- Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion
- Assertion and the Declarative Mood
- Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion
- The Belief View of Assertion
- The Indicativity View
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category
- Assertion among the Speech Acts
- Promising and Assertion
- Threats, Warnings, and Assertions
- Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions
- Hedged Assertion
- Bullshit Assertion
- Slurs, Assertion, and Predication
- Proxy Assertion
- Can Groups Assert That P?
- Assertion and Convention
- Testing for Assertion
- Assertion and Mindreading
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?
- Assertion and Fiction
- <i>De Se</i> Assertion
- Assertion and the Future
- Assertion and Modality
- Assertibility and Paradox
- Assertion and Testimony
- Assertion of Knowledge
- Asserting Ignorance
- Assertoric Quality
- Austin on Asserting and Knowing
- Formal Models of Assertion
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action
- Moore’s Paradox and Assertion
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms
- Silencing and Assertion
- Social Identity and Assertion
- Ethical Dimensions of Assertion
- The Norm of Assertion and Blame
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Abstract and Keywords
Assertions of knowledge—that is, assertions which constitute ascriptions of knowledge—have served both as a central source of data in the epistemological theorizing and as an important target of such theorizing themselves. This chapter considers three issues concerning knowledge ascriptions that have figured prominently in recent discussion: their use as evidence for specific epistemological claims and theories, the pragmatics and psychology of knowledge ascriptions, and the social role(s) that the relevant assertions might play. There are important interactions among these topics; and they, and positions taken in response to them, interact as well with central questions about both assertion and linguistic communication generally. One central point on which epistemologists divide, however, is over how closely tied various features of our knowledge-attributing behavior are to semantics, or to (presumed) facts about assertion per se.
Patrick Rysiew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria.
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