- In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited
- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- Disability Liberation Theology
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What’s the Moral Difference?
- Why Inflicting Disability is Wrong: The Mere-Difference View and the Causation-Based Objection
- Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach
- Disability and Partial Compliance Theory
- Fair Difference of Opportunity
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- Care and Disability: Friends or Foes
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction Perspective
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Beyond Instrumental Value: Respecting The Will of Others and Deciding On Their Behalf
Abstract and Keywords
Neurodiversity advocates apply the same kind of critiques to psychiatric conditions such as autism that disability theory has long applied to somatic conditions. Yet these critiques have received little attention from philosophy of psychiatry. Although the arguments of neurodiversity advocates often are undeveloped, they raise critical issues about psychiatric diagnosis and classification. This chapter uses Jerome Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction analysis” of the concept of mental disorder to reconstruct and evaluate neurodiversity arguments that autism is a normal variation, not a mental disorder. We argue that because of the heterogeneity of “autism,” these arguments are more plausible for some subgroups than others. We find support for a moderate neurodiversity position that objects to psychiatric overreach without denying the reality of some forms of autistic disorder.
Jerome Wakefield, Ph.D., D.S.W., is University Professor, Professor of Social Work, Professor of Psychiatry, and Associate Faculty in the Center for Bioethics at NYU. He writes on philosophy of psychiatry. His coauthored book, “The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder” (Oxford 2007), was named best psychology book of 2007 by the Association of Professional and Scholarly Publishers. His most recent book is “Freud and Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1: Reconstructing the Argument for Unconscious Mental States” (Palgrave-Macmillan 2018).
David Wasserman is on the faculty of the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. He works primarily on ethical and policy issues in disability, genetics, reproduction, and neuroscience. He is co-author of Debating Procreation (with David Benatar, 2015) and co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability (with Adam Cureton, forthcoming).
Jordan Conrad, M.Phil., M.S.W., is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Philosophy at KU Leuven, Visiting Scholar at the Center for Bioethics, NYU, and Academic Associate at the Baltimore Washington Center for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. He has written on issues related to disability, substance use, and the concept of disorder, and is currently writing on Nietzsche, Freud, and the conceptual foundations of psychiatry.
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