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date: 04 June 2020

(p. 899) Index

(p. 899) Index

Tables and figures are indicated by an italic t and f, respectively, following the page number.

2-trade, 121n2
Aarøe, L., 337
Abdulkadiroglu, A., 731
Abrams, Samuel, 370–371
Abramson, Paul, 299
absentee voting, 327
all-postal, 328
e-voting, remote, 327–328
absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index, 110
access prices, appropriate and nondiscriminatory, 588, 597n7
Acemoglu, D., 555, 610, 612–613, 657
Achen, Chris, 381
Ackerman, Bruce, 773
activist support for political parties, 223–233. See also party (political), activist support
activist valence, 222
Adams, James, 174, 203, 272, 283–284, 288n47
Adams divisors, 896n8
additive valence, 272–273
additivity, 726, 871
adjusted winner (AW). See also fair division, in dispute resolution
additivity, 871
applications, 868
envy-freeness, 868, 869, 871
equitable/ity, 871
linearity, 871
procedure, 727–728, 727t
procedure illustration, 870–872, 870t
properties, 868–870
adjusted winner (AW) solutions, 876–878
define issues, 882–883
make point assignments truthful, 880–881
minimize adjusted winner’s vulnerability to manipulation and spite, 879–880
optimize timing, 881–882
render issues separable, 881
advantaged candidate, 267
advertising, campaign, 417, 418, 420–421
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 416
affine-shares contract, 709n15
Affordable Care Act, expected benefit, 352–353
age, voting, 316–317
agency problems
between organization’s workers and goals, 13–14
between partially informed voters and elected representatives, 13
agenda power, 95–96, 101n9
agenda setter, 168, 183n2
agenda setting, in one dimension choice, 168–171, 169f, 170f, 183nn2–6
aggregate approach, rent-seeking costs, 551, 555–557, 560t
aggregate happiness indicators, 788–789
aggregation of information, by binary voting rules, 127–144, 128
applications, 137–138
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 127
business administration, 138
decision capability, 127
dependent decisions, 134–135
future research, 138–139, 139n3
general dichotomous model, 128, 130–134
general dichotomous model, asymmetric alternatives, 133–134, 143–144
general dichotomous model, heterogeneous competencies, 130–133, 139nn1–2 (see also heterogeneous competencies) (p. 900)
industrial organization, 138
labor economics, 138
latent competencies, exposing, 135–137
management and structure of firm, 138
personal preferences (tastes), 127
simple dichotomous model, 128, 129–130
simple majority rule, 128
team decision group, 127–128
webometrics, 139n3
aggregation rule, optimal, 129
heterogeneous competencies, 131
small teams (n≤5), 132–133
Aghion, Philippe, 637
agnotology, 662n12
agreement, 35–36
Aidt, Toke S., 493, 604, 618, 619, 622n8, 634
Akerlof, George A., 343, 353
al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakra, 863
Albert, Hans, 808n2
Aldrich, John, 222, 325, 327, 457
Aleman, Eduardo, 405
Alesina, Alberto, 357, 631
Alford, J. R., 420
Ali, S. Nageeb, 370
Alito, Samuel, 240n30
allied interest blocs, 149
allocative efficiency, 587
all-things-considered choice, 340, 341
Alonso-Meijide, J. M., 116
AL procedure, 732n11
Al Qaeda, 863
Altbach, P. G., 495
alternative, covered, 459n2
alternatives, number of
total, 147, 148
voter picking single outcome, 148, 162n1
altruism
expressive voting, 340–341, 346n13, 354–355, 717
vs. fairness, 352
altruism, political action and, 351–358
advantage, vs. civic duty and expressive voting, 354–355
altruism-as-sympathy, 352
candidate programs helping others, 352–353, 358n1
civic duty and expressive voting, 351–352
definition, 352
dictator games, 357
Down’s cost-benefit analysis, 351
group identity altruism, 353–354, 358n2
liberal and conservative altruists, 354
methodological individualism, 356–357
origins, 357
on political information, acquiring, 356
on political participation, 356
public interest groups, 356
strategic voting and, 355
sympathetic (weak) altruism, 354, 357
utilitarian altruism, 353, 358n2
volunteer work, relational goods, 371
altruism-as-sympathy, 352
aluminum, Alcoa’s monopoly, 537
Alvarez, Michael, 297
al-Zarqawi, 863
ambiguity, 34–35
American Crossroads, 236
American National Election Studies (ANS), 250
American primary, 436
American Voter, The (Campbell), 248, 254, 311, 383
amoral familism, 630, 631
Amorós, Pablo, 438, 440
Ampofo-Tuffuor, E., 552
Anabaptists, 856t, 866
Anagol, Santosh, 294
Anarchical Fallacies (Bentham), 767
anarchical fallacy, 800, 808, 809n12, 811n39
anarchy
Buchanan, 26
Hobbesian, 533, 547–548n6
ideal, to constitutional government, 26–29
as individualist ideal, 29
as political ideal, 26
practical, 27
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick), 825
Anderson, C. J., 251, 252, 255
Andvig, J. C., 613
Anewalt-Remsburg, C., 548n9
Angelopoulos, K., 556–557, 560t, 561
announcement game, 697–698, 703, 710n26
anonymity, 49
(p. 901) anonymous index, 109
Ansolabehere, S., 114, 276, 277–278, 422
anticompromisers, 152
anticorruption statutes, 14, 545
antidumping legislation, 558
antiprivilege statutes, 14
antitrust policy, 597n3
Antoni, Giacomo Degli, 371
Aparicio-Castillo, F. J., 427
a posterior analysis, of voting power, 119
apportionment. See also fair division, in allocating cabinet ministries
divisor methods, 887, 890–895, 891t, 896n8
Jefferson, 887, 891t, 892–894, 896n8
mechanisms, 887
methods and sequencing, 890–893, 895–896nn4–9
in practice, 894–895, 896nn10–11
Webster, 887, 891–893, 891t, 896n8
approbation, 801
approval voting, 160
a priori analysis, of voting power, 103
a priori unions, 119
Aragones, E., 270, 279, 287nn34, 36
Aranson, Peter, 287n38, 597n4
arbitrariness, of social choice, 836–838, 843nn4–6
Arceneaux, Kevin, 184n15
arenas for voluntary exchange, 751
Aristotle
allocation, 720
constitution design, 15
equal treatment of equals, 716, 718, 722
happiness, 7
majority rule elections, 19
middle class in democracies, stabilizing role, 21n7
natural law and natural justice, 767
Nicomachean Ethics, 716
nondemocratic regimes, 851
Politics, 9
rational choice, 3
self-mastery, 20n2
Arrow, Kenneth J.
