- Copyright Page
- Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice
- Choosing among Governments
- Public Choice: Early Contributions
- From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow’s Theorem
- Institution-Induced Stability
- Voting Power
- Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications
- Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions
- Spatial Social Choice
- Economic Voting
- Valence Politics
- The Study of Strategic Voting
- Turnout: Why Do Voters Vote?
- Expressive Voting
- Altruism and Political Participation
- Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout
- Information Cues and Rational Ignorance
- Campaign Finance
- Primaries, Conventions, and Other Methods for Nominating Candidates: How Do They Matter?
- Logrolling and Coalitions
- Collective Action
- Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits
- The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation
- The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction
- Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking Costs
- “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group
- Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture
- The Political Economy of Trust
- Contested Political Persuasion
- Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change
- Leadership as Persuasion
- Fairness Concepts
- Social Contract versus Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas
- Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action
- Public Choice and Happiness
- Kantianism and Political Institutions
- Public Choice and Libertarianism
- Public Choice and Social Democracy
- Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism
- Fair Division in Dispute Resolution
- Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries
Abstract and Keywords
Just as voting occupies a central role in democratic politics, so a rational choice–theoretic account of voting occupies a central role in public choice theory. Such an account must initially address two questions: under what circumstances is it rational for an individual to vote, and in those circumstances, how will a rational individual cast his or her vote? After reviewing the basic logic of expressive choice, this chapter addresses salient theoretical and empirical themes relating to expressive voting. The theoretical section addresses the debate regarding the probability of causal effect when voting, strategic voting, and institutional design. The empirical section discusses expressiveness as related to identity and moral choice, and the extent to which expressive choice can be distinguished from social pressure and illusion.
Alan Hamlin is Emeritus Professor of Political Theory at the University of Manchester and Visiting Professor and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London.
Colin Jennings is Reader in Political Economy at King’s College London.
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