- In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited
- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- Disability Liberation Theology
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What’s the Moral Difference?
- Why Inflicting Disability is Wrong: The Mere-Difference View and the Causation-Based Objection
- Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach
- Disability and Partial Compliance Theory
- Fair Difference of Opportunity
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- Care and Disability: Friends or Foes
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction Perspective
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Beyond Instrumental Value: Respecting The Will of Others and Deciding On Their Behalf
Abstract and Keywords
Neurotechnologies under development are often explicitly justified in terms of the advantages they will provide to disabled people. Thus, it would seem important to know what disabled people want from current and future iterations of these technologies and how they experience the functional barriers the technologies are meant to address. Ensuring that disabled people want what is designed requires attention to “end user” needs and values. The paradigmatic form of end user input in device design focuses on device acceptability, usually happens late in the development process, and is oriented to economic viability. But seeking out and taking seriously the perspectives of disabled people (potential end users) should be grounded at least in part by considerations of justice, including both distribution and recognition.
Sara Goering is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, core faculty for the Program on Ethics, affiliate of the Disability Studies Program, and ethics thrust co-leader at the UW Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering. She works on disability issues in medical ethics and neuroethics.
Eran Klein is a neurologist at the Portland Veterans Administration Health Care System in Portland, Oregon, and holds appointments in the Department of Neurology at the Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington. He co-leads the ethics thrust at the UW Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering. His current areas of interest in ethics include brain-computer interface technology and deep brain stimulation for neurologic and psychiatric illness.
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