Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 10 July 2020

Climate Change and Energy Transition Policies

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter focuses on policies designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change and policies that encourage transition away from fossil fuels and toward greater energy efficiency and low- or non-emitting energy sources. It describes categories into which countries’ legal and policy approaches to climate change and energy transition can be divided and illustrates them with select examples from various jurisdictions. The chapter also examines regulations and policies to address climate change and energy transition, the roles of key international agreements, and factors important to the effectiveness and transferability of policies. The discussion covers the scope and structure of law governing climate change and energy transition; policies at the national, sub-national, and local levels; executive and legislative roles; litigation over climate change policies; and substantive provisions relevant to energy efficiency and electrification, renewable energy, and nuclear energy.

Keywords: comparative environmental law, climate change, energy transition (Energiewende), electrification, separation of powers, legislation

25.1 Overview

Most countries are engaged in some form of energy transition away from fossil fuels and toward greater energy efficiency and low- or non-emitting energy sources, or at least aspire to do so. Climate change is foremost among the reasons for undertaking this transition, owing to the causal relationship among climate change, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and fossil fuel consumption. But while those national policies that seek to mitigate and adapt to climate change and those that encourage an energy transition overlap, sometimes substantially,1 this chapter discusses each category of policy separately.

(p. 533) To keep its scope manageable, the chapter offers rough typologies of particular subcategories and illustrates them with select examples from a wide range of jurisdictions.2 Following this survey of regulations and policies to address climate change (section 25.1) and to accomplish energy transition (section 25.2), section 25.3 discusses the roles of key international agreements. Section 25.4 offers brief analytic observations about factors important to the effectiveness and transferability of policies discussed earlier in the chapter.

Before describing categories into which countries’ legal and policy approaches to climate change and energy can be divided, it is important to spell out the precise meaning of several key terms as they appear in this chapter. ‘Law’ refers to any measure that is binding on either a government or private party; ‘legislation’ or ‘statutes’ are generated by whatever body has national legislative authority; a ‘regulation’ is legally binding as a result of executive action; ‘executive action’ is used here to describe policy decisions whose scope of legal effect varies widely across countries, but that, unlike a regulation, does not necessarily have legally binding effect; finally, ‘policy’ refers to any set of measures formally announced by a government and is not necessarily formally binding unless embodied in some form of law.

25.2 Climate Change Regulation

25.2.1 Scope and Structure of the Regulation

Many countries have addressed the challenge of climate change by adopting comprehensive laws that create a framework for all other policies related to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. Other countries have done so by adopting—to greater or lesser degrees—new laws that address climate change piecemeal without displacing existing laws that do not, yielding a patchwork. Still other countries’ approaches involve the adoption of climate change policy but no laws codifying it (this category has shrunk substantially over the last decade). Finally, a fourth category of countries has no climate change policy whatsoever. Comprehensive Regulation

‘Comprehensive’ regulatory approaches to climate change action establish overarching emissions targets or budgets to guide national mitigation efforts, risk assessments, and adaptation agendas, as well as procedural and institutional measures to support progress toward compliance with both.3 Such approaches often do not specify how mandates should be implemented, leaving that task to sector-specific legislation or implementing regulations.

(p. 534) The majority of countries that have adopted laws expressly responsive to climate change have taken a comprehensive approach,4 authorized either by decision of the full legislature—as in Brazil,5 Mexico,6 New Zealand,7 South Korea,8 and the United Kingdom9—or through regulations adopted by the executive with tacit legislative approval—as in China,10 Fiji,11 India,12 Pakistan,13 and the Netherlands.14 The framework laws of the United Kingdom and India, summarized here, provide examples of each.

The UK Climate Change Act 2008 (echoed and reinforced by the Scottish Parliament’s Climate Change Act 2009)15 sets an emissions reduction target of 80 per cent from a 1990 baseline by 2050, as well as specifying increasingly tight emissions budgets for the five-year periods leading up to 2050.16 The first three five-year budgets were set in 2009; the fourth, approved by Parliament in 2011, calls for a 50 per cent reduction from a 1990 baseline by 2025; and the fifth calls for 57 per cent reduction by 2030. The Act also establishes an independent, expert Committee on Climate Change, which is to provide recommendations to the government and to report annually on compliance with the emissions budget.17 Importantly, (p. 535) the government must explain itself whenever it rejects the Committee’s advice,18 as it did in 2012 on the question of whether to include in the five-year budgets emissions from international aviation and maritime shipping with a nexus to the United Kingdom.19 This reporting requirement is the primary means of enforcing these legally binding budgets, as the Act does not create a private cause of action pursuant to which private actors might sue the government for failure to implement either particular provisions or the Act as a whole.20 In addition to establishing this overarching mitigation framework, the Act’s various other provisions include a call for a climate change risk assessment every five years,21 and authorization for the government to launch subsidiary programmes like the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme, which targets emissions not covered by the European Union’s GHG Emissions Trading Scheme and calls on the country’s largest electricity consumers to reduce their carbon footprints through improvements to energy management.22

India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change is a nonbinding coordinating document, first issued by the Prime Minister’s National Council on Climate Change in 2008.23 Unlike India’s Five Year Plans, which set targets for economic growth, the National Action Plan does not set any overarching target for emissions reduction. Instead, it describes ‘National Missions’, each of which serves climate change mitigation and/or adaptation goals.24 The 2008 plan contained eight National Missions, addressing: solar energy, energy efficiency, forests, ‘strategic knowledge for climate change’ or research and development, water, sustainable habitat, sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem (focused on protecting water supplies flowing from the north of India), and sustainable agriculture. In 2014 the Council added four more to address: wind energy, human health, coastal resources, and waste-to-energy.25 Some but not all of the National Missions draw on pre-existing legislation—for instance, the Mission to Enhance Energy Efficiency builds on the Energy Conservation Act of 2001. Although (p. 536) comprehensive in many respects, the National Action Plan is not the sole basis of climate change-related policy: the National Clean Energy Fund, for instance, which draws revenue from a tax on coal and allocates it to the development of renewable electricity generation capacity, was established in 2011 by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs.26 Patchworks of Old and New Laws

Patchworks of old and new laws comprise some that are expressly oriented to climate change, others that are incidentally responsive to climate change, and still others that are indifferent to it. Laws in the middle category, which govern areas such as land use, energy use, air pollution, environmental protection, and environmental impact review, were often not written with climate change in mind, but can nonetheless provide a legal basis for acting on climate change. Argentina, Canada, and the United States provide characteristic examples of patchworks: although the limited legislation that expressly addresses climate change in each country has not substantially reoriented policy, regulations and other executive actions have begun to do so, largely by applying existing legislation to the new purpose of climate policy.

