Abstract and Keywords
Persuasion can be seen as a strategic setting—a game—in which a better-informed individual (a sender) seeks to influence what a less well-informed individual (a receiver) knows. The tension in such a game arises because the interests of sender and receiver are not fully aligned. Leaders often have incentives to mislead their followers. How leaders can communicate credibly to their followers has recently become a topic of study. This chapter surveys and synthesizes that literature. It offers an introduction to sender-receiver games and considers ways in which the problem of an untrustworthy leader may be overcome. At the end the chapter offers some directions for future research.
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