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date: 04 June 2020

Abstract and Keywords

While public choice theory is generally skeptical about government, challenging the assumptions that often underpin arguments for government or for governmental action in particular circumstances, it is also generally supportive of a particular form of government: constitutionally limited democracy. Public choice theory emphasizes choice and agreement in relation to constitutional government at several levels: the choice of government over anarchy, the choice of constitutional arrangements and rules, the choice of particular government administrations under democracy, and the choice of policy by governments acting within the constitution. This chapter sketches out these various levels discussing the relevant sense of “choice” at each level and identifying the key procedural and substantive issues involved in democratic constitutional design.

Keywords: anarchy, constitutional government, democracy, rules, agreement

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