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date: 04 June 2020

(p. 941) Index

(p. 941) Index

Tables and figures are indicated by an italic t and f, respectively, following the page number.

Aalen, Odd, 184
Abrams, Burton A., 549–550, 865
absolutism, paradox of, 297
abstention, voting
bandwagon, 918
Peru, fine for, 906
rate, 917
UN General Assembly, 844–845
voting costs vs. benefits model, 928
abstract review, 136, 137
acceptable interval, 104
accountability
bicameralism, 64, 66, 68–69
to citizens, government, 195
coalition governments, 922n12, 922n14
coups and autocrats, 328
courts, 417, 419, 420, 433n5
democratic, China, 303
direct, elections, 25
direct democratic institutions, 685
electoral, democracies, 394, 501, 630
electoral, group identity, 937, 938n12
EU, direct and indirect channels, 224
federalism, 80–81
fiscal decentralization, 685
international aid, 707
international organizations, 634, 635, 636
judicial checks, 418
legislators, 36
mixed-member and multi-tier systems, 212
monitoring (Ostrom), 565
parliament, insiders elected to, 35
parliamentary majority, 95
party government, 408–409, 412
political parties, 407
pope election, 770
representatives, direct election, 195
single-party majorities, 202
special-interest government, 408
Acemoglu, Daron
coups, 330, 336, 338, 348
democratization, 726
franchise extension, revolution risk, 53
franchise extension, ruling elite motives, 554
French Revolution and aftermath, 447, 448n4
political participation and welfare state, 545–546
redistribution, enfranchised poor, 536
redistribution, political economy, 520
revolutions, 348, 354
on RRMR model, 543
suffrage, universal, 549
threat-of-revolution hypothesis, 457
Ackerman, Bruce, 180, 581
active monetary, passive fiscal policy (AMPF), 507–508
Adams, John, 812
Adolph, C., 500–501, 511, 514n6
advisory referendum, 363
advocacy networks, transnational, 626–627
Afghanistan, Constitution, 192n2
Africa, electoral systems, 209
agency
common agency argument, 628
electoral systems, 199–207
through representation, 811–812
(p. 942) agency problem, approach to, 800
agent pool, international organizations, 621–622
Age of Federalism, 72
Age of Reform, The (Hofstadter), 413
Aggeborn, L., 553
aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE), 845, 846f, 847
aggregation, miracle of, 579–580
Agné, Hans, 634
Agranov, M., 902
Agrawal, A., 564, 565
agreement score matrix, 840
double-centered, 840–843, 842f, 843f
Ahmed, Amel, 201
aid, international
on education, 705–706
electorate theory, 322–323
on health, 704–705
on savings and investment, 704
to UN Security Council temporary members, 611
aid, international, politics, 697–719. See also specific topics
aid allocation as Stackelberg game, 698
altruistic donors, recipients on, 719n1
on conflict, 708–713
donor cooperation, 719n2
donor motives, 697–698, 699t
donor motives, vs. recipient needs, 700, 719n3
donor motives, vs. recipient practice, 719n4
forms, 697
fundamentals, 697–699, 719nn1–2
on growth, 702–706
on institutions, 706–708, 719n8
politics, flow to conflict zone, 702
politics, political support, 701–702, 719nn5–6
for public goods, 698
as redistribution, 697
research, 713–717
research, aggregate data, 719n15
research, excess heterogeneity, 717
research, primary studies needed, 718
research, publication selection bias, 714–715, 714f, 715f, 719nn10–12
research, statistical power, 715–717, 716t, 719nn13–14
aid allocation
Alesina on, 701
bandwagon, 700
as Stackelberg game, 698
Aidt, Toke, 29, 342n7, 457, 467, 490n34, 520, 536, 547–548
Aiyagari, S. R., 506
Alarie, Benjamin, 119
Albertus, M., 536
Aldenhoff, Frank-Oliver, 638n8
Aldrich, John, 405–406, 408, 409, 412, 822
Alesina, Alberto
aid allocation, 701
central bank independence, 505, 515n10
deficit financing, Barro’s tax-smoothing model, 489n26
fair acquisition, 537n12
federalism, 86
fiscal adjustments, large, on re-election, 866
midterm elections, President’s party, 860
public debt and electoral equilibrium, 465
redistribution policy, 520, 528, 531–535
algebraic thought and understanding, 800–801
Allen, Douglas, 749, 774–775
α-NOMINATE, 824, 832n2
Alt, James, 471–472
Alternative Smith rule, 13
altruism, impure, 284n19
Altunbaş, Yener, 81
Alvi, E., 706
amendment
constitutional (see constitutional amendment)
culture, 171
procedure, 109
Amend Rate, Comparative Constitutions Project, 171, 173n4
American Voter, The (Campbell), 409
Anckar, Dag, 164–165
Anderfuhren-Biget, Simon, 617, 638n13
Anderson, Thorton, 785, 786
Andreoni, James, 284n19
(p. 943) Angeletos, G., 528
Annen, K., 701
anomalously democratic democracy, Greece, 747–749, 756nn7–10
Ansell, Ben, 520
anti-Federalists, on constitutional courts, 419, 433n5
Apolte, Thomas, 342n7, 348
appointment, king-and-council template, 48–50, 57nn5–6
Approval rule, 8t, 9f, 16
Arab Spring, 300–301, 350
Arceneaux, Kevin, 371
Archibugi, Daniele, 636
Ardanaz, Martin, 471
Arendt, Hannah, 290, 305, 739n10
Origins of Totalitarianism, The, 288
Argentina
constitutional amendments vs. replacements, 179–182, 192nn4–6
constitutional review, 136
constitution life span, 185
judicial behavior, 117, 123
parliamentary structure, 62t
party discipline and alignment, 83
Aristotle
democracy, from Greek infantry, 749, 756n9
good vs. bad democracies, 307n1
good vs. bad dictatorships, 287
good vs. bad governance, 286
incentives, 756n13
sortition and juries, 801
tyrants, 746, 754
voting for public good, 751
armies, mass, and democratic revolution, 457
Arnold, Felix, 38n10
Arrow, K. J., 239
Arrow’s theorem, 802
Artés, J., 556n9
Artha, I. K. S., 511
Articles of Confederation, 781
Arzaghi, Mohammad, 75, 86–87
Asatryan, Zareh, 83, 374
asceticism, Christian Church, 772–773
Asia, electoral systems, 208
Askarov, Z., 707, 709, 713, 714
asymmetric reactions, voting and popularity, 862–863, 871n43
asymmetric society, 482
Athens, ancient, 50. See also Greece, ancient
Atkinson, A. B., 490n41
atomization, 288–289
attitudes
butterfly, Palm Beach County, Florida (2000 presidential election), 882
court, 137
redistribution policy, 528–531, 537n12
attitudinal approach, 115–116
attractiveness ratio, 30
Austen-Smith, David, 469, 822, 914
austerity policy, on voting, 866, 871n48
Australia, Western, taxation, 272
authoritarianism
competition for office, 328–342 (see also coup)
regionally decentralized, 302–303, 307
selectorate theory, 316–319
autocracies
China and Singapore, 725
politics, endogenous institutional change, 319–324, 324n2
redistribution, 520
Autocracy (Tullock), 336, 520
autocracy–democracy mixture, government, 247–252
governance, inclusivity, 247–248
majority’s optimal taxation, 249–250, 250f, 258–259nn16–17
majority’s public investment, 251–252, 259n18
welfare maximization, for majority ruling interest, 248–249, 258nn14–15
Aytaç, S. Ernem, 357
Baccini, Leonardo, 609
backswing effect, 861
Badinger, Harald, 615
Baehr, Peter, 739n9
Bagehot, W., 55
Bagwell, K., 654, 663, 665, 670, 675n24
Bailey, M. J., 244
Bakker, Ryan, 821, 830
(p. 944) Balafoutas, L., 535
balanced-budget laws, 464
balanced society, 482
Baldwin, Richard, 228
Ballingrud, Gordon, 786
ballot
concurrent, 108–109
joint, 109
Baltrunaite, Audinga, 28
Bandiera, O., 535
bandwagon
abstention, 918
aid allocations, 700
revolutions, 346, 356
tie breaking, 921n4
bandwagon voting, 916, 916t, 918, 920, 921, 921n4
duty to vote and large elections, 938n7
low-cost expressive voting, 913, 922n12
proposals, 913
rational model, 922n8
supporting winner, 909, 909t
Banks, J., 914
Barany, Zoltan, 727, 739n14
bargaining theory, 47–48, 57n3
Barkus, G. B., 854, 869n6
Barnett, Michael, 610, 616, 619–620, 622, 638n17
Baron, Jonathan, 938n11
barons, England, tenure, 314–315
Barro, Robert, 279, 284n25, 376n4, 867, 868
Bartholdi, J. III, 810
Basinger, Scott, 465
Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 88