Argentina’s national legislature voted to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001,27 and in 2007 enacted a forest conservation law whose express goals included carbon sequestration.28 It also enacted renewable energy legislation in 2007 and again in 2015, in both instances making express mention of emissions reduction goals.29 A series of presidential decrees have stitched these measures together with the country’s constitutional commitment to sustainable development,30 and its General Environmental Act of 2002, which established the Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development (SAyDS).31 Those decrees made the SAyDS responsible for compliance with commitments Argentina made to the UNFCCC in 2002,32 created an office for participation in the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the same year,33 and created the Argentine Carbon Fund to manage investments in emissions reduction and sequestration projects in 2005.34 To implement these legal measures and climate policy more generally, in 2010 the SAyDS created an intragovernmental steering committee, the Governmental Commission on Climate Change, which has a leading role in formulating and implementing Argentina’s National Strategy on Climate Change.35

(p. 537) Canada’s political ambivalence about how to respond to climate change36—reflected in its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and withdrawal from it in 201237—has generated a mixed bag of legislative and regulatory measures, including the 2005 Emissions Reduction Incentives Agency Act and the Clean Air and Climate Change Trust Fund included in the 2007 federal budget. The 2005 Act established an Agency to manage emissions reduction incentives in keeping with Canada’s ambitious emissions reduction commitment of six per cent below 1990 levels by 2012.38 But the Agency never performed this function and was ignored even by the 2007 Budget Implementation Bill, which created a C$1.519 billion Clean Air and Climate Change Trust Fund for allocation by provincial governments of federal money to emissions-reducing projects in Canada.39 Also in 2005, the Canadian Cabinet (‘Governor General in Council’) decided to add carbon dioxide and other GHGs to Schedule 1 of the regulations issued pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Policy Act (CEPA),40 thereby laying the groundwork for federal regulation of GHG emitters on the foundation of the federal government’s authority to enact criminal laws.41 Notably, a subsequent effort to amend the CEPA to expressly address GHG emissions failed in 2006,42 and the authority to regulate GHGs under CEPA was not employed until the United States began issuing GHG regulations in 2010.43

Legal authority for the regulation of GHG emissions from US sources by the federal government rests chiefly on the Clean Air Act (CAA), which was passed in 1970 and amended in 1977 and 1990.44 This pre-UNFCCC legal basis did not prevent the federal government (p. 538) under President Barack Obama from issuing regulations limiting GHG emissions45—in no small part because the US Supreme Court has interpreted the CAA as applying to GHGs.46 However, reliance on pre-UNFCCC legislative authority has made those regulations more politically contentious and susceptible both to litigation and repeal by a subsequent administration. When this volume went to press, the Trump administration’s efforts to repeal all Obama-era regulations of GHGs, including the Clean Power Plan, were underway, though their ultimate outcomes are uncertain. Federal regulations that address adaptation, like those focused on mitigation, rest on statutes of an old vintage or that avoid mentioning the relevance of anthropogenic climate change to their subject-matter.47 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act are lonely exceptions to the American rule of excluding climate change from legislative language.48 EISA, in addition to naming climate change among the factors for federal agencies to consider when setting targets for renewable fuel production, and as a reason to explore technologies capable of sequestering GHGs, also created an Office of Climate Change and Environment in the Department of Transportation.49 While it is more an energy transition law than a climate change law, it is notable for referencing climate change as a reason for action. As for the FY2008 appropriation, it authorized EPA to gather information consistent with a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule,50 which itself was based on provisions of the Clean Air Act.51 Policy But No Laws

Some governments are implementing climate change policies without (yet) codifying them legally. The list of countries in this category was substantial in the early 2000s, but has dwindled since. This is probably due in part to growing recognition of the need for climate (p. 539) action by citizens and governments, and in part to the support for mitigation and adaptation efforts increasingly being made available through the international mechanisms and agreements discussed in section 25.4 of this chapter. These mechanisms condition, formally or informally, recipient-countries’ participation on their establishment of domestic regulations consistent with the international programme’s goals and parameters.52

Malaysia’s National Policy of Climate Change is perhaps the quintessential example of an approach to climate policy that is not (yet) legally binding. It has not been codified, either via legislation or regulations, but, as the Prime Minister’s preface to the 2010 document explains, ‘the National Policy on Climate Change provides the framework to mobilise and guide government agencies, industry, community as well as other stakeholders and major groups in addressing the challenges of climate change in a holistic manner’.53 In the same informal vein, the Prime Minister’s Tenth Malaysia Plan 2011–15 articulates climate change policies that are being implemented—again, in most instances, without being codified in legislation or regulations.54 That Plan includes a national climate risk assessment, measures to promote energy efficiency (in buildings, machinery, and consumer products) and renewable energy sources, improved GHG-control and capture in the context of solid waste management, and conservation of forests that ‘function as carbon sinks’.55 Notably, the feed-in-tariffs for renewables called for by the Plan have been codified in the Renewable Energy Act of 2011,56 but that Act makes no mention of climate change or greenhouse gas emissions and is thus categorized in this chapter as energy legislation. Gestures Towards Policy Only

Venezuela, which has not established any climate change mitigation or adaptation policy goals or implemented any measures toward such goals, has at least acknowledged climate change. Its 2009 Law on Risk Management calls for the government to draft a National Plan for Climate Change (which the government has not done). Similarly, its Economic and Social Development Plan for 2007–13 and the follow-on plan for 2013–19 both recognize the fact and importance of climate change and call, at least on paper, for the design of a ‘National Mitigation Plan’ and a ‘National Plan of Adaptation’.57 This sort of lip service is characteristic of governments that have not acted on climate change.58

(p. 540) 25.2.2 Segments of Government: Levels and Branches Levels: National, Sub-national, and Local

Climate change is like other policy areas in that national and sub-national actors, even if they share basic goals and approaches, generally exercise different competencies. Whether enshrined legally in principles of ‘subsidiarity’59 or ‘federalism’,60 this informs the division of labour between most national governments, which establish basic policy goals and parameters for implementation, and sub-national governments, which refine and further articulate those goals and parameters in keeping with regional or local circumstances. This is not to say that the climate change policies of a given country’s national and sub-national governments are necessarily aligned—to the contrary, in some instances governments within the same national borders have adopted diverse and even conflicting approaches to climate change.61 But, whether or not national and sub-national governments agree on how to approach climate change, their distinct competencies tend to inform their approaches.

