- In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited
- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- Disability Liberation Theology
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What’s the Moral Difference?
- Why Inflicting Disability is Wrong: The Mere-Difference View and the Causation-Based Objection
- Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach
- Disability and Partial Compliance Theory
- Fair Difference of Opportunity
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- Care and Disability: Friends or Foes
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Neurodiversity, Autism, and Psychiatric Disability: The Harmful Dysfunction Perspective
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Beyond Instrumental Value: Respecting The Will of Others and Deciding On Their Behalf
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter on prenatal diagnosis explores the obligations on prospective parents to act morally. Specifically, the chapter explores the highly contextual and variable nature of reproductive decision making when looking at (and criticizing) parental choice with respect to prenatal testing and selective termination. The chapter engages both with those critics who argue that disability should not be grounds for selective termination of pregnancy, and those critics who argue that not only testing for significant medical conditions but also wider testing for non-medical traits might be permissible or useful. It is argued that decisions around prenatal diagnosis are private, difficult, and entail the balancing of different concerns around abortion, disability, and the good life. The chapter then explores the usefulness of the Aristotelian concepts of excess and deficiency, as a guide to navigating our way through these difficult decisions. The idea is considered that too much selection and too little selection might both potentially represent a failure to act as a virtuous prospective parent. The chapter concludes by exploring the value of seeking the Aristotelian “mean” between those concerns.
Richard Hull is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the National University of Ireland, Galway. He is the author of Deprivation and Freedom (2007) and has published on a number of topics including disability, genetic technologies, parental responsibility and agent intention. He served two terms on the Irish Council for Bioethics and is a member of the Irish Government’s National Advisory Committee on Bioethics. He teaches in the areas of ethics, political theory and applied philosophy.
Tom Shakespeare is Professor of Disability Research at London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and was formerly with the World Health Organization. He is the author of Disability Rights and Wrongs (2006), and Genetic Politics: From Eugenics to Genome (2002), inter alia, and has published on various aspects of disability and bioethics. He was formerly a member of the (UK) Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and chair of the working group on Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing.
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