Bassi, A., 911
Bates, Robert, 457, 486n5
Baum, Dale, 883
Baumol, William, 592, 593–594
Bawn, Kathleen, 128n1, 395
Bayesian item response theory (IRT), 824–826, 829, 832n2
Beard, Charles, 445, 789–792, 794n8
Beath, A., 446
Beatpath rule, 8t, 18–19
Beccaria, Cesare, 76
Beck, John, 763
Beck, Thorsten, 399n4
Becker, Gary, 594–596, 660
Becker, Johannes, 38n10
Bednar, Jenna, 87
Bedock, Camill, 204
Beeman, Richard, 781
behavior. See also specific types
corporate actor , internal participatory voting, 283n4
judicial, politics and, 114–127 (see also legal system, politics and)
veto power, executive, 107–108
behavior, election
candidates, 897
parties, 897
behavior, veto games, 98–99
behavior, voter, 896
ethical vs. rational, 574–575
large elections, 912
popularity on, 853, 869n1
types, 909, 909t
voting and popularity, 853, 869n1
Beissinger, Mark, 355–356
belief-profligate species, 283n13
Belke, A., 515n14
Belkin, A., 330, 333, 341n2
Bellani, L., 526–527, 533
Bénabou, R., 523, 529
benchmark model, 373, 521
benefit taxation, 488n14
benefit-tax system, Wicksell–Lindahl, 459, 487n10
benevolence, Leviathan, 244, 245f, 263
benevolent despot, 263
as anti-democratic, 270
government, 264
policymaker, public interest motivation, 264
policytaker, private interest motivation, 264
Benford’s law, 887–891, 889t
Berggren, Niclas, 284n26
Bergh, Andreas, 745–746
Bergson, A., 239
Berlemann, Michael, 859
Berman, E., 710
Berman, Harold, 597
Bermeo, Nancy, 86, 727, 739n14
Bernanke, B. S., 500, 502–503
Bernhard, W., 503–504
(p. 945) Besley, Timothy, 25, 28, 29–30, 330, 464, 487n9
Best, Heinrich, 39n14
Bhagwati, J. N., 661, 674n17
Bhansali, Rayendra, 854, 858, 869n3, 871n38
Bhattarai, S., 507
bicameralism, 61–69
accountability, 66
balance of power, 61
benefits, 64–67
Congress, 94
constitutional amendment procedures, 158–159
effectiveness, 67–69, 69n6
fundamentals, 61–63, 69nn1–2
history, 64
legislation quality, 67
open-rule vs. closed-rule, 61
parliamentary structure, by country, 61–63, 62t, 63t, 69nn1–2
proposal power, 65
representation, 64–65, 69n4
stability, 65–66, 69n5
strong, 61
structure and power, 61
variety and evolution, 63
Bickel, Alexander, 432–433n3
Least Dangerous Branch, The, 433n6
bilateral exchange, 422
Bilsky, Wolfgang, 616
binary decisions, 800–802
Birchler, K., 706
bird’s-eye standpoint, 578, 584n10
Bischoff, Ivo, 913, 932
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E., 690
Black, Duncan
Condorcet elections work, relevance, 812
Condorcet jury theorem, 807
courts, characterizing, 116
median voter theorem, 96, 128n5, 802
voting process, mathematics, 798
Blackman, Justice Harry, 119, 120f
Black rule, 8t, 9f, 16–17
black voters, on political participation, 550
Blair, Tony, 574
Blais, A., 200, 901–902, 905, 907
blame game politics, 108
Blanchard, Olivier, 82
Blanchflower, David, 866
Bland, Elizabeth, 638n10
Blinder, Alan, 464, 502, 867
Blöchliger, Hansjörg, 82, 84, 88
blocker, 112n7
block-voting, 922n9
Bloomington Workshop, 559
Blume, Lorenz, 78, 81, 82, 369, 390, 397
Bodea, C., 501, 510
Boehmelt, Y., 340
Boehmke, Frederick, 371
Bohara, Alok K., 81
Böhmelt, Tobias, 638–639n20
Boix, Carles, 200, 457
Bojar, Abel, 871n48
Bolton, Patrick, 86
Bonica, Adam, 120–121, 471
Borck, R., 467, 520, 528, 543, 545, 555, 556n3
Borda, Jean-Charles de, 14, 205, 806
Borda count, 203, 805, 808, 808t, 898
loophole, electoral rules, 205
Borda rule, 8t, 9f, 14–15, 21, 805–808, 808t, 810
boundaries, well-defined, 565
bounded rationality, 563
Bourgignon, F., 537n7
Bouton, L., 912
Bove, V., 335, 340
Bracanti, Dawn, 76
Brady, Henry, 821, 830
Braendle, Thomas, 28, 31, 35–36
Brams, Stephen, 16
Bregret, 938n4
Brender, Ali, 858–859
Brennan, Geoffrey
EU, powers to tax vs. power to regulate, 284n29
expressive voting, 929
government revenue raising, constraints, 598
internal participatory voting, on corporate actor behavior, 283n4
Leviathan approach, 263–264, 590
Power to Tax, The, 263–264, 266, 269, 272, 276, 278, 280–282
welfare cost of taxation, 595
Brennan, George, 466
Breton, Albert, 289, 456, 463, 765
(p. 946) Brexit referendum, 231, 234, 575, 938n4
Breyer, F., 524, 525
bridging methods, 828
Brigden Committee, 673n3
Briggs, R. C., 718
broad-based taxation, 489n22
broad redistribution, political participation on, 548–550
broad tax bases, 463
broad tax rates, 463
Broda, C., 670
Brollo, Fernanda, 32
Brown, Robert, 790
Brownlee, Jason, 350
Broz, J. Lawrence, 628
Brückner, M., 703
Brutus, 419
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 289
Buchanan, James
balanced budgets, 596
broad base tax, on income, 463
budget deficit, Keynesian economics in, 598
Calculus of Consent, The, 271, 421
citizen demands on government, 600
coercive redistribution, 466
constitutions, creation, 782
contractarian arguments, 597
debt financing, 465
distributional arrangements, regulations and taxes, 277
“Economic Theory of Clubs,” 40
expressive voting, 929
federalism, 78–79
fiscal structures, socially efficient and minimally coercive, 456
governance and self-serving humans, 239
government spending levels, 596
Leviathan, government as revenue-maximizing, 590
Leviathan approach, 263–264, 597
marginal cost of tax collections, on government size, 595
politics without romance, 270
Power to Tax, The, 263–264, 266, 269, 272, 276, 278, 280–282
procedural restrictions and generality principle, 433n10
productive state vs. coercive state, 486n2
public-choice approach, 421–424, 433nn6–11
Public Finance in the Democratic Process, 269
social choice and public-choice movement, 797
social welfare function, 561
symmetric tragedies, 560
tax analysis, democratic political processes, 268
taxation, welfare cost, 595
budget
balanced, 596
balanced-budget laws, 464
federalism, constraints, 83–84
maximization, international organizations, 618–620, 638nn15–18
revenue, politically assignable rents vs., 653–654
budget deficit. See deficit, budget
budget maximization, international organizations, 618–620, 638nn15–18
Budina, Nina, 464
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 57n3, 312–315, 317–324
Logic of Political Survival, The, 318, 319, 321
Bulman, David, 615
bureaucracy
competitive, Nazi regime as, 289
theocracy of, 765
Wintrobe’s theory of, 765
bureaucratization of sanctity, 765
bureaucrats, international organization staff, 607, 614–624
budget maximization aims, 618–620, 638nn15–18
characteristics and policy outcomes, 617–618
importance, 614–617, 638nn12–14
independence aims, 620–621
legitimacy aims, 622–624
monopoly aims, 621–622
Burnham, W. Dean, 408
Busby, Joshua, 624
businessmen, in politics
pay on, 30 (p. 947)
political influence, 33–34, 38n12
Butkiewicz, James, 865
butterfly ballot, Palm Beach County, Florida (2000 presidential election), 882
Byrd Amendment, 662, 674–675n20
caciquismo, 293
Cahoon, Lawrence, 821, 832n1
Cai, Hongbin, 77, 85
Calculus of Consent, The (Buchanan & Tullock), 271, 421
Callen, M., 885
Calvert, Randall, 406, 426–427, 431–432, 822
Cambridge Compromise, 226
Cameron, Charles, 111n1
campaign organizing, political parties, 411–412
Campbell, Angus, 409
Campbell, James, 857–858
candidate feeling thermometers, 821, 827, 830, 832n1
capitalist, defined, 308n10
Caplan, Bryan, 272, 574
capture, political participation, 545–546
Caramani, Daniele, 197
carbon tax vs. emissions quotas, 276–277
Carlsen, Paul, 783
Carlsson, Fredrik, 278–279, 864, 936
Carnes, Nicholas, 38n9
Carroll, Lewis, 810
Carroll, Royce, 832n2
Carrubba, Clifford, 434n15
Carruthers, C. K., 550–551, 552
Carstairs, Andrew, 212n1
cartels, international organizations, 622
Carter, John, 95, 912, 930, 933
Caruso, Germán, 390
cascade models, 342n6
Cascio, E. U., 550, 552
Case, Anne, 464
Casella, A., 898
Caselli, Francesco, 30
case study research, constitutional analysis, 445
Cassone, Alberto, 763
Cassorla, C. S., 688