biography, 48–49
chaos results, 839
domain restriction, 152, 163n13
intransitivity/cycling problem, 11
libertarian scholars, 815, 826n3
preference aggregation, 843n4
Social Choice and Individual Values, 47
Arrow’s conditions, 48–49, 85–86
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 127
Arrow’s theorem, 78–80, 84n6, 771, 776n5
independence of irrelevant alternatives, 79
independence of irrelevant alternatives, modifying, 81
restricting profiles, 81
Ashworth, Scott, 157, 163n19, 184n14, 418
asset specificity, 577
associational activity, 628
social trust, 630
asymmetric alternatives, general dichotomous model, 133–134, 143–144
asymmetric benefits, exploitation of the great by the small, 469–470, 483
asymmetric information, 696, 708n2
voter turnout models, 324–325
Atkinson, D., 137
attractiveness, physical
communicator, 388
as information cue, 384
auction model, 609–610
Aumann, R., 107, 720
Auriol, A., 558, 560t, 561
Austen-Smith, David, 96, 98, 325, 405
austerity changes, 580–581
Austrian school, 827n5
Austrian socialist calculation problem, 843n4
average cost, 587
long-run, 587–588
Axelrod, Robert, 176
axiomatically characterized, 110
axioms, 109, 718–719. See also specific types
Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran, 852, 857t
Aztec empire, 856t, 859–860
backward folding induction-based strategy, 170
Baharad, E., 136
Baik, Kyung Hwan, 491, 492, 508, 509, 523
Bailey, Martin, 772
balance condition, 222
balanced alternation, 894
(p. 902) balance equation, 223–224
balance locus, 218, 219f, 224
balancing gains and losses accruing to different persons, 768–770, 776nn1–2
Balinski, Michel L., 731, 892
Banerjee, R., 611, 621
Banfield, Edward, 630
banks, independent central, social trust and, 640
Banks, Jeffrey, 96, 98, 325
Baños Pino, J., 558
Banzhaf, John F., 108
Banzhaf-Owen index, 119
Banzhaf value, restricted, 119
Barber, M. J., 427
Barbieri, S., 509–510
Bardhnan, P., 604
Bargagliotti, A., 67
bargaining
protocols, 122–123n9
small numbers, 577
Barnes, Barry, 473
Baron, David, 99, 114
Baron, D. P., 659, 662nn6–10
Barr, A., 621
Barry, Brian, 362
Bassi, Anna, 364
Baul, R., 611
Baumol, William, 555, 558
Bawn, Kathleen, 294
Baye, Michael R., 500, 521
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, 323
Bayesian persuasion, 705, 708n5
Bayes theorem, 161
Becchetti, Leonardo, 371
Becher, Michael, 364
Beck, R. L., 557
Becker, Gary, 477
corruption, 611, 616
political redistribution from rent seeking, 496–497
Becker, R. N., 337
behavior
economic, group identity, 353
expressive political, federalism, 344
mass political, literature, 381
rule-following, 28, 29, 36
saving and investment, rent seeking, 556
self-interested, government officials, 568
strategic behavior studies, 306n2
systems, voting rules and, 401–410 (see also voting rules, systems behavior and)
behavior, internal enforcement, 633, 644n3
Bélanger, Éric, 251–252, 255
Bénabou, Roland, 357
benefit of the doubt, 195, 204n11
benefits. See also specific types
asymmetric, exploitation of the great by the small, 469–470, 483
collective, groups seeking, 492
collective, rent seeking, 497–498
concentrated, 475, 483, 586
corruption, 604
marginal, 569
total, 569
of voting, consumption, 361–362
of voting, expressive, 334
of voting, instrumental, 355
of voting, psychic, 351
of voting, utility, 361
benefits, consumption
group, 362, 364
group-based mobilization models, 362, 363, 364–365
benefits, contestable
social cost, 489–511
social loss, 490–492, 490f
benevolent dictator, 789
benevolent principle, corruption, 609, 610–613, 622n4
benevolent social planner, 771, 776n4
Bentham, Jeremy, 7, 764, 766
Theory of Legislation, 767, 768
Bentley, Arthur, 452, 453–454
Benton, Allyson Lucinda, 253, 258
Ben-Yashar, R., 132, 138, 144
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, 183n8
Berg, S., 135
Berggren, Niclas, 636, 640, 641
Bergh, Andreas, 645n6
Bergson, Abram, 48, 770–771, 776n3
Bergstrom, T. C., 352
Bernergård, Axel, 529
Bernhardt, D., 280, 284n4
Bernholz, Peter, 455, 459n1, 855
(p. 903) Breton, Albert, 640
Bertrand, Marianne, 595
Besley, Tim, 427, 571f, 576–577, 611
Bhansali, Rajendra, 253
Bhavnani, Ravel, 252
Bianco, William, 456
bicameralism, on policy choice, 15
Bicknell, P. L., 420
bilateral transactions, 748, 757n50
bimodality hypothesis, for single-member single-ballot systems, 293–294
binary voting, basic framework, 104–107
simple voting games, 105–106
weighted voting games, 106–107, 121n1
binary voting, power indices, 107–115
computation, 115–117, 123n11
Deegan-Packel index, 113–114
Holler-Packel index, 113–114
Penrose-Banzhaf index, 107–110, 121–122nn2–6
Shapley-Shubik index, 110–113, 122nn7–8
binary voting rules, aggregation of information by, 127–144. See also aggregation of information, by binary voting rules
binomial voting model, 108–109
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 416
Bischoff, Ivo, 479–480, 482
Bjørnskov, Christian, 632, 634, 635, 636, 640, 641, 643
Black, Cyril, 481
Black, Duncan
biography, 46
choices as judgments, 164n24
intransitivity/cycling problem, 11
median voter, 150–151, 191
public choice, 42
simple majority rule, 85
single-peaked preferences, 68–69
single troughedness, 152
standard amendment procedure, 169, 169f
supermajority requirements, 122n7
Blais, André, 294–295, 297–299, 304, 306, 319, 320, 325, 357, 362
Blanes I Vidal, Jorid, 595
blanket primaries, 436
Bliss, C., 615
bliss point. See ideal point, voter
Bloch, Francis, 895n3
Bloomington School of Institutional Analysis of Development, 815, 816
Blue Laws, 599n18
Blume, L. E., 352
Bodenstein, Martin, 32
Bodet, Marc André, 297, 298
Boehmke, Frederick, 297
Boix, Carles, 632–637, 632f, 632t, 645n5
Boko Haram, 863, 865
Bol, Damien, 306
Boland, P. J., 131
Bolger, E. M., 120
Bombardini, Matilde, 595
Bond, Robert, 375
Boosey, L., 510
bootleggers and Baptists theory, 592–594
Borda, Jean-Charles de, 9, 20n4, 44, 71–72, 837
Borda count (rule), 44, 71–72, 74
vs. majority count, in decision making, 396–398, 397f, 398f
Borda paradox, 837–838
Börgers, Tilman, 324
Borm, P., 119
Bottom, William, 401, 405
bottom up, 823
Boucher, D., 755n29
bounded rationality, 578
Bouton, Laurent, 303
Bouveret, S., 730
Bowen, H. R., 774
boycott, consumer, 337
Braham, M., 113
Brams, Steven J.
adjusted winner properties, 871
claims problems, 723
fair division of divisible goods, 893, 895n5
fair division of indivisible objects, 727–729, 732nn12–13
logrolling and social choice, 454–456
optimality claim, 454
size principle, 113
vote trading, suboptimal outcomes, 454
Bratton, Michael, 252
Braybrooke, David, 770
(p. 904) Brennan, Geoffrey
contractarian construction, 752n9
contractarians, 759n66
duty to vote and ethics of voting, 320–321
esteem, 809n13
expressive choice and strategic voting, 338–340
expressive voter, 321–322, 336
expressive voting, institutions, and constitutions, 344
on Logic, 484n4
“Rent Seeking in Academia,” 494
tax policy, 33
Brexit, 168
bribes, 492
British Election Studies (BES), 251, 272
British Factory Acts, 594
Brock, W. A., 555–556
Bronars, S., 422
Brookins, P., 510
Brown, Mitchell, 642
Brumm, H. J., 556
Brunell, Thomas, 183n9
Bruni, Luigino, 371
brute luck, 716
B-term, 318
Buannono, Paolo, 633
Buchanan, James M.
advantage, mutuality of, 757n58
allowable tax base, restriction, 33
anarchism, 26
biography, 46–48, 56n2
Calculus of Consent, The, 15–16, 21n8, 30, 47, 50, 55, 452, 735, 747, 758n64, 773, 797, 804, 820
club goods, 471
coercion, justification, 773
collective action, 747, 756n46
constitutional choice, 28, 36n7
constitutional design and rational choice, 16, 21n8
contractarian constitutionalism, 746–750, 756–759nn44–69
contractarian construction, 752n9
contractarianism, 27
contractarians, 742, 754n27
debt, 33–34
economics tools for politics, 819
“Economic Theory of Clubs,” 48
exchange-contractarian paradigm, 751, 759n73
“fiscal brain” approach, critique, 818
free and responsible individuals, moral justification, 815
free society, 815
implicit logrolls, 452
institutional choice, 640
institutional framework for social cooperation, 822–823
Limits of Liberty, The, 32, 808n3
logrolling and social choice, 453–457
“Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy,” 747, 756n46
methodological individualism, 819
monopoly’s “dead hand,” 598n16
normative analysis, 822, 827n7
Pareto with Wicksellian principle of unanimity, 816
political exchange, 749, 758nn61–62
political outcomes, political institutions and constitutional rules in, 344
Politics by Principle, Not Interest, 803–804
“Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,” 747, 756n45, 823
priority of liberty, Rawslian system, 807, 811n37
promise with Nutter, 816–817
public administration, costs and incentives, 819
public choice as politics without romance, 55
public choice theory, 834
public finance, 819
“The Pure Theory of Government Finance,” 747
on Rawls, 811n35
on Rawls and The Calculus of Consent, 746–747, 756n44
Rawls inspiration, 823, 827n10
rent seeking, 494
social contract theory, 823, 827n10
spontaneous order of market, 739, 752n11
taxation, 33, 819 (p. 905)
Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy, 817
voting rules, costs, 30
voting rules, geometry, 15–16, 15f
Buchanan clubs, 471
Buchantianism
defined, 797, 808n3
justificatory focus, 798, 809n6
Buchantianism, political institutions and, 803–807
communitarian contractualism, merits, 805–807, 811nn32–35
