- Copyright Page
- How Should Votes Be Cast and Counted?
- Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?
- Divided Government: The King and the Council
- Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
- Politics and the Legal System
- Constitutional Review
- Institutions for Amending Constitutions
- Constitutional Transition
- Electoral Systems in the Making
- Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
- Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
- Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model After 40 Years
- Are There Types of Dictatorship?
- Are There Really Dictatorships?: The Selectorate and Authoritarian Governance
- The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes
- The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
- Direct Democracy and Public Policy
- Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
- The Significance of Political Parties
- The Least Dangerous Branch?: Public Choice, Constitutional Courts, and Democratic Governance
- Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
- The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
- The Politics of Central Bank Independence
- The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
- Political Participation and the Welfare State
- Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
- Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
- Is Government Growth Inevitable?
- The Political Economy of International Organizations
- The Politics of International Trade
- Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy: What Do We (Not) Know?
- The Politics of International Aid
- Is Democracy Exportable?
- Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
- Christian History and Public Choice
- Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
- Precursors to Public Choice
- Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
- The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
- Voting and Popularity
- Detection of Election Fraud
- Experimental Public Choice: Elections
- Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Abstract and Keywords
In this chapter, the authors survey the empirical success of the spatial (or geometric) theory of voting. Empirical work lagged behind the development of theory until about 30 years ago and since then has exploded, with ideal-point estimation emerging as an important methodological subfield in political science. Empirical applications of spatial theory are now legion, and the basic news is that the spatial model has been enormously successful in explaining observed political choices and outcomes at both the elite and mass levels. In the United States, empirical estimates of the spatial model also help to explain incongruities between the median voter theorem and party polarization. These empirical estimates have demonstrated that the theory is extremely powerful on a number of levels—indeed, that it is one of the most successful mathematical theories in the social sciences.
Christopher Hare is Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of California, Davis.
Keith T. Poole is Philip H. Alston Distinguished Chair and Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia.
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