Castro, Fidel, 332
Catholic religious orders, as clubs, 771–774
caudillismo, 293
causally efficacious set, 583n8
censorship
collaborative, 354
corporate intermediary, 354
cost, 353
Facebook, 353–354
central bank conservatism (CBC), 500, 514n5
Central Banker Career Conservatism (CBCC), 500
central bank governors, turnover rate, 509–512, 512t
central bank independence (CBI), 499–515, 513–514n1
career socialization and incentive, 500
vs. central bank conservatism, 500, 514n5
conservativeness, 500–501, 514nn6–7
on debt sustainability, 501
financial crisis, during and after, 502, 514n11
financial crisis, since, 509–512, 512t, 514nn17, 18
fiscal authority and central banks, 506–509, 514n16 (see also fiscal authority central banks and)
Central Europe
after communism, 204, 209–210, 342n7, 346–347
electoral systems, 209–210
central taxing, 464
Cervellati, M., 529
Chancellor, Lord, 58n15
charity of the uncharitable, 531
testing, 930–932, 932f
Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, 28
Chauvet, L., 705
Chavez, Hugo, 332
Checchi, D., 534
checks and balances, 55, 462
Cheibub, Jose Antonio
coalition partners, 396–397, 399n7
dictatorship, 291, 293, 294, 300, 306
government coalitions, formation, 387
industrialized parliamentary regimes, 399n9
separation of powers and breakdowns, 380
(p. 948) Cheng, Heng, 356
Chevalier, A., 556n10
China
autocracies, 725
“unclassifiable” regime, 301–304, 308nn10–11
choice experiments, 739n7
Chou, T., 710
Christian church history, 760–778
anti-Pelagianism, 763–764
doctrine and organizational form, 775
future, 777, 778n5
leaderships and organization, 774–776, 778n4
popes, selection and rule, 767–771, 778nn2–3
regulatory capture, 778n4
religious orders as clubs, 771–774
rent-seeking, doctrine, and theology, 760–764, 777–778n1
saint-making as incentive device, 764–767
Chwieroth, Jeffrey, 616, 617, 618
citizen-candidate models, 25–26
citizens
constraint of government, 597
demands on government, 600
on democracy trajectory, 732
election fraud detection, 880
government accountability, 195
influence, EU, 629, 639n23
productivity, public goods on, 320
representation, equal, 193
self-preservation, 798–799
citizens, importing democracy, 727–733
looking ahead, 731–733, 739nn12–13
outcomes and instruments, 727–729
preference intensity, 729–731, 739nn7–11
civic duty, voter turnout, 530, 551, 898–899, 899t
Clarke, Harold, 857, 868–869
class cleavage, 197
Classical period, 746. See also Greece, ancient
classification
political science and economics, 286, 307n2
types, 286–287
Clemens, M. A., 703
clones, resistance to, 6, 7, 8t
closed rule, 61, 112n4, 159
closed-rule bicameralism, 61
clustered equilibrium, 529
coalition (government)
accountability, 922n12
debt rescheduling, 395, 399n9
decisive, 422
fiscal, taxation, 458–459, 487n8
formation, Gamson’s law, 922n16
legislative, 391, 399n7
long, 395
portfolio, 391, 399n7
signals, 922n17
winning (see winning coalition)
Coate, Stephen, 25
Cobb-Douglas production function, 440
Cochrane, J. H., 509
Coen, David, 628, 629
coercion
nondemocratic states, 456
coercive redistribution, 466, 489n31
coercive taxation, 458–459, 487n7
cohesive equilibrium, 529
Coleman, James, 228
Coll, S., 284n26
collective action, 739n3
collective-action problem, 408
collective choice
arrangements, 565
problem, 408–409
collective goods
revolutions, 348
underprovided international, 607, 637n1
Collier, Paul, 740n19
Colombier, Carsten, 28
Colomer, Josep, 196, 209, 212, 768
Color Revolutions, 355, 356
committees, voting in, 897
common agency argument, 628
common pools
Bloomington Workshop, 559
federalism, 87
incentives, 87
resource management, Ostrom’s eight principles, 564, 564t (p. 949)
tax structure, public debt and, 460–465, 488–489nn14–25
commons, the, 559, 562–563
commons problems, institutions for solving, 559–569, 569n1
“the commons,” 559
commons research, 562–563
diagnostic approaches, 568–569
external validity and contextual analysis, 567–569
Ostrom, eight design principles, 562, 563–567, 564t
Ostroms, Indiana University research, 559–560
public choice, for commons research, 561–562
social welfare function, reified, 561
communication, voter turnout, 904–905
communism
Central and Eastern Europe, after, 204, 209–210, 342n7, 346–347
China, dictatorship control, 303
electoral system reforms on, 202–203
independent central banks, on budget deficits, 501
international aid on democracy, 708t
North Korea, 304–305
radical, 731, 732–733, 738
revolutions toppling, 349, 355
UN voting, 846, 846f
community-based governance, 563
comparative advantage (trade)
gains from trade, 655–656, 673nn1–2
international trade, 673n1
Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), 156–157, 172, 177
Amend Rate, 171, 173n4
compensation, material and nonmaterial, 29–34
extractable rents, from office and transparency in politics, 32–34, 38n12
moonlighting, 31–32, 38nn10–11
politicians’ pay, 29–31, 38n9
competence
political vs. private market, 30
representative selection, 26
competition
among international organizations, strengthening, 634–635
among subnational units of government, 289, 303
electorate, two-dimensional model, 537n9
for office, authoritarianism, 328–342
party, electoral rules, 27
competition, taxation
intergovernmental, 595
international, 457, 459, 463, 464, 487n11, 595–596
competition effect, voter turnout, 902, 903, 905, 907, 908t
reversed, 905
competitive equilibrium paradigm, 460–463
compliance, 228
constitutional courts and, 430–431
monitoring, 430
compromise
bicameralism, 65
Great Compromise, U.S. Constitution, 188–189, 785, 786, 792, 793n4
concrete review, 136–137, 138, 143n16
concurrent ballot, 108–109
conditional delegation, 621
conditional effects, constitutional design on public policy, 443
conditionality
International Monetary Fund, 613, 618, 620, 622, 627, 632, 638n18
World Bank, U.S. on enforcement, 611
Condorcet, M. J. A. N., 806–809
Condorcet Anti-Plurality rule, 8t, 9f, 20, 21
Condorcet-Hare rule, 8t, 9f, 13–14, 21–22
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 801
Condorcet loser, 918
Condorcet lower, 910
Condorcet’s paradox, 807
Condorcet winner, 12, 807, 808. See also specific examples
definition, 69n5
median voter, 65, 69n5
veto games, 96
conflict, international aid on, 708–713
appraisal, 711–713, 711t, 712t
empirics, 710–711, 711t
theory, 709–710, 719n9
(p. 950) conflict analysis, stationary bandit model, 255
conflict-resolution mechanisms, 566
conflicts of interest
occupation-specific regulations, 34–36, 39nn13–15
representative selection, 26
Congleton, Roger
broad tax base, 463
citizen constraint, of government, 597
Constitution, U.S. and state, 448n6
constitutions, amendments, majorities on, 170
constitutions, as contracts, 782
constitutions, consensus, decisions, and actions, 165
constitutions, exchanges, efficiency gains, 47, 47f
democracy, double requirement, 53
democracy, export, 739n2
king-and-council template, 45–47
political economy, global environmental commons, 560
tax state maturation, 457
consensual democracy, perfect, 244, 245f
consensus optimization problem, 245–247, 257–258nn7–13
consensus society’s constraint, invest all tax proceeds, 244, 245f, 257n6
consequentialist economic reasoning, 928
consociational democracies, 199
constitution
as contracts, 156, 782
culture, 171
economic effects, 390–391
enforcement, 187
English, efficient secret, 381
forms vs. function, 178–179, 192nn1–3
government size and, 391–393, 392t
incompleteness, political property rights, 53–54, 58nn11–14
life span, 156, 183–185, 187
public-good state, 525
redistributive state, 525
revision, 48, 57n4
as social contract, 54
structure, 97
welfare state, 525
constitution(s), 178–179, 192nn1–3
core, 167
deliberation costs, 167
evolution, 156
locking mechanisms, 167
Constitution, U.S.