The rest of this section describes examples of sub-national governments’ policies, which illustrate the importance and the limitations of sub-national efforts. British Columbia, Tokyo, and Heidelberg provide examples of sub-national governments adopting more ambitious climate change mitigation and adaptation policies than their respective national governments. Sub-national governments in Indonesia’s heavily forested regions provide an example of sub-national resistance to national climate change policies. And legal challenges brought by US states against policies of the federal government put the United States in both columns: some sub-national governments have pushed for more ambitious mitigation efforts at the national level and others have resisted such efforts.

British Columbia’s carbon tax. The Canadian province of British Columbia instituted a carbon tax—North America’s first—in July 2008.62 The tax rate started at C$10 per ton of CO2, applied to all GHGs from fossil fuel combusted in the province, and was offset in fiscal terms by (p. 541) reductions in provincial corporate and individual income tax rates.63 A factor crucial to the adoption of the tax was the expectation that neighbouring jurisdictions would shortly also price carbon emissions through either taxes or cap-and-trade mechanisms.64 But the tax has persisted—and seems to have driven down emissions intensity65—even after those jurisdictions shied away from assigning prices to CO2 emissions and survived for the duration of a Conservative Canadian government that withdrew from the Kyoto protocol and promoted development of the tar sands in Alberta.66

Tokyo’s cap-and-trade programme. In 2010, following adoption of GHG emissions reduction targets in its Basic Environmental Plan of 2008,67 and against the backdrop of stalled negotiations over climate policy at the federal level,68 the Tokyo Metropolitan government imposed a cap-and-trade scheme on GHG emissions from approximately 1400 ‘compliance facilities’ starting in 2010.69 It covers roughly 20 per cent of Tokyo’s emissions, which in turn are roughly 5 per cent of Japan’s emissions.70 Adoption of that scheme was incipient: neighbouring Saitama prefecture established a voluntary emissions trading scheme and linked it to Tokyo’s in April 2011, and the Japanese Diet imposed a carbon tax on petroleum and coal (albeit a modest one) in 2012.71

Heidelberg’s Bahnstadt district. The city of Heidelberg has adopted a bevy of measures to reduce emissions in a 116-hectare mixed-use development, which will occupy the site of a disused rail yard.72 Those measures include energy efficiency requirements for buildings and appliances far in excess of national standards,73 as well as carefully integrated plans for (p. 542) land use, electricity generation and distribution, and transport.74 While Heidelberg is not unique for imposing requirements that align with national climate change policy goals but exceed national minimums, the Bahnstadt district is notable for pursuing national policy goals using means uniquely available to a local government and without direct incentives from the national level.

Indonesian forests. The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) that Indonesia submitted in advance of the 2015 Paris Conference emphasized the significant role Indonesia’s forests would play in national climate change mitigation efforts.75 However, controls on logging have been substantially undermined in recent years by conflicting legal mandates from national and regional governments,76 and by the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s apparent unwillingness or inability to rule that local laws are superseded even when they would seem to conflict with national laws.77

U.S. States v The Federal Environmental Protection Agency. In 2007, when the US Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v EPA,78 proponents of climate change mitigation policy were out of power at the federal level and so brought a lawsuit to challenge federal inaction; in 2016, when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered West Virginia v EPA,79 they were in power and defended such action against detractors. In the 2007 case, twelve states joined the challengers of EPA inaction and ten supported the EPA; in the 2016 case, twenty-eight states joined the challengers of EPA action and eighteen supported the EPA. These are just two of dozens challenges to EPA climate change regulations.80 Due in part to this steady stream of litigation, the basic nature of US climate change mitigation policy remains unclear and uncertain.

The foregoing examples illustrate several points. First, in the context of climate change policy, national governments tend to set a combination of overarching goals and minimum requirements, leaving it to sub-national governments to decide how to achieve the overarching goals and whether to do more than the minimum required. Second, sub-national governments’ alignment with national governments on climate change policy is important—or indispensable, if sub-national governments retain significant autonomy—for that policy’s coherence and effectiveness. Third, non-alignment between national and sub-national governments is made much more problematic in countries where questions of subsidiarity or federalism are not fully resolved. And fourth, however ambitious they are, sub-national (p. 543) governments’ efforts to implement climate change policies within their particular jurisdictions cannot substitute for the adoption of policies at the national level: Heidelberg can do its part and provide a model to other cities, but it cannot eliminate demand for coal-fired electricity generation in Germany by devising just one highly efficient district. Branches: Executive and Legislative Roles

The distinction between executive and legislative action is less important in parliamentary systems because in those systems the executive’s policies reflect the parliament’s composition and will. The distinction still matters, even in a parliamentary system: legislated decisions reflect a greater degree of consensus and political investment than policies or implementing regulations announced by the executive, and more often outlive the parliamentary executive that proposed them. As an example of the changeability of executive policies, and of such changes’ subordinate status vis-à-vis legislation, consider the recent disbanding of the United Kingdom’s Department of Energy and Climate Change, which garnered quick reactions but did not signify material departure from the legal obligations imposed by the Climate Change Act of 2008.81

In presidential systems, where the executive and legislative branches can be at odds politically, codifying policy in a statute or a binding regulation matters a great deal. The Obama administration’s effort to impose GHG emissions restrictions on the transportation, electricity, and oil and gas sectors is the most salient example of this distinction mattering to climate change policy. There is no dispute that the President of the United States has the authority to direct federal agencies through executive orders,82 for instance by requiring that procurement decisions reflect consideration for climate impacts.83 However, as noted in section, regulations restricting GHG emissions from US sources have prompted litigation and accusations from members of Congress that the executive branch is exceeding its remit. Specifically, the argument goes that because Congress did not write the Clean Air Act to apply to GHG emissions, regulations implementing the Clean Air Act cannot be applied to GHG emissions. Branches: Courts and Litigation

Litigation over climate change policies has arisen in no fewer than twenty countries.84 That litigation can be divided into roughly three categories: one-off cases aiming to spur government (p. 544) climate change mitigation efforts, lower-stakes cases dealing with a particular application of policies affecting land use or GHG emissions, and litigation in the United States.