procedural safeguards and rights, 804–805, 810–811nn27–31
Buckley v. Valeo, 416
budgeting, zero-based, 95–96
budget-maximizing model (Niskanen), 569–573, 570f
bureaucratic interest, 14
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 157, 163n19, 184n14
Bullock, John, 387
Burden, B. C., 288n41
“bureaucracy” as interest group, 567–581. See also “the bureaucracy” as interest group
bureaucratic efficiency
indexes, as rent-seeking proxies, 556, 560t
social trust, 632–634, 634f, 636f, 644–645nn2–4
bureaucratic oversupply, 569–573, 570f
bureaucratic quality, cross-country differences, 632, 644n2
bureaucratic rents, happiness and, 785–786
bureau-shaping models (Dunleavy), 570f, 574–576, 576f
business administration, aggregation of information by binary voting rules, 138
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 607
Butler, Bishop, 809n19
by-product theory of group formation, 470–471
Byrd Amendment, 558
Cahuc, Pierre, 637
Cain, Michael, 472
Calcagno, P. T., 339
Calculus of Consent, The (Buchanan and Tullock), 15–16, 21n8, 30, 47, 50, 55, 452, 735, 747, 758n64, 773, 797, 804, 820
calculus of constitutional choice, 749, 758n64
Calderon, C., 557
Calvert, Randall, 389, 684, 704
Calvin, Jean, 860–861
Calvin, John, 765
Calvin’s Geneva, 856t, 860–861
campaign finance, 415–429
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 416
Buckley v. Valeo, 416
Citizens United v. FEC, 416–417, 428, 429n4
contributions, 421–425
contributions, 1998 vs. 2014, 415, 429n1
contributions, 2008 election, 226f, 227, 239nn16–17
contributions, potential rents, 552, 560t
contributions, regulation, 425–426
controversy, 428
early laws, 428
expenditures, 417–421, 429nn6–11
expenditures, 1998 vs. 2014, 415
expenditures, on electoral outcomes, 418–419
expenditures, presidential campaigns, 415, 429n2
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 415
Federal Election Campaign Act, 415–416
Federal Elections Commission, 416
history and regulations, 415–417, 429nn1–5
integrated political strategy, 425
for personal consumption, 429n9
Randal v. Sorrell, 416
regulation, 426–427
roll-call vote outcomes, 428
soft and hard money, 416
spending, 2010 election cycle, 237
Tillman Act of 1907, 415, 429n3
unanswered questions, 428
U.S. issues, 428
campaign valence, 286n22
Campbell, A., 248, 254
American Voter, The, 248, 254, 311, 383
Campbell, Colin, 324
Campbell, David, 371
Campbell, J. E., 258, 420
Camp David accords, 868, 895n2
(p. 906) Camp David accords, issues, 872–876
diplomatic recognition of Israel, 874
formal linkage of accords and Palestinian autonomy, 875
Israeli recognition of Palestinian rights, 875
Jerusalem, 876
overview, 872–873
Sinai Peninsula, 873–874
West Bank and Gaza Strip, 874–875
Campos, N. F., 616
candidacy, 435
candidate, 284n2
advantaged, 267
incumbents and challengers, 280, 288n40
moving sequentially, 280, 288n40
multicandidate competition, 183n12, 267, 281–282
multicandidate models, 282–284, 288nn43–49
multicandidate voting games, 120
plurality-maximizing, 282
policies proposed, limits, 279, 287nn38–39
policy preferences, 281, 288nn41–42
positions, 219–220
positions, optimal vs. opponent’s, 218
positions, vs. party positions, 389–390
programs helping others, 352–353, 358n1
strategies, uncertainty about, 277–278, 287n34
thermometer scores, 671
three-candidate cycles, two-thirds rule, 63–64
valence differences between, uncertainty about, 278, 287n35
valences, 269, 286n22
valences, nonpolicy, 219–220
valences, vs. policies, 269
vote-share-maximizing, 282
voting for, vs. for a policy, 267
candidate, primaries
aspiring, 438
competition, with same party, 438
polarization, 439–441
candidate selection
linear model, 440
primary bonus, 439
strategies, uncertainty about, 277–278
valences, nonpolicy, 219–220
candidate selection method (CSM), 433–447
academic interest, 424–435, 447n5
candidacy, 435
categorization, 435–438, 447nn6–10
consequences, 439–441, 447nn11–16
early contributions, 433, 447nn1–3
exclusive pole, 435–436
future research, 445–446
on governance, 434
importance, 433–435, 447nn1–5
political trends, 434
primaries, 436–437
selectorate, 436
variety, global, 433
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter), 45, 49–50
capitalism, unbridled, 818
capitulation wages, 611
Caplan, Bryan, 322–323, 342
Carlin, Ryan, 258
Carroll, Lewis. See Dodgson, Charles
cartels, 537–538
government-created rents on, 539
Case, A., 427
Casella, Alessandra, 32
case study method, 4
Castanheira, Micael, 303
Castiglione, Dario, 755n29
catallactics, 749, 758nn60–63
catenary, 222f, 224
caucus, manipulation, 408–410, 409f
causal effect, rationality and probability of, 335–336, 345nn5–7
causality, conceptualizing, 629–631
Cautres, Bruno, 183n8
Center for the Study of Public Choice, 54
centrifugal movement, 669f, 670f, 674, 675f
(p. 907) centrist coalition, 178–181, 181f
centrist positions, 198
Certificate of Need (CON) application, 426
Chamberlain, Gary, 319
Chamber of Commerce, 236–237
Chambers, Dustin, 594
Chamlee-Wright, Emily, 640
Chan, Steve, 480, 482
chaos results, 839
Chappell, Henry W., Jr., 249, 253, 422
character-based valence, 204n11
characteristic function, 105
characteristic vector, 115
charismatic leader, 850
Chawdhry, M. A., 556
Che, Y.-K., 501
cheap-talk game, 685, 687–688
announcement game, 697–698
equilibria, 709n10
openness vs. secrecy, 695
Chen, Tse Hsin, 252
Chevaleyre, Y., 730
Chicago School of Political Economy, 815–816
Cho, In-Koo, 709n14, 710n27
Choi, Kwan, 480, 484n11
choice, 25, 35. See also specific types
all-things-considered, 340, 341
expressive, 339
expressive, strategic voting and, 338–340
geometry, 8–9, 8f
institutional, 640
instrumental, 339
Luce’s choice axiom, 162n4
models, Aristotelean (utilitarian) approach, 7
probabilistic, 671
rational (see rational choice)
selfish vs. benevolent, redistribution, 341
sincere, 889
sophisticated, 889, 894
structured, 89
subset, 160
choices as judgments approach, 164n24
Chong, A., 557
Chowdhury, S. M., 509
Chzhen, K., 272, 286nn21–22
Cicero, 766
citizens. See also voter
as addresses of policy advice vs. metric stations, 789
happiness, institutions on, 16
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 235–236, 416–417, 428, 429n4
civic duty
vs. altruism, 354–355
cost-benefit analysis of voting, 320, 351–352
ethical voter and, 320–321, 351–352, 362
on turnout variation, 355
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 313
claims problems, 719–723, 721t, 731nn5–8
Clarke, Edward, 50, 774
Clarke/Groves solution, 51, 55
classical liberal political economy, post–World War II reconstruction, 816–819
“classical” public choice models
budget-maximizing, 569–573, 570f
rent seeking, 570f, 573
Clean Air Act, 593–594
clientelism, 622n1
Cline, Brandon, 637
closed primary, 437
closed rule, 89
cloture, 240n24
club good, 471
coalition, 47, 52, 105, 452–459. See also logrolling, coalitions and
agenda setting, 168
centrist, 178–181, 181f
connected, 176
definition, 176
extremist, 177
governing, 182
grand, 105, 256
logrolling, 452–459 (see also logrolling)
losing, 105
losing, maximal, 105
minimum winning, 456–457
structure, in one dimension choice, 176–181, 179f, 181f, 183–184nn12–14
winning, 105
winning, minimal, 105, 114
(p. 908) coalition agreement. See also logrolling
parliamentary democracies, 458–459
party, 452
coalition bargaining, 890
minimum winning coalition, 456–457
coalition formation
agenda methods and sequencing, 890–893, 895–896nn4–9
single crossing, 184n14
single peakedness, 184n14
coalition governments, 895n4
formation, in parliamentary democracies, 888–890
Coase theorem, 454, 610
Coate, Stephen, 321, 418, 421, 427
Coates, Dennis, 480, 481, 482
codecision procedure, 120
coercion, justifying, 767–768
consensus and revealed preferences, 773–775, 776nn7–8
social welfare maximization, 770–772, 776nn3–6
Coffey, Eva, 257
Cohen, Geoffrey, 389, 390
Cohen, Marty, 445
Cole, I. M., 556
Coleman, James S., 52–53, 628–629, 644n1
Coleman, J. S., 122n3
collective action, 467–484. See also specific topics
constitutional analysis, 472
group formation, 468–474
interest groups and macroeconomic inefficiency, 474–483
logic, 52
Logic of Collective Action, 56n6, 467, 472–474, 484nn3–5, 589, 598n10
NATO, 472
Olson, 467–468
problem, interest groups, 356
religion, economics of, 473
Rise and Decline of Nations, The, 52, 467
Warsaw Pact, 472
collective benefits, rent seeking, 497–498
collective choice
arbitrariness, 836–838, 843nn4–6
division and specialization of labor, 88
method, 10
as redistributive decision, 839–840
social democracy, 834
collective decision making
sensitivity, 120
two-stage process, 47–48
Collier, P., 337
Collins, Courtney, 594
commitment, 808n4
problem, delegation on, 578–579
committee, 88
Dodgson-Ratliff committee of two, 70
member preference change, majority rule with unrestricted proposals, 402–404, 403f, 404f
multidimensional system, 93–94, 93f
committee games, weighted, 120
committee of the whole, 88
committee system
gatekeeping power, 458
influence and access, campaign contributions, 423–424
on logrolls, 458
common knowledge, 135
Commons, John, 468
communication structure, 119
Communism, 852
communitarian contractualism, merits, 805–807, 811nn32–35
comparability, 86
comparative institutional happiness analysis, 780–782
electoral democracy, forms, 780–781