bicameral Congress, 94
Fourteenth Amendment, 162
Great Compromise, 188–189, 785, 786, 792, 793n4
separation of powers, 94
tenure, federal judges, 189
Thirteen Amendment, 162
constitutional amendment
agenda setting, 159
amendment culture, 171
bicameral systems, 158–159
explicit change, 160, 160t
implicit change, 160–161, 160t
judicial interpretation, 161
political adaptation, legislative and executive actors, 163
vs. replacements (Argentina), 179–182, 192nn4–6
simple majority rule, 157–158, 159, 167–168, 168f
supermajority, 158, 159–160, 167–169, 168f
two-thirds majority, 158–159, 167–169, 168f
constitutional amendment, institutions for, 156–173
change by other means, 160–163, 160t, 173nn2–3
Comparative Constitutions Project, 156–157, 171, 172, 173n4, 177
constitutional politics, 163–172 (see also constitutional politics)
procedures, 157–160, 173n1
Constitutional Convention, U.S., 781, 793n1
purpose, 781
Constitutional Convention, U.S., voting at, 781–794
Beard thesis, 781, 789–792, 794n8
big picture, 782
convention overview, 781, 793n1
delegate votes, data, 787–789, 793–794nn6–7
major issues, 785–787, 793nn4–5
(p. 951) constitutional court power, democratic governance and, 424–431
background, 424, 434n12
courts and compliance, 430–431
courts and constraints, 428–430, 434n18
courts and coordination, 424–428, 434nn13–17
constitutional courts, 54, 135, 143n13
judicial politics, 138, 139–140, 141
partisan politics, 138, 139–140, 141
constitutional courts, democratic governance and, 417–434
constitutional analyses, 418
constitutional review, 432n1
countermajoritarian challenge, 417–418, 420–424
decisive coalition and decision costs, 422–423
majority rule, 423
majority rule, rules restricting, 423, 433nn9–11
normative foundations and public-choice perspective, 417–424
sub-constitutional, 418, 421–423
constitutional courts, democratic governance and, public-choice perspective normative foundations, 418–424
contemporary context, 419–421, 433n6
public-choice perspective per se, 421–424, 433nn6–11
constitutional democracy, 458. See also constitutionalism
constitutional design
for enduring constitutions, 187
vs. environment, 185–186
lessons, 446–447, 448n6
varieties, 95–96
constitutional design on public policy, estimating, 438–447
cross-country econometrics, beyond, 445–446, 448n5
established effects, 439
lessons, 446–447, 448n6
methodological challenges, 439–444
methodological challenges, conditional effects, 443
methodological challenges, endogeneity, 443–444, 448n4
methodological challenges, measuring explanatory variables, 441–442
methodological challenges, measuring outcome variables, 440–441, 448nn1–2
methodological challenges, preliminary remarks, 439–440
methodological challenges, transmission channels, 442–443, 448n3
Persson and Tabellini, 438–440, 448n1
constitutional exchanges
efficiency gains, king-and-council template, 47–48, 47f, 57nn3–4
political property rights, 53–54
constitutionalism, 458
popular, 417
constitutional order, 178–179, 192nn1–3
constitutional political economy, 418
constitutional politics, 163–172
amendment institutions and formal constitutional change, 167–172, 168f, 173n4
measuring amendments, 165–167
measuring constitutional difficulty, 163–165
constitutional review, 134–144
abstract, 136, 137
adoption, rationale, 134–135
arguments against, 135, 143n9
concrete, 136–137, 138, 143n16
countermajoritarian, 143n6
cross-citation patterns, 143n7
empirical evidence, 140–141, 142t
exercise, theories, 135
general theory, 137–138, 143n26
institutional variations, 135–137
judicial politics, 139–140, 143n31
negative legislator, 136, 143n13
preventive, 137, 138
constitutional rules
individualism on, 444
trust on, 444
constitutional systems, 443
constitutional transition, 177–192
amendments vs. replacements (Argentina), 179–182, 192nn4–6
consequences, 187–191
constitutions and constitutional order, 178–179, 192nn1–3
cycling, 188 (p. 952)
definition, 192n7
Jeffersonian arguments, 187–190
Latin America, 184
Madisonian arguments, 187, 190–191
as oxymoron, 177
postlude, 191–192
vs. regime transition, 182–183, 192n7
why and how?, 185–187, 192n8
constitutions, government spending and, parliamentary vs. presidential systems, 389–393
empirical findings, 390–391, 392t, 399nn5–8
literature, 389, 399n3
tax and spend, politicians’ incentives, 389–390, 399n4
constraints
citizen, of government, 597
consensus society’s, invest all tax proceeds, 244, 245f, 257n6
constitutional courts, 428–430, 434n18
government revenue raising, 598
soft-budget, federalism, 83–84
tax policy making, 473
constructive veto, 95
contract. See also specific types
relational, 54
social, constitution as, 54
Converse, Philip, 128n2, 410, 829
Cook, Chris, 860
Coombs, Clyde, 821
cooperation
donor, international aid, 719n2
interest groups international organizations, 624–626, 638–639nn19–20
coordinated understanding, constitutional courts, 424–428, 432, 434nn13–17
coordination approach, 427
derived problem, 426
Cooter, Robert, 26–27
Copelovitch, Mark, 620, 621, 628
Corneo, G., 524, 531
corporate intermediary censorship, 354
corporatist model, 198
corruption
electoral district size on, 439
individually elected candidates on, number of, 439
cosmopolitan democracy, 636
cost effect, turnout decision, 900–902, 906, 907, 908t, 922n19
cost of ruling, political variables, 860–861, 870–871nn26–39
cost of voting, 922n19
Cotta, Maurizio, 39n14
Couch, Jim, 39n15
Coughlin, Peter, 488n16
Council of Ministers (CM)
culture of consensus, 224
decision-making rule, challenges and changes, 223
degressively proportional representation, 224
founding, 220
influence, 227
new rules, seeking, 227–228
ordinary legislative procedure, 225–226
qualified majority voting, 220, 224
representation, 219–223, 221t
trialogues, 226
two-tier system, 228
weighted votes, European Free Trade Association, 224
weighted votes, ratio of, 223
Council of the European Union, 229, 639n25
countermajoritarian
constitutional courts, challenge, 417–418, 420–424, 432
constitutional review as, 143n6
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), 618, 621
coup, 328–342
average number, by country, 331–332, 331t
countries, 331, 331t
coup d’état, 336, 342n4
definition and success, 328, 341n1
dictator’s dilemma, 337–338
empirical studies, 331–335
extreme bounds analysis, 332
future research, 341
general framework, 329–330
Ghana (1979), 328, 341
literature, 328–329
military, accommodation and counterbalancing, 339–340, 342n8 (p. 953)
public-choice approach, classic, 336–337, 342nn5–7
as selection mechanism, 339–340
success and failure, 332, 332t
theories, 336–339
transitions, 332, 333t
coup d’état, 336, 342n4
courts
accountability, 417, 419, 420, 433n5
attitudes, 137
characterizing, 116, 128n5
constitutional (see constitutional courts)
electoral systems, 206–207, 213n9
ideal point, 125
ideological median, 116
intra-court interaction, 137
Kelsenian-type, 135–137, 138
Cover, Albert, 121–122, 122f
Cowles, Maria Green, 628–629
Cox, Gary, 393, 411
Cox, M., 564, 565–567
Coyne, Christopher, 739n1
Cragg, John, 848
credibility
in democratization, 726
international organization membership for, 609
credible executive commitment with constructive veto, 106
credible veto threat, 98
Crepaz, Markus M. L., 84
Croly, Herbert, 598
cross-citation patterns, constitutional review, 143n7
cross-country econometrics, constitutional design on public policy, 445–446, 448n5
cross-jurisdiction comparisons, democracy export, 728–729
Crowe, C., 504, 515n12
Cruces, G., 534
Cukierman, A., 501, 509–510, 514n6, 515n11
culture
constitution, 171
cultural contestation, international organizations, 618
diversity, electoral systems, 198–199
trade preferences, 673n1
Cusack, Thomas, 213n3
Cusanus, Nicolaus, 798, 805–806
customs union, lump-sum taxes and transfers, 668, 675n26
cyclical majorities, 521
cycling, constitutions and, 188
Dahl, Robert, 633–634
Danelski, David, 120
Danziger, L., 537n5
Dark Ages, 746, 748, 755–756nn1–2
Database of Political Institutions (DPI), 391, 399n4
Daunou, P. C. F., 808–809
David, Otto, 820
Davig, T., 507
Deacon, Robert, 295
Deaton, Angus, 485
debate, enlarged and refined, 407
Debreu, G., 239
Debrun, Xavier, 464
debt, public, 273–276, 273t
common pools and, 465–466, 489nn26–29
fiscal powers revisited, 273–276, 273t, 284nn17–20
Keynesianism, 465
sustainability, central bank independence on, 501
taxing the future, 465, 489n27
tax structure, common pools and, 460–465, 488–489nn14–25
debt, sovereign
credit ratings, shadow economy and, 688–693, 691f, 692t, 694nn2–3
debt rescheduling, 396–398, 397t
default, domestic politics on, 396, 399n10
debt crises, predicting, 488n20
debt distress episodes, 395
debt/GDP ratios
by country, 273, 273t, 284n17
historical, 276
debt repayment, sovereign
default, redistributive consequences, 393–394
empirical evidence, 395–397, 397t, 399nn9–13
forms of government, 394–395
policy reversals, 393–398
(p. 954) debt rescheduling
coalition government, 395, 399n9
presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, 396–398, 397t
Decentralisation Theorem, 77–78
decentralization, fiscal, 686–687
decentralization, government, 685
vs. federalism, 75
regionally decentralized authoritarianism, 302–303, 307
decision costs, 422
decision-makers. See also specific types
international organizations, 607, 637n2
political, politically assignable rents vs. budgetary revenue, 653–654
self-interest and personal gain motivation, 653, 654
decision-making
EU, democratic legitimacy and, 223–225
by sortition, 581
decision-making, EU voting rules
alternatives, debates, and approaches, 227–230, 234nn1–2
democratic legitimacy and, 223–225
European Parliament in, 225–226
rules prospects, 230–234, 232t, 234n2
decision rules
override, magnitude, 97
veto games, 96
decisive coalition, 422
decisiveness, 228, 234n2
policymakers’, 398
Declaration of the Future of the European Union, 228
declining-industry model, 657–658, 673n8
default, sovereign debt repayment
domestic politics on, 396, 399n10