Solitary cases in Belgium,85 Pakistan,86 the Netherlands,87 and New Zealand88 have sought to push those countries’ governments to abide by existing or abandoned climate change mitigation commitments. Nearly 200 cases brought in courts in Australia, the EU, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom have focused on smaller-scale issues arising from climate policy-related land use, renewable energy credits, or emissions restrictions rather than on shaping basic policy decisions.89 The United States, an unmistakable outlier, has been home to a geyser of over 500 cases disputing climate change policies, sometimes aimed at particular instances of those policies’ implementation, other times aimed at their basic legality.90

25.2.3 Principal Legal Techniques

The foregoing sections describe key elements of the legal and institutional scaffolding that supports (to a greater or lesser degree) particular climate change policies. This section turns from the scaffolding to the policies themselves: it describes mechanisms that governments use in their efforts to connect climate change mitigation and adaptation goals to outcomes. As with the foregoing sections, the descriptions below include general summaries and specific examples. Quantitative Targets

The world is awash in quantitative climate change mitigation targets, though less so in quantitative targets for adaptation efforts.91 Actors at all levels of government—international, national, regional, and local—and in the for-profit and non-profit segments of the private sector have identified targets for emissions reductions, energy efficiency improvements, renewable electricity generation, reforestation, and other climate change policy goals. This subsection offers a brief survey of how climate change policies identify, employ, and enforce quantitative targets. It also notes challenges arising in relation to these functions.

Quantitative climate change mitigation targets often point to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s analysis of relationships between the global warming (p. 545) potential (GWP) of particular GHGs, those GHGs’ chemical lifespans and concentrations in the Earth’s atmosphere, average global temperature, and the stability of the climate system. In particular, many quantitative targets take as their lodestar the IPCC’s conclusion that an increase of 2ºC in average global temperatures would destabilize the climate system,92 and some derive an emissions ‘budget’ for themselves based on that conclusion.93

The UNFCCC used the 1995 version of this scientifically derived budget as the basis for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,94 which parcelled out national budget constraints to UNFCCC members in the form of nominally mandatory caps.95 Some national governments ratified the protocol and set targets consistent with those caps. The UNFCCC’s 2011 Durban Platform anticipated the end of Kyoto’s top-down approach and replaced it with bottom-up voluntary commitments96—the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that informed the 2015 Paris Agreement. The quantitative emissions reduction targets in INDCs take diverse forms, including percentage reductions from a baseline year,97 percentage reductions in emissions intensity,98 and timeframes within which emissions will peak.99

National governments set a variety of quantitative targets in their pursuit of climate change mitigation and adaptation policy goals. The emissions targets in INDCs and NDCs have already been mentioned. Others on the mitigation side of the ledger include sector-specific emissions reductions,100 gigawatts of available renewables capacity,101 phase-out dates for high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons used as refrigerants,102 reductions in rates of deforestation,103 and others. Adaptation is less amenable to quantitative targets,104 but governments have (p. 546) nonetheless found ways to quantify indicators of adaptation and have articulated adaptation policy goals in quantitative terms.105

Quantitative targets also abound at the sub-national level, both in the policies of provinces or states as well as cities. In some instances, these targets reflect the breakdown of targets set nationally, but in others they reflect the efforts of a sub-national government to exceed its proportional responsibility pursuant to a national mitigation or adaptation goal. The long list of categories for which sub-national governments have set quantitative targets includes the standard menu of emissions reductions, but often articulated in greater detail—for instance, California has not only set state-wide targets for reducing GHG emissions and petroleum use by 2030 and 2050, but its updated Climate Change Scoping Plan sets targets for particular measures to be taken in each of six economic sectors, including agriculture and solid waste management.106 California cities and counties have translated those targets into climate action plans, which themselves contain lists of detailed quantitative targets.107 Notably, it is not just national governments but also international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that facilitate the development and monitoring of compliance with quantitative emissions targets by large cities.108

Non-governmental actors have also integrated quantitative targets into their climate change policies. Universities like Cornell and the Free University of Berlin have used targets to reduce emissions from their energy and waste management systems,109 and corporations like Wal-Mart and Microsoft now impute a carbon price to internal cost-accounting to inform and help coordinate emissions-reduction and energy efficiency efforts.110

Several challenges confront efforts to identify and abide by quantitative climate change policy targets. Perhaps the most basic challenge for GHG accounting is deriving useful (p. 547) emissions reduction targets from climate models, which are rife with uncertainties.111 Further challenges arise from the need to relate an emissions budget to economic circumstances and behaviours—that is, to estimate the present cost to the economy of emitting a unit of GHGs, termed the Social Cost of Carbon.112 One especially thorny valence of this accompanies efforts to assign values to the climate-related impacts of land use, land use changes, and forestry (LULUCF), discussed in section Layered on top of these basic scientific and analytic challenges are issues of allocation: given economic circumstances, what targets are feasible? Necessary? Fair? Regarding adaptation targets, a sizeable challenge arises from calls to specify robust quantitative indicators in a way that will improve resource allocation. Pricing Emissions: Taxes and Cap-and-Trade Schemes

The types of institutions that have assigned a price to GHG emissions include the EU, almost forty national governments, and more than twenty sub-national governments,114 hundreds of corporations115 and a growing number of universities.116 Some governments have imposed carbon taxes, others have imposed emissions trading schemes (ETSs) that cap aggregate emissions and require emitters to purchase allowances from designated low- or non-emitting entities, such as renewable electricity generators. These carbon taxes and ETSs vary in the scope of their coverage, both with respect to types of emissions (Tokyo’s ETS covers CO2 only,117 the EU’s covers six GHGs118) and facilities (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of the northeastern United States covers fossil-fueled power plants with a generating capacity of at least 25MW,119 British Columbia’s tax covers all GHG emissions from fossil fuels imported (p. 548) or combusted in the province120). They also vary in the rates they impose on emitters: carbon taxes in Mexico and Poland impose rates of less than US$1 per ton of CO2; the ETS in Tokyo, US$38; and the carbon tax in Sweden, US$130.121 At the time of writing, existing carbon pricing mechanisms cover roughly 13 per cent of global emissions.122 Command and Control