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Project, 163n9, 204–205n12
comparative well-being. See also happiness, public choice and
policy assessments, 782
procedural utility, 782–783
competence, 127
competition
for natural monopoly position, 588
new public management, 572, 581
policy, 597n3
competitive solution, 212, 212f
complete dissipation hypothesis, 551–552, 560t
(p. 909) completeness, 65
complete simple games, 122n8
complexity, political system, as virtue, 34
composition down, 722
composition up, 722
compromisers, 152
compulsory voting, 327
concentrated benefits, 475, 483, 586
concentrated interests, 586
Concept of Law, The (Hart), 800, 809n9
concession property, 722, 731n7
condition D, 729, 732n13
Condon, Meghan, 374, 375
Condorcet, Marquis de (Nicolas de), 65, 837
biography, 43–44
“choices as judgments” approach, 161, 164n24
paired comparisons, 63
rational choice models, 9, 20n4
simple majority rule, 85
wisdom of the crowd, 129–130
Condorcet cycle, 208, 210f, 211f, 211t
Condorcet domain, 68–69
Condorcet jury theorem, 137, 161, 219
assumptions, 43
justification for democracy, 44, 137
on Madison’s extended Republic, 219
majority option, as better than minority, 774, 776n8
persistence, surprising, 131
simple majority rule, 49, 129–130
western democracies policies and success, 18
Condorcet point (core), 208, 209f, 210t
Condorcet winner, 11, 20n5, 43, 150, 406
ranking wheels, 74–75
Congleton, Roger, 16, 489, 501, 541, 550, 652–653
Politics by Principle, Not Interest, 803–804
congruence, media, 420, 429n11
Conlin, Michael, 321
connected coalition, 176
Connolly, J. M., 557
Conrad, Geoffrey, 859
consensus, coercion justification, 773–775
consistency, 722
consociationalism, 896n6
constant sum simple voting game, 106
constitution, 748, 757n51
collective action, 472
complexity, 31
de facto, 37n19
“democratic,” 37n21
design, rational choice and, 14–16, 15f, 21n8
economic, 33
efficiency from, 34–35
expressive voting and, 343–344, 346nn16–17
fiscal, 33
monetary, 33
political, marginal and total approaches, 29, 36n7
procedural, 30–32
public choice theorists’ view, 37n19
structures, potential significance, 32
substantive, 32–34
constitutional constraint, 34–35, 37n21
constitutional democracy and democratic institutions, 29–35, 804
constitutional constraint, 34–35, 37n2, 37n21
procedural constitution, 30–32
substantive constitution, 32–34
constitutional economics, 735
constitutionalism, contractarian, 27, 29, 36n3, 735, 746–750, 756–759nn44–69
constitutional political economy (CPE), 15–16, 15f, 48, 736, 827n8
vs. public choice, 821
social trust, 640–641
constitutional rules, 29
power, structuring, 27
role, 27
significance, potential, 32
starting from here, 27–28
constitutional societies, 36
constrained equal awards rule (CEA), 720–721, 723, 731n5
constrained equal losses (CEL), 721, 723, 731n6
constrained utilitarianism, 772, 776n6
constraint
choice, geometry, 8, 8f
constitutional, 34–35, 37n21
informational, voters’, 17–18
(p. 910) consumption benefit
group, 362, 364
group-based mobilization models, 362, 363, 364–365
voting, 361–362
consumption goods. See also specific types and topics
relational, 366
contestability, 588
contestable benefits, social cost of, 489–511. See also rent seeking
social loss from, 490–492, 490f
contestable rents, 511, 605, 606
losses from, 489
social loss from, 490–492, 490f
contested garment rule, 720
contested political persuasion, 651–662. See also persuasion, contested political
contest functions, 651
as persuasion functions, 654–657, 662nn3–5
contests (rent seeking)
bribes, 492
“doping,” 492
group, 491–492
group, for public good, 507–510
groups seeking collective benefits, 492
indivisible rent or share of rent, 491
nonobservability of, 495
number of participants unknown, 506
prerequisite success, 491
public good rent, 492
sabotage, 492
self-allocation, 530–531
contest success functions, 520, 651
contract
hypothetical, 737–738
implicit, 737–738
original, 737–738
contractarian constitutionalism, 27, 29, 36n3, 735, 746–750, 756–759nn44–69
contractarianism, 746
contract curve, 218, 219f
contractualism, 27
Contrat Social (Rousseau), 736
contributions, campaign, 421–425. See also campaign finance
1998 vs. 2014, 415, 429n1
potential rents, 552, 560t
regulation, 425–426
2008 election, 226f, 227, 239nn16–17
contributions, campaign, on influence
committee-level influence and access, 423–424
interest group relationships, long-term, 424
investment vs. consumption contributions, 423
roll-call votes, 422–423
contributions, marginal, 108, 725, 726t
conventions, party, 433–447, 436. See also candidate selection method (CSM)
convergence
to electoral center, 217, 218
to electoral center in equilibrium, 239n6
moderate, 174
to moderate positions, 11
convergence coefficient, 213–214, 214f, 231–232
convex loss functions, 286nn25–27
cooperation
leadership facilitating, 684
relational goods, 371
cooperative games, nonempty core, 725, 731n9
Copeland, A. H., 70–71
Copeland, Cassandra, 326
core, 208, 209f, 210t
core property, 725, 731n9
Cornes, R., 503, 509
corporate order, 751
corruption, 604–622
across U.S., variation, 644–645n4
benefits, 604
benevolent principle, 609, 610–613, 622n4
causes, cross-country evidence, 615–616
consequences, 617–620, 622nn7–8
corrupt procurement model, Auriol, 560t
culture of, 613, 621
culture of, on wars between France and UK, 644n2
definitions, 605–606, 605t
discretionary power, 608
economic rents, 609
efficient corruption, 609–610 (p. 911)
experiments, 620–621
grand, 609, 614–615
“greasing the wheels” hypothesis, 609–610, 618–619
growth, 556
growth, GDP, 617–618
influence-seeking activities, 605, 605t
literature focus, 606, 622n2
literature reviews, 604–605
measurement, 606–608, 622n3
measurement, perceptions on, 607
necessary conditions, 608–609
negative effects, 604
nonbenevolent principle, 609, 614–615
persistence and universality, 604
principal-agent model, 611, 613
public spending, composition, 557
pure, 606, 610
rent extraction, 434, 493, 543
rent seeking, 493
social interactions and self-reinforcing corruption, 609, 613–614, 621, 622nn5–6
social trust, 633–635, 642
social trust, U.S., 634, 634f, 644–645n4
theories, 608–615
Transparency International map, 604
weak institutions, 609
corruption development nexus, 617–620
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 607
corrupt procurement model, Auriol, 560t
cost. See also specific types
average, 587
average, long-run, 587–588
decision-making, 47
diffuse, 475, 483
external, collective decision making, 47
least-cost separating equilibrium, 710n27
opportunity cost rate of return, 547n1
rent-seeking, 550–561 (see also rent-seeking costs)
total, 569
transaction cost curve, 15, 15f
of voting, 318–320, 319–320
cost, marginal, 569, 587
advocacy, 574
sender-receiver games, 686
cost, social
contestable benefits, 489–511 (see also rent seeking)
lobbyists, 477
cost, welfare
monopoly, 491
rent extraction, 544–545
tariffs, monopolies, and theft, 50, 491
Costa Lobo, Marina, 256
Costas-Pérez, E., 608, 612
cost-benefit analysis
asymmetric information models, 325
civic duty, 320, 351–352
Down’s, 351
early, 769, 776n2
expressive voting, 351–352
lack of information and rational choice, 382–383
mental sensitivity analysis, 318–319, 320
utilitarianism justification, 770
cost-benefit criterion, social welfare function, 771
cost sharing, 723–726
cost function, 723, 724t
lower and upper bounds, 724–725, 724t
marginal contributions, 725, 726t
nonempty core, 724, 731n9
Shapley value, 725, 732nn10–11
Courbois, J. P., 556
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, noncooperative, 469
court independence, highest, on economic development, 16
Cowling, K., 551–552, 559t, 560
Cox, Gary, 292, 293–294, 305, 306
craftsmanship, 823–824
Crain, W. Mark, 479
credibility, communicator, 388
critical decision, 108
Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies (GPS), 236
cross-subsidies, regulatory, above-cost prices, 588, 598n9
crucial decision, 108
C-term, 318
culture, 16
culture of corruption, 613, 621. See also corruption
on wars between France and UK, 644n2
(p. 912) Cutts, David, 370
cycles, avoiding, limiting alternatives, 76–77
cycles, straightening out, 69–72
Borda count, 71–72
Copeland, 70–71
Dodgson, 70, 84n3
Kemeny, 64, 70, 84n4
cyclical majority, 837
cyclic effects
paired comparisons, 67
possible, 67–68
cycling, 43
global cycling theorem, 191–193, 192f
logrolling, 455–456
majority preferences, 90
majority rule, 456
parties’ positional, 204n7
cycling under simple majority rule
Black on, 46
Condorcet on, 43
Dagan, N., 723
Dalai Lama’s Tibet, 852, 857t
Dal Bó, Ernesto, 711n37
Dal Bó, Pedro, 711n37
D’Alimonte, Roberto, 172, 173f, 183n8
Danforth, John, 224–225, 239n15
Daniele, Gianmarco, 637–638
Dassonneville, Ruth, 253, 259
Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov, 640
dead hand, monopoly, 598–599nn16–17
deadweight losses, 497, 545
deadweight welfare loss, 587
Dean mean, 896n8
Debreu, G., 20n3
debt, Buchanan and Wagner analysis, 33–34
de Caritat, Marie-Jeane-Antoine-Nicolas, 837
decision capability, 127
decision-making costs, 47
decision process, voting rules and, 396–401
manipulation within and between voting rules, majority and Borda, 396–398, 397f, 398f
options and voting rules, changing, given individual preferences, 398–399, 398f, 411n1
organization and manipulation, 399–401, 400f
decisions. See also specific types