redistributive consequences, 393–394
defensive forecasting, 624
defensive surveillance, 624
deficit, budget
on government re-election, 858–859
Keynesian economics, 598
majoritarian systems, 439
on presidential elections, 859
deficit financing
Barro’s tax-smoothing model, 489n26
on welfare costs of taxation, 596
de Figueiredo, Rui J. P., 82, 87
degree of dispersion, 97
degressive proportional representation, 225, 639n25
de Haan, J., 501, 511, 514n8
delegate selection, 24–37. See also representative selection
delegation chain, between voters and international organizations, 629–630, 639n24
Delfino, G., 884
deliberation costs, constitutional amendments, 167
DellaVigna, S., 899
Dellmuth, Lisa, 624
Del Negro, M., 509
Delooz, Pierre, 765–766
De Mesquita, B. E., 709
democracy
ancient Greek thinkers, 801
authority in, organization of, 380
collective-action problem, 408
collective-choice problem, 408–409
cosmopolitan, 636
direct (see direct democracy)
double requirement, 53
international organizations on, 632–633, 639n27
monomaniacs, 730, 732, 738
nascent, international organization membership on, 609
political parties for, 407–412
on political violence, 740n19
pure proceduralist defense, 578, 584n11
on repression, 740n19
stakeholder model, 634
survival, 730–731
transition and diffusion, 725
democracy, exportability, 725–740
by bargaining, 726
citizens in, 725–726, 739n4
by force, 739n1
income distribution and elites, 726, 739n3 (p. 955)
limitations, theory, 727, 739n6
officeholders in, 726, 739n5
people, on exporting side, 733–737, 739nn14–15 (see also democracy diffusion)
people, on importing side, 727–733 (see also citizens, importing democracy)
private life outcomes, 730–731
threshold approach, 725–726, 739n2
trajectory, citizens on, 732
transition, 725
unitary actors, 726
democracy diffusion, 725, 733–737, 739nn14–15
direct promotion, limits, 734–736, 740nn16–17
human rights abuses as indirect way to promote democracy, fighting, 736–737, 740nn18–19
democracy emergence, ancient Greece, 50–51, 51f, 746–751
anomalously democratic, 747–749, 756nn7–10
first democracy, 746
poleis, more democratic than others, 750–751, 756nn11–12
democracy emergence, king-and-council template, 51–53, 51f
democratic deficit, 224, 632–633
democratic dilemma, international organizations, 633–634
democratic legitimacy, EU decision-making and, 223–225
DeNardo, James, 345, 351
Denzau, A., 384
De Paola, Maria, 28–29
derived problem of coordination, 426
design principles, Ostrom’s, 561, 563–567, 564t
design vs. environment, constitution, 185–186
DeSimone, Jeffrey, 863
despot
benevolent, 263
policymaking, 264, 282n1
despotism, 263
determinism, historical, 37n1
de V. Graaff, J., 239
Dicey, Albert Venn, 192n1
dictator’s dilemma, 290, 294, 337–338
dictatorships
Cheibub’s classification, 293–294
institutionalized, 294
military regimes, 291–292, 294
monarchies, 294, 296–297
Nazi regime, 289
papacy, 767
power vs. diminishing returns, 290
repression and loyalty, 290, 307n5
selectorate and authoritarian governance, 311–324 (see also selectorate theory, authoritarian governance and)
stationary bandit, 295 (see also stationary bandit model)
theocracy (Papal States), 293
timocracy, 290, 297
tyranny, 290–291
dictatorship types, 286–308
Arab Spring, 300–301
classification, 286–288, 307nn1–2
classification, all same?, 296–297
“good” vs. “bad,” 297–298, 307nn6
idea and history, 286, 307n1
North Korea, 304–305, 308nn12–13
power, holders of, 286, 293–294
power, tinpots vs. totalitarians, 286, 288–293, 307nn3–5
problems/issues, 296–298
Russia under Putin, 298–300, 307–308nn7–9
time horizon, short vs. long, 286, 295–296
“unclassifiables,” analysis, 298–305
Dieleman, J. L., 705
Diermier, D., 66
difference-in-differences (DiD) models, 28, 552
differential item functioning, 828
digit-based tests, election fraud detection, 887–891, 889t
2BL and Benford’s law, 887–891, 889t
dilemma of the strong state, international organizations on, 609
dimensionality, parliamentary voting, 839–851. See also parliamentary voting, dimensionality
(p. 956) DiPasquale, Denise, 349
direct democracy
international organizations, 635
on shadow economy, 685–686
direct democracy, public policy and, 363–376
causality, 373
definition, 363
election rules and government structure, 372
empirical approaches, 367–368
established effects, 439
evidence, 368–372
fiscal policy, initiative, 369–371
fiscal policy and mandatory reform, 368–369
initiative process, 363
literature, 364, 376n3
policy–public preferences congruence, 372–373
referendum process, 363, 375n1
referendums, advisory, 363
referendums, mandatory, 363, 376n5
referendums, petition, 363–364, 376n5
representative democracy and, 364, 375n2
safety valve or last resort, 364
social policy, 371
summary, 375
theory, 364–367, 376n4
theory, initiative, 366–367, 366f
theory, mandatory referendum, 365–366, 365f, 376n5
direct feedback effects, redistribution, 521–522
Director’s law, 468, 490n36, 525
disaster prevention and relief, selectorate theory, 323–324
disciplining bad politician, 25
discount rate, political, 855–856, 867, 869, 869n10
backward-looking voters, 857, 858
discretional power, political decision-maker, 24, 37n1
dispersion, degree of, 97
disposable income, 521
dissimilarities, 840
distributed denial of services (DDoS), 354
(re-)distribution, voting on, 932–935, 933t, 938nn8–10
distributional arrangements, regulations and taxes, 277
Dittman, Ingolf, 938n8
divided government, 44–58
definition, 44–45
justification, 45
king-and-council, historical perspective, 50–53, 51f, 57–58nn7–10
king-and-council, template, 45–50 (see also king-and-council template)
divided-majority setting, strategic voting, 910–911, 910t
divorce rates, years married and, 184
Dixit, A., 528
Dixon, Rosalind, 170
D-NOMINATE, 850
Dodgson, C. L., 19, 810–811
Dollar, D., 701
Donald, Stephen, 848
Döpke, Jörg, 858
Dorsch, Michael, 350
double-centered agreement score matrix, 840–843, 842f, 843f
Doucouliagos, H., 703, 705, 707, 709, 713, 714, 719nn8, 10–12
Dougherty, Keith, 783–784, 786, 787, 788–789, 791–792
Downs, Anthony, 25, 406, 594, 898
Economic Theory of Democracy, An, 820
Downsian actors, 406
Doyle, O., 556n10
Drazen, Allen, 858–859
Dreher, Axel
central-bank governs term, 511
international aid, politics, 701, 702, 703, 706, 718
international organization membership, exploiting, 611
international organizations, 609–613, 615, 624, 631, 635, 637n4, 638n8
leaders’ occupational background, on policy choices, 33
DSGE model, 506–507
Dube, A., 335
Dube, O., 710
Duch, Raymond, 870n23, 915
Dudley, Leonard, 466
Duffy, J., 901–902, 919
(p. 957) Duflo, Esther, 28
Duncan, Denvil, 471
Durr, Robert, 864
duty-free economic zones, special, 669
Duverger, Maurice, 193, 408, 909
Duvergerian forces, 922n10
Duverger’s law, 193, 212, 909, 911
DW-NOMINATE, 850
dynamic effects, 522
early-agreement practice, 226
ease
of casting votes, 6, 7, 8t
of counting votes, 6, 7, 8t
of understanding how votes are counted, 6, 7, 8t
Eashaw, Joshy, 863
Eastern Europe
after communism, 204, 209–210, 342n7, 346–347
electoral systems, 209–210
revolutions, 346–347
East Germany revolution, 346, 347–348
easy taxes, 487n8
Eberstadt, Nicoholas, 302
Economic Effects of Constitutions (Persson & Tabellini), 390
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (Beard), 789
economic protectionism, 577
economic reasoning, consequentialist, 928
“Economic Theory of Clubs” (Buchanan), 40
Economic Theory of Democracy, An (Downs), 820
economic variables. See also specific types
prospective evaluations, U.S. presidential election, 857
retrospective judgment, 857–858
voters on government responsibility, 858, 869n13
voting and popularity, impact, 857–859, 870nn17–24
voting and popularity studies, 854
Edelman, Murray, 599
Edgeworth box, 47, 47f
education
international aid on, 705–706
on political participation, 546–548, 556n3
political participation on, spending in, 550–551, 556nn4–5
on turnout and participation, 546–547
Edwards, Chris, 595
effective lower bound (ELB), 502
efficiency
constitutional exchanges, 47–48, 47f, 57nn3–4
English constitution, 381
normative tax theory, 265
Pareto, 409n45, 433n11
sincere, 6, 7–10, 8t, 9f
social, fiscal structures, 456
tax collection, 594
Egan Brad, Louisa, 934, 935
Egbert, Henrik, 913, 932
Eggers, Andrew, 38n11
egotropic voting, 861–862, 871nn40–42
Ehrlich, Seam, 489n24
Ehrmann, M., 513n1
Eichenauer, Vera, 612
Eichmann, Adolf, 288, 289
Eijffinger, S. C. W., 514n2
Eising, Rainer, 628
Ekelund, Robert, 760, 762, 763, 772, 777, 778n4
Sacred Trust, 760
Elazar, Daniel, 82
electing one vs. electing many, 812–813
election(s), 39n4. See also specific topics
experiments, laboratory and field, 896
founding, rules choice, 207–208
institutions, 490n38
international organization membership on, 612–613
international organizations, benefits, 610, 638nn6–8
observers, 880
personalization, 210–211, 213n11
political parties running, 411–412
simulated, voter rules, 6
election(s), experimental public choice, 896–921, 922nn7–22. See also specific topics
behavior, candidate and party, 897
committees or legislatures, voting in, 897 (p. 958)
experiments, common characteristics and limitations, 920–921, 922n22
experiments, future, 921
experiments, laboratory and field, 896
literature, 897
party choice, 908–916 (see also party choice)
plurality rule, 897
proportional representation, 897, 905
rational-choice models, explanatory power, 897
simultaneous analysis, turnout and party choice, 916–920, 922nn18–21
turnout decision, 898–908, 916–918 (see also turnout decision)
voting behavior, understanding, 896
election fraud detection, 880–892
citizen trust, 880
definition, 881–882, 892n1
digit-based tests, 887–891, 889t
election observers, 880
experimental approaches, 885–886, 892n5
manipulative activities, 882–883, 892n2
methods, prediction models, 883–885, 892n3
methods, vote and turnout distributions of current election, 887
vs. normal votes, 881
outlook, 891–892
political science analysis, 880–881