Often called ‘traditional’ air pollution regulation, command and control approaches do not employ price or market mechanisms to encourage emissions reductions, but instead require polluters to adhere to particular operational or technological requirements. Most GHG emissions regulation employs a price-based mechanism instead of command and control measures. Some countries, like Austria, use command and control approaches to regulate high-GWP pollutants like hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),123 but others, like New Zealand, employ a pricing mechanism for these as well as for other GHGs.124 The United States is the leading example of a jurisdiction that applies traditional command and control regulation to GHGs generally. There, regulations based on the Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended in 1977 and 1990, have set limits on emissions from vehicles by modifying corporate average fuel economy standards and from stationary sources by specifying performance standards.125 Notably, however, EPA has signalled to state governments that stationary sources may achieve those performance standards via a form of ETS.126 Subsidies and Tax Incentives

A number of climate change policies use subsidies and tax incentives to encourage emissions reductions or adaptation measures. These incentives are especially prevalent in the energy sector (discussed in more detail in section 25.3), but also feature in climate change policies focused on LULUCF. For instance, Peru’s National Forestry and Climate Change Strategy provides incentives to small farmers who refrain from clearing forest land adjacent to their (p. 549) property,127 and its Business and Biodiversity Initiative supports ecosystem services by coordinating financing from private firms for maintenance of designated areas by forestland inhabitants.128

While subsidies and incentives for fossil fuel extraction and use are not a feature of climate change policies per se, they are nonetheless directly relevant because their encouragement of fossil fuel consumption (and thereby the emission of GHGs) counteracts climate change mitigation efforts and increases the extent to which climate change adaptation will be necessary. This direct relevance,129 and the adverse impacts of fossil fuel consumption on public health, have inspired the IMF, the G7, and the G20 to declare that fossil fuel subsidies should be reduced from their current level of roughly $500 million annually.130 Information

Some climate change policies facilitate or require disclosure of information relevant to climate change impacts. Mitigation-oriented policies of this sort include emissions inventories, and energy efficiency labelling requirements for vehicles, equipment, and buildings. Energy-efficiency labelling is discussed further in section Information and disclosure requirements in adaptation-oriented policies tend to focus on locational hazards such as flood zones.131 These policies are often contentious because of their large potential effects on real estate prices and local government planning. The Welsh village of Fairbourne offers a striking example of how potent information about sea level rise can be: noting that rising seas would visit severe impacts on the village and eventually require managed retreat, a 2012 shoreline management plan recommended that the village be incrementally ‘decommissioned’, which in turn led to a sharp drop in the value of local property and businesses.132 In a similar vein, recent coastal storms and updates to the maps that designate flood risk zones have revealed the extent to which the maps issued under the National Flood Insurance Policy have obscured information about flood hazards that are generally increasing as the climate changes.133

(p. 550) Corporate financial disclosure requirements regarding risks related to climate change are a nascent but growing application of information for the purposes of climate change policy. France,134 the EU,135 and the United States136 have all (in descending order of stringency) imposed such requirements on publicly traded companies subject to their respective jurisdictions. These requirements are diverse and the corporate disclosures they prompt vary widely—even within the same jurisdiction.137 The G20’s Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures published recommendations regarding the structure and application of requirements like these in December 2016.138 For Non-fossil Fuel Sources of Greenhouse Gases

Substantial volumes of GHG emissions come from sources unrelated to fossil fuel extraction or consumption, chief among them LULUCF and waste—including both solid waste and wastewater. Unlike fossil fuel-related emissions, which can be avoided through relatively straightforward improvements in efficiency or substituting renewables, reducing emissions from LULUCF and waste often requires complex emissions accounting and nuanced interventions into policy areas that are already knotty. In some jurisdictions, the technical and political challenges involved in such interventions prevent governments from adopting strong measures to control GHG emissions.139 In some countries—Brazil and Indonesia are notable examples—emissions from these sources outweigh those from fossil fuels.140 Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF)

All manner of land uses have implications for climate change, whether because they release emissions or create, maintain, or eliminate carbon sinks.141 In spite of agriculture’s (p. 551) responsibility for roughly one-quarter of GHG emissions worldwide,142 climate change mitigation policies that focus on lands used for agriculture are generally ‘soft’, involving reporting requirements, guidelines, and technical assistance for low-emissions techniques rather than emissions reduction requirements.143 Similarly, adaptation policies for agriculture generally focus on developing and publicizing research findings about risks and responses rather than imposing restrictions or requiring specific actions.144

Climate change policies addressing forestry tend to include not just encouragements but also requirements,145 and many are designed to be compatible with the REDD+ programme (the acronym derives from ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation’),146 which integrates forest preservation into UNFCCC-led climate change mitigation efforts by recognizing and quantifying the contribution of five qualifying activities in developing countries.147

Brazil, Indonesia, and Vietnam each approach agricultural and forestry-related aspects of climate change policy in a more or less integrated way. Brazil’s National Policy on Farming-Livestock-Forest Integration includes ‘soft’ measures like education and technical assistance, as well as ‘harder’ measures that prohibit clearing or road-building in forests.148 Indonesia’s 2011 moratorium on regional forestry licensing seeks to address logging as well as conversion of native forests to plantations where fast-growing trees are harvested for palm oil or pulp useful in paper production.149 Similarly, Vietnam’s REDD+ National Action Program sets related goals for afforestation, forest preservation, and agricultural practices and assigns (p. 552) the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development responsibility for managing REDD+ project funds in Vietnam.150 Methane from Solid Waste and Wastewater

Waste streams are an important source of methane.151 Regulations intended to reduce methane emissions from landfills and from wastewater processing employ sticks—for instance, restrictions on how much biodegradable waste may be sent to landfills, or on how much methane a landfill may emit—and carrots—such as subsidies for building and operating facilities that capture methane and generate energy from its combustion.

