- Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion
- Assertion and the Declarative Mood
- Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion
- The Belief View of Assertion
- The Indicativity View
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category
- Assertion among the Speech Acts
- Promising and Assertion
- Threats, Warnings, and Assertions
- Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions
- Hedged Assertion
- Bullshit Assertion
- Slurs, Assertion, and Predication
- Proxy Assertion
- Can Groups Assert That P?
- Assertion and Convention
- Testing for Assertion
- Assertion and Mindreading
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?
- Assertion and Fiction
- <i>De Se</i> Assertion
- Assertion and the Future
- Assertion and Modality
- Assertibility and Paradox
- Assertion and Testimony
- Assertion of Knowledge
- Asserting Ignorance
- Assertoric Quality
- Austin on Asserting and Knowing
- Formal Models of Assertion
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action
- Moore’s Paradox and Assertion
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms
- Silencing and Assertion
- Social Identity and Assertion
- Ethical Dimensions of Assertion
- The Norm of Assertion and Blame
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter is concerned with answering this question: What is Stalnaker’s Grice-inspired model of communication, and how does this general model guide and constrain an account of the speech act of assertion? In Section 1, the author explains and motivates Stalnaker’s general Grice-inspired model of communication, and then in Section 2 examines how this model guides and constrains an account of the speech act of assertion and thereby leads to Stalnaker’s claim concerning the “essential effect” of assertion. In Section 3, the author considers two challenges for Stalnaker’s claim: the first challenge concerns assertions of necessary truths, and the second concerns assertions of propositions that are (already) commonly believed. Finally, in Section 4, the author briefly considers a more fundamental challenge for the general Grice-inspired model of communication within which Stalnaker’s claim is formulated.
Leonard Jay Clapp is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University.
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