- In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited
- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- Disability Liberation Theology
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach
- Disability and Partial Compliance Theory
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter argues that within the realm of justice, not all goods or opportunities are the same—a failure to secure some goods results in mere disadvantage, while a failure to secure other goods results in corrosive disadvantage. If a disadvantage adversely impacts one’s ability to secure other goods or opportunities, we should regard it as being corrosive in nature and thus give it higher priority within a theory of distributive justice. This chapter suggests that with respect to the capabilities approach, an understanding of disadvantage that recognizes the often-corrosive nature of the experience of disability would require us to prioritize some capabilities over others. More pointedly, a capability theorist’s refusal to acknowledge the need to prioritize some capabilities over others is a failing of basic justice and would result in the compounding of injustice against people with disabilities.
Christopher A. Riddle, PhD, is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Utica College, where he also directs the Applied Ethics Institute. His work has been published in journals such as The Journal of Social Philosophy, Bioethics, The American Journal of Bioethics, Essays in Philosophy, Medicine, Healthcare, & Philosophy, and Topoi. He is the author of “Disability & Justice” (2014), “Human Rights, Disability, and Capabilities” (2016), and the editor of “From Disability Theory to Practice” (2018).
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