- Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion
- Assertion and the Declarative Mood
- Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion
- The Belief View of Assertion
- The Indicativity View
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category
- Assertion among the Speech Acts
- Promising and Assertion
- Threats, Warnings, and Assertions
- Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions
- Hedged Assertion
- Bullshit Assertion
- Slurs, Assertion, and Predication
- Proxy Assertion
- Can Groups Assert That P?
- Assertion and Convention
- Testing for Assertion
- Assertion and Mindreading
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?
- Assertion and Fiction
- <i>De Se</i> Assertion
- Assertion and the Future
- Assertion and Modality
- Assertibility and Paradox
- Assertion and Testimony
- Assertion of Knowledge
- Asserting Ignorance
- Assertoric Quality
- Austin on Asserting and Knowing
- Formal Models of Assertion
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action
- Moore’s Paradox and Assertion
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms
- Silencing and Assertion
- Social Identity and Assertion
- Ethical Dimensions of Assertion
- The Norm of Assertion and Blame
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. The author calls this the “Difference Intuition.” The author defines lying in terms of asserting but remains open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. The author defines implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. The author narrows down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether there is a moral difference between them. Just as lying requires a robust form of assertion, so the kind of untruthful implicating to be compared with lying requires a robust form of implicating. Next, the author sets out various ways of sharpening the Difference Intuition and surveys a range of approaches to justifying one class of sharpenings. The author finishes by sketching an approach to justifying an alternative sharpening of the Difference Intuition, which is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s discussion of lying.
Jessica Pepp, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
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