EU and US policies directed at reducing methane from solid waste disposal both employ sticks and carrots. EU Landfill Directives, issued in 1999 and 2008, require Member States to reduce the volume of biodegradable waste sent to landfills to 75 per cent of a 1995 baseline by 2010, 50 per cent by 2013, and 35 per cent by 2016 (for some countries, e.g. Austria, Denmark, and Germany) or 2020 (for others, e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Latvia).152 Regulations issued by the US EPA in August 2016 add climate change to the reasons for regulating emissions from landfills and tighten emissions limits consistent with the recognition that methane is not just a volatile organic compound that pollutes the ambient air but also a potent GHG.153 The US EPA’s approach (regulating emissions instead of waste volumes) reflects that its regulations are based on authority provided by the Clean Air Act, rather than legislation tailored to the purpose of reducing GHGs from the solid waste stream. As for carrots, policies in both the EU and United States encourage the capture of ‘biogas’ (Europe) or ‘landfill gas’ (United States) for use as a primary energy source. The policies that apply to wastewater in both jurisdictions closely resemble those that apply to solid waste: restrictions on emissions coupled with subsidies for the development and uptake of technologies that capture methane for use or flaring. Notably, municipalities in both jurisdictions direct some of their food waste to the same digesters as their wastewater.154

Policies focused on methane emitted from waste streams in China and Thailand generally employ carrots rather than sticks. In both countries, feed-in-tariffs compensate biogas from small- and large-scale waste digester systems, which glean methane useful for electricity generation from human, animal, and food waste.155

(p. 553) High-GWP Substances

Fluorinated gases or F-gases can substitute for the atmospheric ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that were used in refrigerants until the Montreal Protocol of 1987 coordinated an incremental world-wide CFC phase-out.156 Unfortunately, F-gases have enormous radiative forcing properties: their GWP values range from 12,000 to almost 23,000 times that of CO2. This is an urgent cause for concern because of how quickly demand for refrigeration and air conditioning is growing, particularly in the developing world. International efforts to apply the Montreal Protocol to F-gases are discussed in section 25.4.2. The EU provides an example of regulatory efforts that have preceded and encouraged those international negotiations. The EU’s 2006 MAC Directive provides for the phase-out of F-gases from use in air conditioning units in new motor vehicles from 2011 to 2017.157 The EU’s more general F-Gases Regulation, first issued in 2006 and updated in 2015, creates a comprehensive regulatory regime for F-gases’ use, containment, recovery, and destruction, as well as restrictions on their sale and timelines for their exclusion from all markets in EU jurisdictions.158 Both of these have prompted implementing regulations at the national level.159 Japan provides another example of F-gas regulation: the 2013 Act on the Rational Use and Proper Management of Fluorocarbons schedules the incremental phase-out of F-gases across all sectors, sets GWP targets for substitutes, and requires manufacturers to draft plans for phase-out based on regulatory guidelines.160 India provides a contrasting example of a country that does not currently restrict (p. 554) the manufacture of F-gases,161 notwithstanding expectations that demand for HFCs will grow at an alarming rate as Indians purchase an increasing number of air conditioning units for their homes and cars in the coming years.

25.3 Energy Transition Regulation

This section surveys regulatory approaches to accomplishing the transition from energy systems reliant on fossil fuels to systems that minimize or eliminate fossil fuel consumption, whether by developing substitutes, promoting conservation and efficiency, or capturing and sequestering or utilizing GHG emissions. It first describes a typology of those approaches in terms of their comprehensiveness and coherence, then turns to energy transition policies’ substantive components.

25.3.1 Scope and Structure of the Governing Law

As with climate change, some governments approach energy transition policy through comprehensive legislation or regulation and others do so in a more piecemeal fashion. Unlike with climate change, comprehensive approaches that aim expressly at decarbonizing are less the norm than piecemeal approaches whose components serve the competing priorities of energy security, economic growth, and climate change mitigation. France’s Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth and Germany’s Energiewende are examples of the former; laws in the United States exemplify the latter.

France’s Energy Transition Law is the result of a three-year National Debate on Energy Transition, which evaluated options for reducing fossil fuel consumption and energy use more generally in the electricity and transport sectors.162 Those options included varying degrees of reliance on nuclear and renewable power, and a range of ambitions for improvements to efficiency through, inter alia, building retrofits and behavior changes such as increased transit and reduced automotive transport. The resulting legislation incorporates a long list of components, including but not limited to: a carbon tax increase, a streamlined permitting process for renewable electricity generation facilities, energy efficiency (EE) standards for buildings, a plan for installing EV charging stations, and a host of subsidies to facilitate compliance efforts.163

Germany’s Energiewende seeks to achieve three goals: reduce GHG emissions by 80–95 per cent by 2050, reduce fossil fuel imports (especially from Russia and other former Soviet Republics), and phase out nuclear power. (The last of these was accelerated in the aftermath (p. 555) of the 2011 Fukushima disaster.164) This trinity of goals has been codified in 2000, 2007, and 2014 laws and amendments to various pieces of pre-existing legislation,165 as well as new legislation.166 As with the French law, the measures in Germany’s legislative ‘packages’ make significant changes in a coordinated fashion to a wide range of policy areas, including feed-in-tariff rates for renewables, transmission line siting and construction, EE requirements for buildings and equipment, and incentives for the transportation sector.

The variety of statutes and policy documents that inform energy policy in the United States reflects that country’s fragmentary and often conflicting approach to energy regulation in general and to the transition to renewable energy in particular. Even the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and 2005 are not as comprehensive as the French and German legislation described above, and they contain provisions acknowledging climate change, promoting renewables, and promoting the production of fossil fuels.167 US energy policy can usefully be thought of as a patchwork comprised of forward-looking plans on the one hand and of various inherited statutes and structures on the other; for instance, the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 all continue to guide federal agency decision-making, though each has been amended at least twice by Congress and interpreted—in changing technological and economic contexts—by the Department of Energy or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s implementing regulations. At present, deep political disagreement over the validity of climate change as a reason to transition away from fossil fuels ensures that new legislation will not make this patchwork any less inchoate vis-à-vis an energy transition.

25.3.2 Substantive Provisions

Substantive energy transition policy provisions vary from country to country, but generally address the following: (i) energy efficiency in buildings, equipment, and vehicles; (ii) the development of renewable energy, whether to supplant existing fossil-fueled sources or to (p. 556) meet a growing demand for electricity; (iii) constraining (to widely varying degrees) the use of fossil fuels as a primary energy source; (iv) options for developing or maintaining nuclear reactors to generate electricity; and (v) developing—or redesigning—the electric grid to integrate a changing generation mix on the one hand and an increasingly sophisticated set of technologies for demand-side management of electricity use on the other.

