- In Pursuit of Justice for Disability: Model Neutrality Revisited
- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- Disability Liberation Theology
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Disability and Disadvantage in the Capabilities Approach
- Disability and Partial Compliance Theory
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter is based on a concern that recent philosophical discussions about disability—more and more focused on the relevance of disability to individual well-being—risk losing sight of the original, political concerns motivating the disability rights movements and its academic interpreters. I develop this by explicating some reasons why pro-disability philosophers can and should reject welfarist arguments across a wide range of cases. Taking debates around causing disability in procreative ethics as an illustrative example, I argue that the best versions of pro-disability arguments in this area powerfully buttress long-standing liberal objections to utilitarianism and welfarism more generally—particularly concerns that policies should not be publicly justified in terms of reasonably controversial conceptions of the good life. Public reason precludes these sorts of judgments regarding well-being, I argue, whether they are positive or negative about the welfare value of disability.
Sean Aas is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar at the Kennedy Institute of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He works primarily in political philosophy, as applied to issues around embodiment, opportunity, and public reason.
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