Borda rule vs. majority count, 396–398, 397f, 398f
dependent, 134–135
decisive, probability of being, 335–336, 345nn6–7
decisive decision, 108
decisiveness, 49
decisive simple voting game, 86–87, 106
de Condorcet, Marquis, 837
Dedekin numbers, 118
Deegan, J., 113–114
Deegan-Packel index (DPI), 113–114
De Figueiredo, J. M., 425
De Figueiredo, R. J., 426
Degan, Arianna, 300, 356
De Haan, J., 616
delegation, 523–525
delegation models, 571f, 572f, 578–580
difficult delegation, 572f, 579–580
straightforward delegation, 571f, 578–579
DellaVigna, Stefano, 375
Dellis, Arnaud, 302
DeLorme, C. D., 552
Del Rosal, I., 550, 558
demand-revealing process, 769, 774, 776n1
stability, western, 12, 21n6
Demange, G., 184n14
Demarest, Arthur, 859
de Mello, L., 557
Demichelis, Stefano, 324
DeMint, Jim, 237
democracy. See also constitutional democracy and democratic institutions; specific topics
Condorcet jury theorem, 18, 44, 137
constitutionally limited, 25
definition, 314
vs. dictatorships, 851
direct, 168, 339
economic, 838–839
forms, 25
indirect, 183n5
liberal, 314
middle class, stabilizing role, 21n7
populism on, 837 (p. 913)
rent seeking, 492
representative, 183n5
rules choice, 25
rules choice, participation and, 25
social, 834 (see also social democracy)
total, 853
democracy, electoral
countries classified as, 314
forms, 780–781
happiness, 780–781
democratic method, Schumpeter on, 45–46
Democratic Party
delegate selection rule, 239n16
membership demographics, 227, 227f
policy space, 239n22
as war party, 284n2
democratization, on social trust, 642
De officiis (Cicero), 766
dependence structure, voter preferences, 122n5
dependent decisions, 134–135
deprivation by others, rent seeking, 493
De Rachewiltz, Igor, 858
deservingness, 896n8
DeSio, Lorenzo, 172, 173f, 183n8
desirable characteristics, expressive voting for, 339
De Soto, H., 614
details, 73–76, 73f, 84n5
deterministic voting, 148. See also politics in one dimension
proximity, median voter with single dimension, 150
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 628
development
corruption development nexus, 617–620
economic, highest court independence on, 16
social capital, 628–629
D’Evelyn, Sean, 302
de Vries, Caspar G., 500, 521
Dewan, Torun, 684
Dhillon, Amrita, 324
d’Hondt, Viktor, 892
Diamond, J., 620
Diamond, Larry, 314, 895n3
dictator player, 117
dictatorship, with elite “councils,” democracy and, 29, 36n8
difficult delegation, 572f, 579–580
diffuse costs, 475, 483
diffuse interests, 586
dimensional reduction, 149–150, 162–163nn6–10
dimension of simple game (N,v), 123n11
Dinesen, Peter, 642
direct accounts, rent-seeking costs, 551, 553–555, 559t
direct democracy, 168, 339
direct enumeration, 115
directional models, 157–158
directional voting, 157–158, 176
direct primary, 436
disaggregating large hierarchies, new public management, 572, 580
discounted marginal utility (DMU), 574
discounting model, Grofman, 158–159, 159f, 164nn22, 23, 176, 176n10, 183nn10–11
discounting parameter, 158
discretionary power, 608
disenfranchisement, 312–313
disposable income, on voting, 248
dispute resolution, fair division in, 868–896. See also fair division, in dispute resolution
dissipation
complete dissipation hypothesis, 551–552, 560t
degree, econometric determination, 552
distance, 119
distribution, individual welfare, 717, 718f
distributional coalitions, 475–479
Becker’s model vs., 477–478, 484n9
extensions of basic model, 478–479, 484n10
fundamentals, 475–477, 484nn6–8
Tullock’s model vs., 477
distributive justice, principles, 717, 731n2
Di Tella, Rafael, 615, 784, 785
divide-the-dollar game, 92, 92f
divisor apportionment methods, 887, 890–895, 891t, 896n8
Dix, M., 279, 287n38
Dixit, Avinash, 523
Dodd, Chris, 238
(p. 914) Dodgson, Charles
biography, 44
“closeness,” 84n3
cycles, straightening out, 70
simple majority rule, 85
Dodgson-Ratliff committee of two, 70
Dodson’s method, ranking wheels, 75
Dolar, Burak, 594, 599n19
Dolez, Bernard, 294
domain restrictions, 152–155
single-peaked preferences as, 152, 163n13
dominance relation, 86–87
Donati, Pierpaolo, 366
“doping,” 492
Dougan, W. R., 557
Dougherty, Keith, 472
Dowding, Keith, 326
Downs, Anthony
biography, 49–50
candidate selection, linear model, 440
civic duty in voting, 320
collective action, 469, 484n1
convergence result, 15 assumptions, 174, 175t
convergence to electoral center, 219
cost-benefit analysis, 318, 351
cost of voting, 469
Economic Theory of Democracy, An, 311
information cues, 383, 386
Inside Bureaucracy, 569, 577
median voter equilibrium, 11, 30
median voter theorem, 177
overview, 268
party competition, 174
political competition, 652
political party information cues, 383, 390
positional dimensions of voting, 188
positional dimensions of voting, proximity of preferred positions, 191, 202, 204n6
prospective economic voting, 250
rational ignorance, 342, 382
rational voter hypothesis, 311, 317–318
Schumpeter’s influence, 45–46
unidimensional politics, 162n3
uninformed voters, 418
Downsian model, 266, 285n15
convergence, inaccuracies, 220
convergence result, 15 assumptions, 174, 175t
multicandidate competition, 281–282
multinomial conditional logit methodology model, 220
one-dimension competition between two office-seeking parties, 202–203
party loyalty vs., 160
political competition, 652
PSNE of, 267
restricting voter preferences, 271–272
Stokes’ criticism, 266, 284n1
two-party positional competition, 194
unidimensional, limits, 154
with valence, 270–271
voter turnout theories, 317
voting for a candidate vs. a policy, 267
Dreher, A., 608, 619
Drinkwater, S., 339
D-term, 320, 362, 363
Dubey, P., 110, 123nn12–13
Duch, Raymond, 251, 252, 254, 255
Duggan, J., 232
dummy player, 109, 726
Dunleavy, Patrick, 570f, 574–576, 576f
Dupuit, Jules, 776n2
Durden, G., 422, 556
Dutta, J., 619
duty to vote, 31, 320–321, 334, 336
Duverger, Maurice, 292, 306
Duvergerian equilibria, strategic voting and, 293–294, 302–303
Duverger’s law, 292, 293–294
under aggregate uncertainty, 306n6
Dworkin, R., 716
Dworkin, Ronald, 236
each against all, 519–521
Ebeke, C., 556
ecological fallacy problem, 250
economic constitution, 33
economic crisis, impact, 258–259
economic democracy, 838–839
“The Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes,” 249
(p. 915) economic development, highest court independence on, 16
economic freedom, trust and, 641
economic Kantianism, 797, 808n1
economic mainstream, Hobbesian, 797
economic orthodoxy, before 1971, 587–588, 597nn4–7
economic regulation, 585–586
economic rents, 533, 609
Economics (Samuelson), 818
Economics of Control (Lerner), 819
“Economic Theory of Clubs,” 48
Economic Theory of Democracy, An (Downs), 311
economic theory of Kantian political institutions, 803
economic theory of regulation, 585, 589–592
antitrust and competition policy, 597n3
free-rider problem, 598n12
privileged group, 598n14
regulatory cross-subsidies, 588, 598n9
regulatory rent seeking, 598n17
selective incentives, 598n13
special interest groups capturing, 592–594, 599nn18–20
stock exchange regulation, 598n16
transitional gains trap, 598–599n17
“The Economic Theory of Regulation” (Stigler), 589
“The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation” (Peltzman), 591
economic voting, 247–261
aggregate findings (1970-1990), 248–250
background, 247
early work and hypotheses, 247–248
economic crisis: impact, 258–259
economy: subjective and objective, 253–255
government responsibility for economy, attributing, 252
individual-level processes, 252–253
inflation, 253
institutions: economic context, 257–258
institutions: political context, 255–257
leading generalizations (2000-2010s), 251–253
patrimony, 260–261
sociotropic vs. egotropic, 251–252
survey findings: 1980-2000, 250–251
unemployment and growth, 253
Edelman, Paul, 896n7
Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy (Isakhan & Stockwell,), 310–311
Edlin, Aaron, 326
Edwards, G. A., 426
effective number of political parties
L-T index, 162n7
in parliament, 162n7
efficiency
adjusted winner procedure, 728
allocative, 587
from constitutions, 34–35
fair division and adjusted winner, 868, 869, 871
index, 110
productive, 587
efficiency effects, rent-seeking, 558
efficiency-wage model, 711n36
efficient corruption, 609–610
Egger, P. H., 616, 618
Eggers, Andrew, 595
egotropic economic voting, 251–252
Eguia, Jon, 99, 101n12
Egypt, pharaohs, 851
Ekelund, Robert B., Jr., 494, 547n4, 550, 554–556, 598n16, 599n19
Ekman, Joakim, 314
elections. See also specific topics
as chaotic, 219
geometry, 10–11, 10f
globalization, 314
1992, Israel, spatial social choice empirical analyses, 209f, 212–215, 213t, 214f, 216f, 238n1
nonpartisan, 184n16
nonpositional dimension, “valence” issues, 190
parliamentary, near-global universality, 314
presidential, near-global universality, 314
strategic voting, proportional representation, 294, 295, 299, 303–304
uncertainty related to, in spatial voting models of party competition, 199–202, 201f, 205–206nn19–22
(p. 916) elections, empirical analyses
Israel, 209f, 212–215, 213t, 214f, 216f, 238n1
United States, 216–222, 217f, 219f, 222f, 238–239nn4–14
elections, spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions
alternative dimensions, 188–190, 203nn2–3
election-related uncertainty, incorporating, 199–202, 201f, 205–206nn19–22
nonpositional dimension, “valence” issues, 190
elections, U.S.