Before exploring examples of these policy provisions, it is useful to note how the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project has characterized energy transition pathways in developed and developing countries. Transition in developed countries consistently builds on three ‘pillars’: 1) the decoupling of economic growth from greater energy- and emissions-intensity through improvements in end-use energy efficiency in buildings, equipment, and appliances, and vehicles; 2) the electrification of end-uses of energy—for instance, the replacement of internal combustion engines with EVs; and 3) the decarbonization of electricity and other energy sources.168 Transition in developing countries is less uniform and tends to reflect to a greater degree the country’s particular circumstances and resources. For instance, Brazil’s ready access to hydropower useable for generating electricity and to sugarcane useable for producing low-emissions ethanols169 makes for a very different pathway to decarbonization than Indonesia’s longstanding history as a producer of oil and gas.170 Energy Efficiency and Electrification

Policies that encourage EE improvements generally impose some combination of performance and labelling requirements. They also often include procurement requirements for governments, consumer purchasing support through direct subsidies or tax incentives, and government-led or -sponsored R&D. Although EE improvement entails the same conceptual task regardless of context—achieve similar outputs or performance while reducing energy inputs—policies intended to improve EE tend to address separately the key categories of buildings, equipment and appliances, and vehicles. This subsection follows that categorization. Although the goal of electrification is in several respects distinct from improving EE, they are discussed together here because they overlap substantially both in terms of policies and outcomes. Buildings

Using less energy in a building generally means improving its insulation, replacing some or all of its HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) systems, water heating, and lighting (p. 557) systems, and refining the alignment of its end users’ energy-consumption patterns with the delivery of energy to particular areas and systems. These efforts take different forms in industrial, commercial, and residential buildings, but policies that promote them consistently combine minimum performance standards and disclosure requirements. As policy-makers at the national level have come to recognize buildings’ sizeable contributions to aggregate energy demand and GHG emissions, national governments have imposed a greater number of requirements on the sub-national and local authorities responsible for drafting and updating building codes.171

In parallel to this shift, a growing number of policies require compliance not only with materials and design standards but also with performance requirements.172 In the EU, energy performance and disclosure requirements for buildings imposed at the national and sub-national levels must fit within parameters prescribed at the EU level.173 Those parameters root in the EU’s legislative 2009 Climate and Energy Package,174 and have since been articulated further in the 2010 update to the 2002 Energy Performance and Buildings Directive (EPBD)175 and the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (EED).176 The 2010 EPBD specifies the ‘Minimum Energy Performance’ required for new and modified buildings of various types. It also requires that all buildings receive an EE rating and must make those ratings available in the form of an ‘Energy Performance Certificate’ in all advertisements for rental or sale.177 The EED, which covers a broader array of subjects than just buildings, calls upon member states to include in their National Energy Efficiency Action Plans provisions for the retrofit of existing building stock generally and for the improvement of energy performance in existing government buildings in particular.178 Implementation of the EPBD and EED by Member (p. 558) States has varied widely,179 with few conforming as quickly or as fully to EU-level goals as Denmark has done.180

South Africa’s 2011 Energy Use in Buildings legislation amended its 1977 National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act.181 The new requirements set energy performance standards and call for new buildings to get at least half of the energy used to supply their hot water from either solar energy or heat pump systems.182 South Africa will also soon require large building owners to issue Energy Performance Certificates that disclose their rates of energy use.183 This regulatory requirement will build on the voluntary third-party verified Green Star South Africa rating system, which resembles the LEED system in the United States, the BREEAM system in the United Kingdom, and expressly imitates Australia’s Green Star rating system.184 A 2013 tax code revision encourages implementation of these various requirements by making energy efficiency savings tax-deductible.185 Equipment and Appliances

EE requirements for equipment and appliances also couple performance standards with labeling requirements to ensure that products meet efficiency requirements and that purchasers can accurately anticipate a given product’s energy use as well as comparing it—in EE terms—to other members of the same product class. This combination of regulatory tools has been applied, in some countries, to nearly all products that use energy to operate, ranging from commercial or industrial-scale motors and HVAC systems to toasters.

Performance standards take one of several forms. Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) set a floor for covered product classes. Japan’s Top Runner Program tethers requirements for average class-wide EE performance to the performance of best-in-class products.186 And High Energy Performance Standards (HEPS) ensure recognition of best-in-class products as exceeding their peers’ EE performance. The United States applies a combination of MEPS and HEPS by establishing a long list of minimum standards and also inviting participation in the Energy Star programme, through which manufacturers can apply for a label indicating that their product’s energy use ranks it in the top 15 per cent of its class.187 Dozens of countries have imposed MEPS on a wide array of appliance and (p. 559) equipment categories; somewhat fewer have adopted HEPS.188 Practically speaking, the effectiveness of MEPS or HEPS often turns on the availability of facilities and staff to test product compliance with relevant standards.189

EE labels all indicate relative energy use, but some do so through ‘endorsement’ and others by enabling ‘comparison’. The Energy Star programme mentioned above authorizes manufacturers to affix ‘endorsement’ labels to qualifying products, thereby providing a simple signal that a given product is relatively more efficient than its peers, but providing no on-label details about the parameters signified by the label. Through ‘comparison’ labels, manufacturers indicate—using colour-coding, data, or a combination—a product’s performance relative to its peers. As of 2014, at least eighty-one countries had imposed EE endorsement or comparison labelling requirements.190 Those countries range widely in their location and level of development—Australia, Bangladesh, and Chile, for instance, all require comparative labeling of multiple products.191 As with performance standards, the value of labels for revealing true differences in expected performance turns in part on governments investing adequately in monitoring and verification. Vehicles

Policies intended to shift the transportation sector away from reliance on fossil fuels seek to achieve that result through greater energy efficiency, or by switching from fossil fuels to electricity, biofuels, or hydrogen—or a combination of efficiency and fuel-switching. In addition to the list of standard EE policy categories listed above (performance and labelling requirements, government procurement, consumer subsidies), which many jurisdictions employ in relation to vehicles as well, policies designed to decarbonize the transport sector also include the construction transit networks and electric or hydrogen fueling stations.