election reforms, 199–200
inclusion vs. governability, 199
electoral rules, parties, 26–29, 38n5
party competition, 27
reservations and quotas, 28–29, 38nn6–8
electoral systems, 193–213
Africa, 209
agency, 199–207
amendments, districts, 201
amendments, history and actors, 201–202, 213nn4–5
Asia, 208
Central and Eastern Europe, 209–210
corporatist model, 198
cultural diversity and conflict, 198–199
future research, 212
governing vs. accountability, 195
government structure, 372
incumbents on, 200
international actors, 208, 213n10
Latin America, 209
lawmakers’ self-interest vs. normative ideals, 193, 213n1
“left threat” thesis, 201–202
mixed, 195, 210
mixed-member proportional, 203–204, 206, 211–212
multi-tier, 211–212
non-industrialized world, 207–210
origins, 195–197
parachute effect, 200
parties, predicting electoral fortunes, 204–205
parties, undermining own legislation, 205–206, 213nn7–8
personalization, of elections, 210–211, 213n11
personal votes, cultivating, 195
personal votes vs. personal representation, 211–212
political economy, 198, 213nn2–3
power sharing, 199
proportional representation, 197, 200
referendums and courts, 206–207, 213n9
reforms, 199–200
representation, inclusive, 194–198
representation, narrowing, 202–203
representation of citizens, equal, 193
restrictive, 202
rules choice, founding elections, 207–208
single-transferable vote, 197
Socialist Party, 200, 201
structural theories, 197–199
systemic failure and legitimacy deficits, 203–204, 213n6
Westminster model, 198
electorate. See also voters
competition, two-dimensional model, 537n9
groups, on voting and popularity, 865–866, 871nn46–47
Elinder, Mikael, 865
elite
as concept, 726, 739n3
franchise extension motives, 554
income distribution, 726, 739n3
(p. 959) Elkins, Zachary, 164, 190
ellipse-shaped indifference curves, 739n8
Elster, J., 445
Emdin, C. A., 705
endogeneity
constitutional design on public policy, 443–444, 448n4
institutional change, autocracy politics and, 319–324, 324n2
enfranchisement lottery, 581
English Constitution, efficient secret, 381
Enikolopov, Ruben, 82, 885
Enkelmann, Sören, 859, 863
Ennser-Jedenastik, L., 511
Enos, R., 901
entrenchment clauses, 753
environment, constitution, 185–186
political economy of trade, 674n9
environmental standards, international trade and, 657
Epp, Charles, 430
Epple, D., 525, 556n4
Epstein, Lee, 117–119, 126, 127
equilibrium
clustered, 529
cohesive, 529
punctuated, 186
equilibrium tax structure, Pareto efficient, 490n45
equi-revenue assumption, 267
equitability, 228, 234n1
Erikson, Robert, 471
Eswaran, Mukesh, 778n3
ethical behavior, vs. rational voter behavior, 574–575
ethical voting, 902, 903, 906, 922n8
expressive voting and, 930
improved, effect, 531
low-cost, experiments, 913, 917–918, 922n8
pivotality and turnout, 901
Ethier, W. J., 654–655
ethnicity
bicameralism, 69
dictatorships, 292–293, 301, 307
electoral systems, 199, 205, 206, 208, 209, 212
fractionalization, federalism, 76, 86
identity and networks, 351
LA riots, 349
revolution, 351
Eubanks, Cecil, 791
Euclidean preferences
one-dimensional spatial model with, 96
as single-peaked preferences, 112n3
European Central Bank (ECB), staff national representation, 615
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 224
European Parliament
in EU decision-making, 225–226
founding, 220
European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), 628–629
European Union (EU)
citizen influence, 629, 639n23
decision-making, democratic legitimacy, 223–225
decision-making, European Parliament, 225–226
democratic deficit, 224
interest groups’ influence, 627–629, 639nn21–22
lobbying, 628, 639n22
overview and special case, 219
policy drift, 224
powers to tax vs. power to regulate, 284n29
on United Nations Security Council budget negotiation, 612
voting rules, alternatives, debates, and approaches, 227–230, 234nn1–2
voting rules, prospects, 230–234, 232t, 234n3
exchange of market access, political, 665–666, 675n24
executive multilateralism, 631
executive veto power and constitutional design, 94–112. See also veto power, executive, and constitutional design
exit option, 685
experimental public choice, elections, 896–921. See also election(s), experimental public choice
explicit change, constitutional amendment by, 160, 160t
export taxes, 662–663
(p. 960) expressive voting, 927–938
definition, 929, 937n2
deviations, from standard predictions, 929, 938n4
experimental evidence, 929–938, 938nn4–12
vs. instrumental, motives, 938n3
low-cost theory of, 912–913, 935–936
low-cost theory of, testing, 929, 938n3
on participation, large elections, 938n7
theoretical background, 928–929
expressive voting, experimental evidence, 929–938
challenges, 936–937, 938n11
consequentialist reasoning, 928
fundamentals, 929–930
instrumental choices, 928
literature, future, 937, 938n12
literature, mixed results, 935–936
low-cost theory of voting, testing, 929, 938n3
Tullock’s charity of the uncharitable, 930–932, 932f, 938nn6–7
voting on (re-)distribution, 932–935, 933t, 938nn8–10
external costs, 422
extractable rents, 29
from office, transparency in politics and, 32–34, 38n12
extreme bounds analysis (EBA), 332
Eyraud, Luc, 83
Ezcurra, Roberto, 76
Facebook revolutions, 352–353, 355
faction
enlarged and refined, 407
evils of, 407, 412
majority, tyranny by, 412
Fair, Ray, 855, 856
“fair” acquisition model, 537n12
Falch, T., 550, 552
Falk, A., 896
Fallaw, Sowell, 849–851, 850f
false consciousness, 527, 529, 913
Falter, Jürgen, 871n43
Fang, Songying, 609
Faricy, Christopher, 490n42
Fauvelle-Aymar, Christine, 859
favoritism. See also interest groups
international organizations, 611–612
World Bank, 611–612
Feddersen, Timothy, 901, 917, 933–935, 933t
Fedele, Alessandra, 32
federalism, 72–89
Age of Federalism, 72
countries, 73, 89n1
vs. decentralization, 75
definition, initial, 73
definition, modern, 73–74
democracy, conflict, and policy experimentation, 76–77
fiscal, 685
geography, 351
laboratory, 729
market-preserving, 302
mass areas under one government, 72
minimalistic definition, 74
origins, concept, 73
public goods provision, efficient, 77–78
quo vadis, 88–89
scholarly contributions and research, 72–73
values trade-off, 72
federalism, endogenous, 72, 85–88
emergence, 85–87
persistence and evolution, 87–88
federalism effects, literature, contemporary, 79–85
accountability, 80–81
market-preserving, 81–82
overview, 79–80
race to the bottom, 85
soft-budget constraints, 83–84
status quo bias, 84
federalism effects, literature, early, 76–79
democracy, conflict, and policy experimentation, 76–77
efficient public goods provision, 77–78
Leviathan and, 78–79
feedback effects, redistribution
direct, 521–522
indirect, 523
feeling thermometers, 821, 827, 830, 832n1
Feld, Lars, 369, 370, 371, 685–686
Felsenthal, Dan, 225, 228, 922n9
(p. 961) female suffrage
on government size and scope, 596
on welfare spending, 549–550
Ferejohn, John, 170, 376n4
Ferraz, Claudio, 30, 38n5
Ferrero, Mario, 764, 765–766, 773
Fielding, D., 710
Filippetti, A., 82, 88
Filippin, A., 534
Finan, Frederico, 38n5
financial crisis, central bank
during and after, 502, 514n11
since, 509–512, 512t, 514nn17, 18
Findley, M. G., 718
Finer, Samuel, 293
Finer, Sanyek, 50, 57nn5–6, 329, 330
Finnemore, Martha, 610, 616, 619–620, 622, 638n17
Fiorina, Morris, 854, 856, 869n5, 898, 929
first-past-the-post (FPTP), party choice, 909–912, 909t, 910t, 911t, 922nn9–13
first-past-the-post (FPTP), turnout decision, 900–905
cost effect, 900–902, 906, 907, 908t, 922n19
rational-choice model, adjusting, 903–905, 922n7
fiscal authority, central banks and, 506–509
financial independence and balance sheet concerns, 508–509
fiscal dominance and monetary–fiscal policy interactions, 506–508, 514n16
fiscal choice, political economy, 474–486
fiscal choice and income–consumption tax mix, political economy of, 474–486
competitive political equilibrium, representation theorem, 480–482, 491n51
general equilibrium economic structure, 477–480, 491n50
model setup, 475–477, 490nn45–49
tax mix and government size, balance and asymmetric societies, 482–486, 491nn52–53 (see also tax mix and government size, balance and asymmetric societies)
fiscal coercion, 456–460, 486–488nn2–13
fiscal decentralization, 686–687
fiscal dominance
central bank, monetary–fiscal policy interactions and, 506–508, 514n16
regime, 502
fiscal federalism, 685
fiscal illusion, 577
fiscal policy
initiative, 369–371
mandatory reform, 368–369
fiscal powers revisited, 263–284
benevolent despot, 263
democracy bashing?, 269–271, 283–284nn10–15
high-tax libertarianism?, 278–280, 284nn25–29
Leviathan model, as morality tale, 268–269
Leviathan model, history, 263
motivations, methodological, 268, 283n8
motivations, normative, 268
political decision-process, public finance theory, 268–269, 283nn8–9
power to regulate, 276–278, 284nn21–24
proposition 13 and lookalikes, 271–273, 284n16
public debt?, 273–276, 273t, 284nn17–20
fiscal systems. See also specific types
political economy, investigation moments, 473–474
Fischer, Alastair, 930–931
Fischer, J., 912
Fishburn, Peter, 16
Fishkin, James, 581
Fisman, Raymond, 31, 80
fixed effects
definition, 719n7
on political participation, 551–552
Fleck, Robert, 611, 702, 747, 748–754, 756nn8, 12, 757n18
floating voters, 853
Foley, Duncan, 256n2
Fong, C. M., 533
foreign aid. See aid, international
foreign direct investment (FDI), 700
Forsythe, R., 910
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution, 162
(p. 962) Fowler, A., 552, 901
franchise extension, 467–468. See also suffrage
to poor voters, on inequality, 545–546
preemptive, 520
revolution risk, 53
ruling elite motives, 554
threat-of-revolution, 53, 457, 470, 546
Franck, R., 520
Francois, J., 669–670
Franzese, R., 515n9
Fratianni, Michele, 638n8
Fratzscher, Marcel, 513n1, 624
fraud detection, election, 880–892. See also election fraud detection
Freedom Index, 278, 284nn25–26
free-rider problem, individuals in politics, 289
free trade, 577
Freier, R., 534
Frey, Bruno S.