primary, 437–438
2004, party spending, 240n29
2008, activist support before, 223f, 224–228, 225f, 227f, 239nn15–17
2008, campaign contributions, 226f, 227, 239nn16–17
2008, political equilibria, 230–233, 239nn18–21
2010, party polarization, 237
2010, spatial social choice implications, 236–238, 240nn32–33
2010, spending, 237
electoral covariance matrix, 231
electoral democracies
countries classified as, 314
forms, 780–781
electoral disequilibria, 11–12, 12f, 21n6
electoral laws
psychological impact on parties, 294
psychological impact on voters, 294
strategic voting across, 294
electoral mean, 239n12
electoral outcomes observation, strategic voting in, 293–297
electoral participation. See turnout
electoral rules. See voting rules
Elklit, Jøgen, 888
emotional appeals, as incentives, 711n37
encompassing interests (organizations), 482–483, 484n12
endogeneity claim, 255
endogenizing structure, 97–100, 101nn11–12
endogenous framework, 824
endogenous rule formation, 824, 825
Enelow, J. M., 220, 232, 285n16
Engelmann, D., 337
engineering college enrollments, as rent-seeking proxies, 556
entrepreneurial leader, 684
envy-freeness
allocation, existence, 729
axiom, 718, 728
division criterion, 869
efficiency, 868, 869
equitability adjustment, 871
“I cut, you choose,” 868
origins, 731n4
proportionality, 868, 869
epistemic judgments, 161
equal division, 725
equal proportions, 896n8
equal-stake assumption, 49
equal treatment of equals axiom, 716, 718, 722
equilibrium expenditure, hierarchical contest, 344
equilibriums
preference-induced, 87, 91–92
structure-induced, 87–100 (see also structure-induced equilibrium (SIE))
equilibrium strategies
first-prize sealed-bid all-pay auctions, 500–501
standard Tullock contest, 502–506
equilibrium traps, 94
equitability, 871
adjustment, 870–871
axiom, 728
fair division, 871
Erickson, R., 420
Erikson, Kimmo, 630–631
Erisen, Cengiz, 304
error-prone voters, 21n6
Esteban, J., 509
esteem
background information, 809n13
ingroup, 372–373
relational goods and turnout, 373–375, 377n3
scope, 809n18
(p. 917) estimated cleavage line, 217f, 218
ethical voter hypothesis, 320–321, 351–352, 362
Euclidean metric, 204n8
eudaimonia, achieving, 7
Eugénie, Dostie-Goulet, 298
evaluation instructions, 66
Evans, G., 272, 286nn21–22
e-voting, remote, 327–328
Evrenk, H., 283, 286nn19, 27, 288n47
Ewerhart, C., 510
example, leading by, 690–695, 709–710nn15–20
exceptional purchase mechanism, 558
excess of S at x, 114
exchange-contractarian paradigm, 751, 759n73
exchange of commitments, 749, 758nn63–64
exchange paradigm, 749, 757n55
exclusive pole, 435–436
exogenous framework, 824
exogenous valence, 219, 220
expected utility, 287n31
expected vote share, 218
expenditures, campaign, 417–421, 429nn6–11
1998 vs. 2014, 415
presidential campaigns, 415, 429n2
expenditures, national, voting rules on, 16
expert rule (ER), 132
exploitation of the great by the small, 469–470, 483
expressive choice, 339
strategic voting and, 336–337, 345nn8–9
expressive voter, 321–322
expressive voting, 31, 333–346
vs. altruism, 354–355
basic idea, 333–334, 345nn1–4
benefits of voting, 334
consumption benefit, 351
expressive choice and strategic voting, 336–337, 345nn8–9
generosity, altruism, and, 340–341, 346n13
institutions, constitutions, and, 343–344, 346nn16–17
vs. instrumental voting, 335
for merit goods, 339–340, 346n12
as moral choice, 339–341
for moral or desirable characteristics, 339
psychic benefit, 351
rationality and probability of causal effect, 335–336, 345nn5–7
for redistribution, 346n13
social pressure, illusion, and, 341–343, 346n15
strategic voting and, 336–337, 355
substantial and empirical issues, 337–343
theoretical issues, 335–337
voting as end in itself, 352
on voting itself, 355
external costs of collective decision making, 47
externalities, 796–797
extortion, rent sharing, 543
extremist coalition, 177
extremist underdog result, 202
Faillo, Marco, 371
Fair, R. C., 249
fair division, in allocating cabinet ministries, 887–896
apportionment in practice, 894–895, 896nn10–11
apportionment methods and sequencing, 890–893, 895–896nn4–9
divisor method of apportionment, 887, 890–895, 891t, 896n8
indivisible goods, 887
Jefferson method, 887, 891t, 892–894, 896n8
mechanisms, 887
in parliament, 888–890, 895nn1–3
Webster method, 887, 891–893, 891t, 896n8
fair division, in dispute resolution, 868–886
additivity, 871
adjusted winner, 868, 870–872, 870t (see also adjusted winner (AW))
adjusted winner solution, 876–878, 876t
Camp David accords, 868
Camp David issues, 872–876 (see also Camp David accords, issues)
comparison with actual agreement, 883–885
efficiency, 868, 869
envy-freeness, 868, 869, 871
equitability, 871
practical considerations, 878–883 (p. 918)
practical considerations, define issues, 882–883
practical considerations, make point assignments truthful, 880–881
practical considerations, minimize adjusted winner’s vulnerability to manipulation and spite, 879–880
practical considerations, optimize timing, 881–882
practical considerations, render issues separable, 881
proportionality, 868, 869
between two parties, adjusted winner, 868–869
fair division of indivisible objects, 726–731, 727t, 730t, 732nn12–13
fair division rules, 721, 721t
fairness concepts, 715–732
claims problems, 719–723, 721t, 731nn5–8
cost sharing, 723–726, 724t, 726t, 731–732nn9–11
fair division of indivisible objects, 726–731, 727t, 730t, 732nn12–13
fundamentals, 715–716
individual preferences, available information, 719
philosophical background, 716–719, 718t, 731nn1–4
what is to be divided?, 719
fairness vs. altruism, 352
fallacy of efficient corruption, 610
Falmagne, J.-C., 672, 674
familism, amoral, 630, 631
Farquharson, Robin, 170–171
feasible sets. See opportunity sets
Feddersen, Timothy, 321, 324–325, 356, 362
Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 415
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 415–416
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life Inc., 235
Federal Elections Commission (FEC), 416
federalism
centralization reforms on life satisfaction, 783
comparative institutional happiness analysis, 781–782
elites’ discretionary power, 33
equilibrium expenditure, hierarchical contest, 344
expressive political behavior, 344
on policy choice, 15
polycentric government, 32
public choice literature, 32
feeling thermometer scores, 666
Feigenbaum, J. J., 422, 429n5
Feld, L. P., 16
Feld, S. L.
