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date: 20 August 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter describes and analyzes the law governing U.S. practice with respect to joining and working in international institutions. It explores the domestic and international politics that shape these actions through the framework of a two-level game. The chapter applies this framework to multilateral military operations, international regulatory cooperation, trade and investment, and international dispute resolution. U.S. foreign relations law allows the executive branch considerable flexibility as to joining an international cooperation project, but also imposes barriers to the implementation of decisions of international institutions within domestic law. Litigants who seek to invoke the actions of international institutions as the basis for governing law in domestic lawsuits typically must link those actions to a domestic enactment, certain narrow exceptions aside.

Keywords: United States, rational-choice international relations theory, multilateral military operations, regulatory cooperation, trade

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