decentralization on domestic terrorism, 76
international organizations, political economy, 607, 613, 616–618, 621–622, 634–636, 639n28
shadow economy, politics on, 685–686
voting and popularity, 854, 864
Friedman, Barry, 420
Friedrich, Carl, 289
Friedrichsen, Kama, 866
Fuchs, A., 702
Fujiwara, T., 551, 553, 554
Fukumoto, Kentaro, 886
Fumagalli, E., 555
functional cleavage, 197
functional demand hypothesis, 626
Funk, Patricia, 369, 370, 374, 899
fusion, legislature and judiciary, 55
futile choice, 99
Gaddy, Clifford, 300, 307
Gagliarducci, Stefano, 30, 32, 38n8
Gais, Thomas, 413
Galasso, Vincenzo, 27, 528
Gallagher, Michael, 212n1
game form veto games, 97
Gamson, W., 922n16
Gamson’s law, 922n16
Gandhi, Jennifer, 294
Ganghoff, Steffen, 465, 489n25
Garoupa, Nuno, 126
Gartzke, Erik, 625, 633
Gassebner, M., 334
gatekeeping power, 103–104
Gates, Scott, 351
Gathmann, Christina, 369, 370, 374
Gatti, Roberta, 80, 505
Gauss-Markov assumption, 823
Geddes, Barbara, 291, 293–294, 306
Gehlbach, Scott, 33
Gehring, Kai, 615
Gelman, Andrew, 937n1
Gelos, R., 395
gender. See also women
on government stability, 38n8
reservations and quotas, 28–29, 38nn6–8
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 666, 670
generality principle, 433n9
general’s dilemma, 294
general-to-specific approach, 443
geographic voting. see spatial (geographic) voting
geography
bicameralism, 64, 69
federalism, 351
revolution, 351
Gerber, A., 898–899, 899t, 921n2
Gerber, Elisabeth, 364, 371
Gerdes, C., 533–534
German Politbarometer, 6, 7, 11
Gerring, John, 128n1
Gertler, M., 506
Geys, Benny, 38n11
Ghana coup (1979), 328, 341
Gibson, James, 411
Giles, Michael, 118, 128n9
Gini coefficients, pre- and post-fisc, 469, 472, 490n43
Ginsburg, Tom, 167, 169, 171, 177
Giordano, R., 501
Giuliano, P., 520, 531–532, 534–535
Giuriato, Luisa, 768, 770
Gjessing, Hakon, 184
Glaeser, Edward, 349
(p. 963) globalization
employment, factory worker, 471
international tax competition, 459
international trade, 671
labor mobility, 522
of sainthood, 767
welfare adjustment response, 84
goal independence, 501–502, 515n10
Godefroy, R., 554
Goel, R. K., 686
Goldman, Sheldon, 118, 128n8
Goldstone, Jack, 348
Goldworthy, A., 50
Gomez, B. T., 554, 556n9
Goodhart, Charles A. E., 854, 858, 869n3, 871n38
Goodin, R. E., 568
Goodman, J., 504
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 291
Gordon, David, 867, 868
Gordon, Scott, 458, 470
Gould, Erica, 627
Gouveia, M., 467
governance. See also specific topics and types
clear, single-party majorities, 202
community-based, 563
good vs. bad, 286
inclusivity, 247–248
informal, international organizations, 612
self-serving humans, 239
government. See also specific types and topics
decentralization, 685
limited, American, 596
party, 408
responsibility, index of clarity of, 858, 870n21
rights protection role, 598
size, constitutions and, 391–393, 392t
special-interest, 408
stability, leaders’ gender on, 38n8
structure, election rules and, 372
taxing power, monopoly on, 265
government growth, 588–601
spending/GDP, 20th century, 588–589, 600nn1–2
theories, 589–590
theories, ideological, 590, 597–599, 601n6
theories, path-dependency, 589, 590–593, 601nn3–5
theories, static equilibrium, 589–590, 593–596
government spending
initiatives, 439
majoritarian systems, 439
mandatory referendums, 439
parliamentary vs. presidential systems, 439
public preferences, income on, 545, 556n2
spending/GDP, 20th century, 588–589, 600nn1–2
government spending, constitutions and, 389–393
empirical findings, 390–391, 392t, 399nn5–8
literature, 389, 399n3
tax and spend, politicians’ incentives, 389–390, 399n4
graduated sanctions, 566
Granovetter, M., 342n6
Grant, Ruth, 634, 639n24
Gravelle, Jane, 595
Great Compromise, 188–189, 785, 786, 792, 793n4
Greece, ancient, 745–755
democracy, ancient thinkers on, 801
democracy, emergence, 746–751
democracy, first, 746
democracy, institutions, 751–754, 756–757nn13–17
economic freedom, 745–746
population and politics, 745
standard of living, wealth distribution, and consumption, 745, 755n1
tyranny, 754–755, 757n18
Green, Andrew, 119
Green, D., 921n2
Green, Donald, 269
Green-Armytage, James, 6, 11, 13, 20
Green Revolution, Iran, 357
Gregory VII, Pope, 767
Grendstad, Gunnar, 118, 126
gridlock, bicameralism, 68
Grigorescu, Alexandru, 623
Grilli, V., 501, 509
Grodzins, Morton, 74
Großer, J., 902, 904
(p. 964) Grossman, G. M., 655, 675n23
Grossman, H. I., 710
Grossman-Helpman, 655, 675n23
protection-for-sale model, 670
group identity
electoral accountability, 937, 938n12
proportional representation, 199
voter turnout, 904
growth, government, 588–601. See also government growth
growth, international aid on, 702–706
aid effectiveness on growth, 702–706
empirics, 703–706
empirics, factor accumulation, 704–706
empirics, growth, 703–704, 719n7
theory, 702–703
Grubb, Farley, 792
Grumm, John, 193, 212
Grüner, H., 524, 531, 537n7
Grynaviski, Jeffrey, 405
Gschwend, T., 915, 922n17
Guerette, Stephen, 912, 930, 933
Guillén, M., 515n15
Guisinger, Alexandra, 870n23
Gunitsky, Seva, 354
Gurr, Ted, 348
Gutmann, Jerg, 86, 609, 613
Guttman scalogram, 840
Gygi, Beat, 616–617, 635, 636, 639n28
Haber, Stephen, 299
habitual voting, 921n1
Häfliger, Ursula, 615–616, 617
Hailey, James, 883
Hainmueller, Jens, 38n11, 860, 861
Hale, Henry, 356
Hall, Richard, 356, 440, 508
Hall, Robert, 869
Haller, H. Brandon, 863
Hallerberg, Mark, 465, 504
Hallstein, Walter, 638n11
Hamada, K., 669
Hamilton, Alexander, 419, 430, 433n4, 434n12, 598, 809
Han, Li, 303
Hanlon, M., 705
Hansen, Eric, 38n9
Hansen, J. M., 546
Hansen, Kasper, 739n7
Hansen, Mogens, 747
Hansford, T. G., 556n9
Hanssen, F. Andrew, 747–754, 756nn8, 12, 757n18
happiness, on voting, 866
Hardin, Russell, 434n16
Harel, Alon, 913, 934–936, 938n9
Hare rule, 8t, 9f, 11–12, 22n2
Harms, Philipp, 490n39, 520, 537n6
Harrington, Joseph, 822
Hausmann, R., 884
Havrilesky, T. M., 513n1
Hawes, Michael Brewster, 628
Hawkins, Darren, 619, 622
Hawthorne condition, voter turnout, 899, 899t
Hayek, Friedrich
federalism, 78–79
government power, on people in government, 599
minimum recognition of rights, 566
order of rules shapes order of actions, 421, 433n7
tacit knowledge, 536n2
Hayes, Rosa, 858
health
international aid on, 704–705
public spending on, political participation and, 551, 556n6
Heckelman, Jac, 783–784, 787, 788–789, 791–792
Heckman, James, 849, 896
Heckscher-Ohlin model, 656, 669, 673n1
Hefeker, Carsten, 514n5, 619
Held, David, 636
Heller, W. B., 68
Helpman, E., 655, 675n23
Henderson, J. Vernon, 75, 86–87
Henry, E., 554
Herrera, H., 902, 905, 907
Herrnson, Paul, 412
heterogeneity
motivational, 26
on public sector size, 490n37
Hettich, Walter, 474
(p. 965) Hibbs, Douglas, 855, 858, 860, 863, 866, 869n13
Hicks, R., 510
Hicks paradox, 384
Higashijima, M., 501
Higgs, Robert, 590, 598
high-tax libertarianism, 278–280, 284nn25–29
Hill, T. P., 888
Hillman, A. L., 655, 659, 674nn11, 19, 675n28
Hinich, Melvin, 409–410, 820, 828
Hintermann, Beat, 487n8
Hirschman, Albert, 748
Hirshleifer, Jack, 255
historical determinism, 37n1
Hoadley, John, 822
Hobbes, Thomas, 239
Leviathan, 265, 798–799
Leviathan, federalism, 78–79
Höchtl, Wolfgang, 938n10
Hodler, Roland, 301, 307, 545, 553
Hoeberichts, M., 514n2