benefit of the doubt, 195–197, 204n11
Condorcet jury theorem, 131
incumbents, winning policy platforms, 280
judgment models, 161, 164n23
majority decisions, accuracy, 131
net preferences, 153–155
single-crossing condition, 156
valence advantage magnitude for unbeatable winning position, 205n15
voters’ decisional capacity, estimating, 135–136
Feld-Grofman theorem, 153–155, 195–197, 196f
Felsenthal, Dan S., 104, 119, 301
Ferejohn, J. A., 99, 114
Ferguson, Adam, 739, 753n15
Ferraz, C., 612
Fey, M., 131, 232
Field, Bonnie, 444
Fieldhouse, Edward, 370
Fifteenth Amendment, 313
Finan, F., 612
finance, campaign, 415–429. See also campaign finance
Finer, Samuel, 310
Fiorina, M., 212, 212f, 250, 281, 321
Fireman, Bruce, 473
firm management, aggregation of information by binary voting rules, 138
“fiscal brain” approach, critique, 818
fiscal constitution, 33
Fishburn, P. C., 113
Fisman, R., 613, 619
Five Star Movement, 183n8
fixed setting, majority rule with unrestricted proposals, 401–402, 402f, 411n2
Flèche, Sarah, 781–782, 783
(p. 919) Fleurbaey, M., 716
Flochel, T., 558
folk theorem of valence politics, 266, 270–271, 285nn12–14
following the crowd, 135
Fonseca, A., 558
Food Stamp program, expected benefit, 352–353
For a New Liberty (Rothbard), 825
foreign trade restrictions, rent seeking, 556
formateur, 888–889, 895n3
Forsythe, Robert, 301–302
Foucault, Martial, 260
Fouirnaies, A., 424
Fourteenth Amendment, 313
Fowler, James, 321
Fraenkel, Jon, 172, 172f, 183n7
Fraga, Bernard, 365
Fraile, Marta, 259
Franklin, Mark, 252
freedom, 80n1, 808n1
free-rider problem, 558, 598n12
coercion, 469
collective agreements, 743
interest group formation, 52
larger groups, 469
low rent dissipation, 498
Nash equilibrium, 507
“privileged” groups, 469–470
public good, underprovision, 470
public goods, inexcludability condition, 468–469
public goods, negligible impact, 474
rent seeking, 497–498
selective incentives to overcome, 470–471
size principle, 469–470
tragedy of the commons, 470
Freidenberg, Flavia, 443–444
Freixas, J., 116, 120
French National Election Surveys (FNES), 251
Frey, Bruno, 16, 32, 781, 783, 787
Friedland, Claire, 589
Friedman, David, 822, 825
Friedman, Milton, 354, 811n34, 819
Frohlich, Norman, 362, 684, 708n2
frozen state, 677, 678f
Fujiwara, Thomas, 294, 295
Fukuyama, Francis, 630, 641
full-rent dissipation, 422–423
fully reflective choice, 339–340
Furtan, H. W., 558
Gaertner, W., 163n14
gains and losses accruing to different persons, balancing, 768–770, 776nn1–2
Galbraith, John K., 568–569
Gale, I., 501
Galileo, 4
game-theoretic models, of turnout, 323–325
asymmetric information models, 324–325
Poisson games, 324
Gamson, William, 473
Garcia-Valiñas, M., 114
Garrett, T. A., 554, 559t, 560
Gassebner, M., 619
Gauthier, David, 744–746, 755–756nn34–40
Gelb, A., 493
Gelfand, A., 137
Gelineau, Francois, 258
Gelman, Andrew, 325
gender
as information cues, 384–385
rent seeking, 493
general dichotomous model (GDM), 128, 130–134
asymmetric alternatives, 133–134, 143–144
heterogeneous competencies, 130–133, 139nn1–2 (see also heterogeneous competencies)
general equilibrium model, calibration, 556–557, 560t
generalized mutual-gains-from-exchange perspective, 749, 757n57
general principles, 4–5
General Theory (Keynes), 817
generating function method, 115
generosity, expressive voting and, 340–341, 346n13
Genghis Khan, 856t, 858
geometry
choice, 8–9, 8f
elections, 10–11, 10f
voting, 10–11, 10f
voting rules, 15–16, 15f
(p. 920) Gerardi, D., 137
Gerber, Alan, 373–374, 375, 418
Gerber, Elisabeth, 436–437, 439–440
Gersbach, H., 288n41
Geys, Benny, 315, 320, 637–638
Ghatak, Maitreesh, 571f, 576–577
Gibbard, Allan, 293
Gillespie, Ed, 236
Gintis, Herbert, 340, 365, 371
Giovannoni, F., 616
Glaeser, Edward, 357
Glazer, Amihai, 149, 573
Glinitzer, Konstantin, 183n10
global cycling theorem, 191–193, 192f
Godbout, J.-F., 255
Goel, R. K., 612
Goldman, A. I., 336
Good, Irving, 319, 774
Goodhart, Charles, 253
Goodin, Robert, 321
good Samaritan, 765
Gordon, Scott, 425–426, 808n4
Gosnell, Harold, 311
Gough, J. W., 752nn1–5
governance. See also specific topics
social trust, 629, 631–641
governing coalition, 182
Governing the Commons (Ostrom), 753n17, 823–824
government(s), 25–26, 36
activity, trust formation and, 641–643
budget deficit reductions, rent seeking, 557
formation, 96
officials, behaving self-interestedly, 568
performance, as information cue, 384
rents creation, 538–539, 547n5
government(s), choosing among, 25–37
agreement, 35–36
ambiguity, 34–35
choice, 25, 35
choice of rules and democratic participation, 25
constitutional democracy and democratic institutions, 29–35 (see also constitutional democracy and democratic institutions)
constraining, 34–35
grabbing hand, corruption, 609, 614–615
Gradstein, M., 492, 541
grand coalition, 105, 256
grand corruption, 609, 614–615
grand logroll, 457–458, 459
Grandmont, J., 156–157
“greasing the wheels” hypothesis, corruption, 609–610, 618–619
greatest happiness of greatest number, 764
Great Recession of 2008, on economic voting, 258–259
Green, Donald, 18, 373–374, 375, 420
Grether, David, 406
Grier, K. B., 16
Griffin, J. D., 548n9
Grijalva, D., 661
Grofman, Bernard, 660
additive valence, 272
apportionment, 888
benefit of the doubt, 195, 204n11
candidate choice, 388
Condorcet jury theorem, 131
domain restrictions and net preferences, 152–155
equilibria, two-candidate competition, 283–284
incumbents, 280
judgmental models, 161
party coalition formation, 181
party competition, 174–176, 175f, 175t
party competition, issue dimensions, 149
party polarization, cyclic variation, 174, 183n9
pure proximity-based voting, alternatives to, 157–160, 159f
single-crossing condition, 155–157
valence advantage magnitude, unbeatable winning position, 205n15
valence-based models and party identifications, 203
valence dimensions, spatial models with, 195–197, 196f
voter choice, 171–173, 172f, 183n7
voter decisional capacity, estimation, 135–136
Grofman discounting model, 158–159, 159f, 164nn22, 23, 176, 176n10, 183nn10–11
(p. 921) Groseclose, Timothy
incumbency advantage, 280, 288n40
kind of folk theorem, 284–285n4
logrolling, 457
moderating front-runner result, 202, 206nn21–22, 281
multiplicative valence with general loss function and single valence issue, 286n19
quadratic loss, 274
Grosser, Jens, 371
Grossman, G. M., 498, 541
Grossman, Sanford J., 708n3
group(s). See also specific types
actions, rational choice model, 13
consumption benefit, 362, 364
internal conflict and hierarchical structure, 527–529
mobilization models, 362, 363, 364–365
group decision process structure, 395
group decision process structure, voting rules and, 396–401
manipulation within and between voting rules, majority and Borda, 396–398, 397f, 398f
options and voting rules, changing, given individual preferences, 398–399, 398f, 411n1
organization and manipulation, 399–401, 400f
group formation (collective action), 468–474
applications, 472–473
basic logic, 468–471
Commons, 468
fundamentals, 468–469, 484n1
Logic of Collective Action, criticisms, 473–474, 484nn3–5
pre-Olson wisdom, 468
selective incentives to overcome free-riding, 470–471
size principle, 469–470, 484n2
group identity
altruism, 353–354, 358n2 (see also altruism)
Hume, 353
Groves, Theodore, 51
growth, economic
corruption and, 556, 617–618
economic voting, 253
social capital, 628–629
Gschwend, Thomas, 299, 303–304
Gui, Benedetto, 371
Guiliano, Paolo, 631
guilt, internal enforcement of behavior, 633, 644n3
Gundlach, E., 620
Gupta, S., 557
Guttman, Louis, 177
Guttman scale, 177–178
Hacking, I., 137
Hafer, C., 425–426
Hall, A. B., 420–421, 424, 427
Hall, R. L., 423
Hallerberg, Mark, 455, 459
Hamilton, Alexander, 896n7
Hamilton method, 896n8
Hamlin, Alan, 321, 322, 337, 338–339, 344
Hamm, K. E., 427
Hansen, John, 327
happiness
achieving, 7
citizen, institutions on, 16
happiness, public choice and, 779–792
aggregate happiness indicators, 788–789
bureaucratic rents, 785–786
citizens as addresses of policy advice vs. metric stations, 789
comparative institutional happiness analysis, 780–782
happiness policy, limitations, 789–790
improved information, strengthens electoral competition, 787–789
partisan preferences over inflation and unemployments, 784–785
playing the system, 789–790
policy assessments, specific, 782
policy choice issues beyond happiness calculus, 790
procedural utility, capturing, 782–783, 789
public choice hypothesis, testing, 783–785
valuing public goods, 787–788, 792n6
voters’ subjective well-being, 787, 792n5
Harberger diagrams, losses from monopoly, 538
Harberger triangle, 50, 490, 490f, 510, 551, 553
(p. 922) Hardin, Garrett, 740, 753n17
“The Tragedy of the Commons,” 740, 746
Hardin, Russel, 754n20
hard information, 685, 705
hard money, 416
harmonic mean, 896n8
Harsanyi, John, 287n34, 773
Hart, Herbert, 809n9
Hartley, R., 503
Hayek, Friedrich
conjectural history, 737
constitutional political economy, 628
deliberate concerted action, products, 759n72
deliberate legislation, 754–755n28
explanations of the principle, 752n6
individual interests, 754n26
“Individualism: True and False,” 750–751
Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, 754n25
Hayes, C. Rosa, 257
Hazan, Reuven, 435–436
Hazlett, T. W., 552–553, 559t, 560
heart, 208
Heckelman, Jac, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484n7
hedonism, 764
Heinecke, A., 163n14
Hellström, Jöorgen, 640
Hellwig, Timothy, 257
helping hand hypothesis, bureaucratic corruption, 609, 610–613, 622n4
Helpman, E., 498, 541
Henry, K., 420
Henry, Marc, 300–301
heresthetics, 410
Hermalin, Benjamin, 685, 688, 695, 696, 703–706, 708n7, 709n12
Herrera, Helios, 240n29, 364–365
Herrero, C., 723
Hessami, Z., 557, 622n6
heterogeneous competencies, 130–133, 139nn1–2
are two better than one?, 132
fundamentals, 130–131
number, interpretation, and identification of optimal aggregation rule in small teams, 132–133, 143
Heyndels, Bruno, 645n5
Hicks, John, 769
hierarchical contest, equilibrium expenditure, 344
hierarchies
disaggregating large, 572, 580
government, corruption from, 615
optimal, 529
structure, internal group conflict and, 527–529
“high score wins” game, 63–64
Hillman, Arye L.
