occurs when a marginalized speaker is compelled, through social manipulation, to provide a privileged person with knowledge. Epistemic exploitation often occurs through compelled assertion. In each of these cases, social identity makes a difference to a speaker’s ability to use assertion to her own ends.
Casey Johnson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Idaho.
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