Hofstadter, Richard, 413
Holcombe, Randall, 6, 589, 591, 601n3
Holden, Richard, 170
Hönnige, Christoph, 126
honor, 799
Hooghe, Liesbet, 616
Hoover, K. D., 462
Horiuchi, Yusaka, 556n9, 886
Hortala-Vallve, R., 901
Hosli, Madeleine, 228
Hotelling, Harold, 820
Hotelling model, 674n19
Hotelling-Smithies model, 820
Hou, Yilin, 464
Householder, A. S., 840
Howitt, Peter, 489n28
Hsiao, A. J., 705
Hug, Simon, 612, 615–616, 617
Hughes, Charles Evan, 419
human rights. See rights, human
Hume, David, 799
Hume, Robert, 371
Huntington, E. V., 801–802
Husted, T. A., 547, 552
Hyttinen, Ari, 36
Iacobucci, Justice Frank, 119
Iannaccone, Laurence, 749
Iaryczower, Matias, 67, 126
Ichino, N., 886
Ickes, Barry, 307
ideal point
actor, 96–98, 99, 819
Constitutional Convention, 784, 784f
court, 125
executive, 96, 97, 102, 104, 105, 107, 108
initiatives, policy and public preference congruence, 372
legislator, spatial voting model, 822, 824
median member, of legislature, 96, 108, 109
roll-call voting, 823, 823f, 824
scaling algorithm, 129n11
term limits, 372
veto players and, 110
ideal point, government, 364
initiative, 366–367, 366f
mandatory referendum, 364, 365, 365f
ideal point, voter, 364, 820
initiative, 366–367, 366f, 373, 375
mandatory referendum, 365, 365f
spatial voting model, 820, 821, 827
identity
ethnicity, 351
ruling interest, stationary bandit model, 255f, 256
identity, group
electoral accountability, 937, 938n12
proportional representation, 199
voter turnout, 904
ideology. See also specific types
conceptions, 819
distance, 819
theories, government growth, 590, 597–599, 601n6
idiosyncratic effects selection, 37n2
ignorance
inadvertent, 572, 575–576, 583n6
political, 575–576
rational, 572–584 (see also rational ignorance)
IMF conditionality, 638n18
implicit change, constitutional amendment by, 160–161, 160t
(p. 966) Improper Influence (Gais), 413
impure altruism, 284n19
inclusivity
governance, 247–248
political, selectorate theory, 318
representation, electoral systems, 193–198
income
disposable, 521
distribution, traditional trade models, 656, 673nn3–6
growth rate, on voting, 858
inequality, U.S., politics, 490n42
on political participation, 546–548, 556n3
on public spending preferences, 545, 556n2
redistribution, trade policy for, 659–660, 674n12
stationary bandit model, effects, 241, 257nn3–4
on turnout and participation, 546–547
income–consumption tax mix, 474–486
income tax. See also taxation
establishment, 591, 601n3
withholding, 591, 601n4
incompatibility rules, 36
independence
mutual, presidentialism, 381, 389
independence, international organizations, 620–621
independence, judiciary, 439
independence of irrelevant alternatives, 807, 808t, 809
indifference curves, ellipse-shaped, 739n8
indirect voting powers, 228
individualism, on constitutional rules, 444
indulgences, Christian Church on, 762–763
industries
declining, protectionist trade, 657–658, 673n8
infant-industry argument, 674n13
ineligibility rules, 36
infant-industry argument, 674n13
inflation
central bank independence on, 499–503, 514nn2–5, 7–9
on voting, 858
informal economy, 687–688
informal governance, international organizations, 612
information
benefits, king-and-council template, 46
cascade, 347
majority cycles from, 537n8
shortcuts, 578–579
informed voters, on political participation, 545
initiative
direct democracy, 366–367, 366f
fiscal policy, 369–371
government spending, 439
process, 363
Instant Run-off Voting (IRV), 11–12
institutionalization, of party-governed rule of House of Representatives, 404
institutions. See also specific types
aid effectiveness on, 706–708, 719n8
for commons problems, solving, 559–569, 569n1 (see also commons problems institutions for solving)
for constitutional amendment, 156–173 (see also constitutional amendment)
constitutional review, variations, 135–137
electoral, 490n38
endogenous change, autocracy politics, 319–324, 324n2
executive veto power, 108–109
executive veto power, constitutional design, 108–109
international aid on, 706–708, 708t, 719n8
organizations, interaction with, 404
political, on shadow economy, 685–688, 694n1
political parties as, most fundamental informal, 404–412
self-selection into politics, 25, 37–38nn2–3
transparency, politics, 26–27, 38n5
instrumental choices, 928
instrumental variables, on political participation, 554–555, 556n9
instrumental voting, motives, 938n3
instrument independence, central bank independence and, 501–502, 514n10
inter-election swing in party popularity, voting and popularity studies, 854
interest groups, 408 (p. 967)
corrupting power, 407
on economic progress, 592
on government growth, 591–592
interest groups, on international organizations, 624–629
on IMF and EU, 627–629, 639nn21–22
strategies and functions, 626–627
interest rates, sovereign-debt and shadow economy, 688–693, 691f, 692t, 694nn2–3
internal participatory voting, on corporate actor behavior, 283n4
international, politics
protectionism, political-economy view, 657–661
protectionism, political support and, 657
international actors, electoral systems, 208, 213n10
international aid. See aid, international
International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC), 562
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 615
international bureaucrats, 607, 614–624. See also bureaucrats, international
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 626
international competition, taxation, 457, 459, 463, 464, 487n11
International Finance Corporation (IFC), 615
international financial institutions (IFIs). See also specific institutions
employees, 614, 638n21
IMF managing directors, European, 614
process-conditionality, 619
World Bank presidents, U.S., 614
International Monetary Fund (IMF). See also international organizations, political economy
conditional delegation, 621
conditionality, 613, 618, 620, 622, 627, 632, 638n18
European, 614
growth forecast optimism, 610, 638n8
interest groups on, 627–629, 639nn21–22
loan numbers, after elections, 610
microconditionality, 620
mission creep, 619–620
International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff
backgrounds and education, 616
independence from principals, 621
national representation, 614–615
policy outcomes, 617–618
recruitment and self-selection, 616–617
socialization hypothesis, 617
international organizations, political economy, 607–639. See also specific topics and organizations
access, civil-society organization and non-state actors, 634
accountability, 634
bureaucrats, international, 607, 614–624
competition among, strengthening, 634–635
decision-makers, 607, 637n2
democratic dilemma, 633–634
direct democracy, 635
favoritism, 611–612
forecasts, vs. private forecasters, 610, 638n8
formation conditions, 607, 637n1
interest groups, 624–629
literature and research, 607–608, 637nn3–4
mission creep, 619
politicians, 608–614
public choice, 607
reform, national representation, 635
reform, proposals, 633–637, 639nn28–29
transnational actors’ access, 625–626
transparency, increasing, 623
U.S. disproportionate control, 632, 639n26
voters, 629–633
voting system reform, 635
international tax competition, 595–596
international trade, politics, 653–665, 675nn21–29
Internet effect, mobilization and revolutions,