all-pay auction, 521
corruption from government hierarchical structure, 615
equilibrium aggregate effort, derivation, 550
equilibrium strategies in first-prize sealed-bid all-pay auction, 500–501
expressive behavior and identity, 337
expressive political behavior, 322
expressive voting as moral choice, 339–341
rent dissipation, 498, 606
rent seeking, costs, 550
rent seeking, migration and, 493
rent seeking, survey, 489
rent seeking, two-stage contests, 491
Tullock’s model, 598n16
Hill proportions, 896n8
Hinich, Melvin, 149, 220, 232, 285n16
Hirshleifer, J., 509, 510, 662n1
Hirshleifer contest success function, 510
History of Economic Analysis (Schumpeter), 818
Hitler, Adolf, 849
Hobbes, Thomas, 533, 736
anarchy, 533
economic mainstream, 797
Leviathan, 736, 740–741, 754n21, 767, 768, 834
life before civilization, 547n2
opinion and belief of the people, 799–800
prisoner’s dilemma, 740–741, 754n21
rational individuals, opinion space, 809n16
Hobbesian anarchy, 533, 547–548n6
Hobolt, Sara, 256, 285n11
Hoffman, Elizabeth, 409
Hofreither, M. R., 552
(p. 923) Hogan, R. E., 427
Holburn, G. L., 425
Hollard, G., 286n19
Holler-Packel index (HPI), 113–114
Holmstrom, Bengt, 686
Homo economicus, 334, 335, 357–358, 800, 803, 808n3
homogeneity assumption, 122n7
homo noumenon, 800, 809n12
homo phaenomenon, 800, 809n12
honesty perceptions, 628
Hood, Christopher, 568
Horgos, Daniel, 480
Horn, Murray, 578–579
Hotelling, Harold, 45, 188, 202, 268, 418
Hotelling-Downs model, 45
Hotelling’s t-squared distribution, 45
Houser, D., 421
Hsu, Y.-F., 672–673, 678
Huck, Steffen, 705
Huckshorn, R., 427
Huddy, L., 337
Hug, S., 282
human action, principles and, 5–6, 20n1
human nature, ignorance and voter ideal points, 17–18
Hume, David
altruism, 352
consent criterion, 738–739
contractarian constitutionalism, 27
group-specific identities, 353
knavery, 799–800
“Of the Original Contract,” 736–737
public opinion, 810n22
pure reason and motivation, 801, 809n15
social contract theory, 736–738
social dilemma–type problems, 741, 754nn23–24
technocratic approach, 818
Hummel, P., 279, 287n36
hybrid models. See also specific types
equilibrium, 285n12
with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, 278, 287nn36–37
restricting voter preferences, 271
hybrid systems, 314
hypothetical consent, 750, 759nn67–68
hypothetical construct
gravity, 668
inferences from, legitimate, 671
persuasion, 674–676, 675f
semiorders, 669–671, 670f
weak orders, 668–669, 669f
hypothetical contract, 737–738
hypothetical contractarianism, 27
“I cut, you choose,” 868–870
ideal anarchy to constitutional government, 26–29
ideal point, 2008
distribution, activists, 229–230, 229f
distribution, voters, 229–230, 229f
ideal point, voter
definition, 191
elections, geometry, 10–11, 10f
electoral disequilibria, 11–12, 12f, 21n6
ignorance, human nature and, 17–18
linear distribution and median voter equilibrium, 11
political choices, one dimension, 147, 167
rational choice model, 8
voting, geometry, 10–11, 10f
identity, expressive voting and, 337–339, 345–346nn10–11
identity, group
economic behavior and, 353
Hume, 353
ideocracy, defined, 854
ideocracy, mature
definition, 854
development, typical, 850–851
historical evidence, 855–857, 856t, 865
ideological movements. See also totalitarianism; specific types
development, 850–851
secular power, crises, and rise of, 855
ideological proximity, self-perceived (Italy), 172, 173f, 183n8
ideologies
public choice profile, 834
rent seeking, 489, 510–511
secular power, crises, and totalitarianism, 855 (p. 924)
struggles, media and persuasion, 660–661, 662n11
supreme values and danger, 849–850
ignorance
human nature, voter ideal points and, 17–18
production of, 662n12
rational, 46, 342, 382
veil of, 48, 56n3
illusion, expressive voting and, 341–343, 346n15
Imai, Masami, 257
immigration
on employment, U.S., 553
rent-seeking, 493, 553
surplus, graphic model, 559t
impact function, 499
impersonal exchange, 756n42
implicit contract, 737–738
implicit logroll, 452
impossibility theorem, 49, 127
imputation, 114
inalienable rights, 805, 811n31
incentivization, new public management, 581
income
inequality, trust, 642
on voting, disposable, 248
income tax
negative, 354
rates, valence politics, 268, 285n8
incomplete information
rent seeking, 501–502
voter, 383
incumbents
advantage, 280, 288n40, 424
campaign finances, 424
candidates moving sequentially, 280, 288n40
as information cue, 384
winning policy platforms, 280
independence assumption, 122n7
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 48–49, 79, 81, 85
Inderst, Roman, 529
index-based studies
defense, 123n13
moratorium on, 120
index of voting power, 104, 110
indicator vector, 115
indifference curves, 8, 8f, 218, 219f
indifferent, 668
indirect democracy, 183n5
indirect influence, voter, 109
indirect measures, rent-seeking costs, 551–553, 559t
individual differences, geometry of choice, 9
individualism
methodological (see methodological individualism)
normative, 738
rational, on voter turnout, 361–362
“Individualism: True and False” (Hayek), 750–751
individualistic conceptualization, of state, 46–47
indivisible goods, 887
industrial organization, aggregation of information by binary voting rules, 138
inflation, voters punishing, 253
influence, campaign contributions on
committee-level, access and, 423–424
full-rent dissipation, 422–423
influence-seeking activities, 605, 605t. See also corruption
information
aggregation by binary voting rules, 127–144 (see also aggregation of information, by binary voting rules)
asymmetric, 708n2
exchange, turnout, 371
impactedness, 577
on preferences, 719
soft vs. hard, 685
information, improved, strengthens electoral competition, 787–789
aggregate happiness indicators, 788–789
public goods, valuing, 787–788, 792n6
voters’ subjective well-being, 787, 792n5
information, incomplete
rent seeking, 501–502
voter, 383
information, voter
acquiring, 356
asymmetric information models, 324–325
constraints, 17–18 (p. 925)
deficits, 319
partially informed voters and elected representatives, 13
information aggregation, by binary voting rules, 127–144, 128. See also aggregation of information, by binary voting rules
informational secrecy, 695–696, 710nn21–22
organization under, 684
information cues and rational ignorance, 381–391
attributes that matter, 388–389
available cues and consequences, 383–386
fundamentals, 381–382
government performance and incumbency, 384
information cue, definitions, 382–383
interest group endorsements, 385
literature, democratic theory, 381
literature, empirical, 382
literature, mass political behavior, 381
misleading, 389–391
motivation, 387
party cues, misleading, 389–390
party vs. candidate position, 389–390
party vs. policy, 390
physical attractiveness, 384
political party, 383–384, 390
public use, 387–388
social groups, 385–386
sociodemographic traits, 384–385
users, 386–387
Ingberman, D., 280, 284n4
Inglehart, Ronald, 203n3f, 205–206nn19–22
ingroup esteem, 372–373
initiative, 183n4
innovation, rent from, 537
Inside Bureaucracy (Downs), 569, 577
insignificance, veil of, 334, 345n4
instability, expectation of, 484n6
institution(s). See also organization
choice, 640
design, expressive voting and, 343–344, 346nn16–17
economic voting, economic context, 257–258
economic voting, political context, 255–257
governance, 818