The bulk of existing and proposed policies focus on cars and trucks; with only two very recent exceptions,192 governments have generally looked to international bodies—the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—to regulate energy efficiency or GHG emissions from marine shipping and air transport.193

(p. 560) Governments that have established fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles and light-commercial vehicles/light trucks include Brazil,194 Canada,195 China,196 the EU,197 India,198 Japan,199 Mexico,200 Singapore,201 South Korea,202 and the United States.203 Several of those governments have also—or are in the process of—applying similar standards to heavy-duty vehicles.204 Some but not all of these fuel economy standards impose GHG emissions reduction requirements directly.205 Other governments, such as New Zealand and British Columbia, Canada, impose no fuel economy requirements but include the liquid fuels used for transport in their comprehensive GHG-pricing schemes—an ETS in New Zealand, and a carbon tax in British Columbia.206 In all of these jurisdictions, retailers who sell cars must also affix prescribed labels to vehicles to indicate their estimated fuel efficiency.207

Several types of policies encourage electrification of the transportation sector. Examples include but are not limited to the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE, as in the United (p. 561) States) or consumption (CAFC, as in China) standards noted above, which recognize zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) powered by electricity or some other non-fossil fuel as a means of reducing average fuel and emissions intensity.208 By contrast, Norway’s policies employ both sticks and carrots more directly. Norway, which draws its electricity chiefly from hydropower sources, is currently planning to couple its carrots for EVs—which include exemptions from vehicle taxes, parking fees, and tolls—with the stick of a prohibition on the sale of all passenger vehicles and most heavy-duty vehicles powered by an internal combustion engine starting in 2025.209 Similarly, in the Netherlands, a parliamentary vote in March 2016 compelled the cabinet to develop a plan (though not necessarily to adopt it) to prohibit the sale of petrol- and diesel-powered cars by 2025.210

Sub-national governments, including a handful of cities, have also created financial incentives to encourage EV purchase.211 Renewable Energy

A number of national and sub-national policies encourage or require the development and integration into the electric grid of generation facilities that draw on wind, water, the sun, or geothermal sources of primary energy. Those policies have responded to three major challenges: price-competitiveness with traditional generation, difficulties in siting renewable facilities and transmission lines to link them to existing electric grids, and integrating renewables’ variable outputs and financial profiles into electricity systems built around the assumptions that generation facilities are large, centralized, and responsive to demand. Each of these is discussed in turn below. Mandates and Incentives to Ensure Price-Competitiveness

Governments have helped the private sector to overcome the uncertainties that attend renewables technologies’ novel and developing financial profiles through several means, including feed-in-tariffs, quotas such as renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), and preferential tax treatment or other subsidies.212 Such incentives have proliferated over the past decade;213 the Chinese government, for instance, has employed all three.214 Each of these three categories is described here through examples: Germany’s declining rooftop solar feed-in-tariff; India’s Renewable Purchase Obligations, and tax incentives in the United States.

(p. 562) From 2001 to 2014, Germany provided a declining feed-in-tariff for electricity produced by various renewable sources, including rooftop solar.215 This incentive, which guarantees twenty years of supplemental payments to solar panel owners for the kW of electricity they generate, has spurred significant nationwide rooftop solar installation.216 The declining rate matched the declining risk to solar panel owners that their sale of electricity back to the grid might not recover the up-front costs of purchase and installation.217 In addition to encouraging adoption of rooftop solar, the tariff was also meant to support Germany’s nascent solar panel manufacturing sector.218

India’s framework climate change law amends the Electricity Act of 2003 to establish targets for rates of renewable generation and to require State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to meet those targets by imposing Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPOs) on utilities in their jurisdictions.219 Utilities unable to meet their RPO directly may purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) to do so.220 The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy recently announced that the minimum solar RPO for all SERCs would be 8 per cent by 2022.221

The United States has provided various tax incentives for renewable electricity generation facilities since passage the Energy Policy Act of 1992,222 most notably the Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC).223 The PTC provides a tax rebate for a proportion of the electricity produced by renewable facilities; the ITC provides a rebate based on the amount invested in a new renewable facility. Their effects on wind and solar generation capacity development have ebbed and flowed in recent years as Congress has periodically balked at reauthorization; the most recent reauthorization sets end dates for both: the PTC will lapse in 2020, the ITC in 2022.224 Siting of Transmission Lines

Renewables do not conform to the traditional model of large thermal power plants proximate to load centres. Utility-scale renewable facilities that generate 100s or 1000s of MW of electricity—as fossil- or nuclear-fuelled thermal plants do—must cover many more acres (p. 563) of land.225 However, they must also be located wherever the primary energy source or adequate land is available, which can mean far from both load centres and existing transmission lines. Developing such facilities and connecting them to load centres therefore requires assembling rights of way and acquiring the various permits and licences required of any project that can be expected to have potentially significant environmental impacts. Chile, China, and the United States offer examples of how national governments have addressed the challenge of building transmission lines to link utility-scale renewables development to load centres.

Chile, which has struggled to link locations like the Atacama Desert in the north (ideal for solar farms) to Santiago and other cities further south,226 in July 2016 adopted legislation restructuring electricity transmission planning and regulation.227 In addition to assigning responsibility for those tasks to an independent regulatory authority, the legislation redefines the parameters of the transmission system, revises planning protocols, and requires competitive bidding where prices were previously insulated from market pressures.228 In China, although the Twelfth and Thirteenth Five Year Plans that govern the economy as a whole set forth ambitious targets for national renewable generation capacity, they provide no specific guidance on electricity sector planning.229 Provincial governments have therefore taken on the tasks of generation and transmission planning, but have generally not coordinated the two, in addition to not coordinating with other provinces.230 The results have included mushrooming wind and solar farms of mixed quality, delayed grid connections, and high curtailment rates at sites where more electricity is generated than can be consumed.231 In the United States, the courts dashed expectations that the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s promotion of National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors would streamline the process of transmission line development by making it harder for state- and local actors to resist connecting wind and solar farms to distant cities.232 The courts’ 2009 and 2011 interpretations (p. 564) of the 2005 Act leaves state authorities in a position to authorize or refuse new transmission facilities, even if those facilities do not originate or end in but simply cross a given state, based on determinations of ‘need’ for such facilities within that state’s borders.233 Integrating Renewables into Grid Operations and Accounting

Renewable generation is ‘variable’, meaning that facilities reliant on the wind or sun for primary energy cannot control when the sun shines or the wind blows, and so can only generate electricity when those resources make it possible to do so. Renewable generation can also be undertaken at different scales: utility-scale facilities cover large swathes of land (or ocean) and generate electricity at the same order of magnitude as small and mid-sized thermal power plants, community-scale solar farms tend to have a maximum capacity of about 1 MW, and installations on commercial rooftops or parking lots and on residential rooftops are smaller still. Variability and scalar diversity both depart from the patterns that have informed physical and institutional design of electricity grids for decades. In developed countries with long-established grids, accommodating these features while ensuring reliable electric services and financial viability means changing the way grids are managed. In developing countries where electrification continues, renewables can sometimes offer a cost-effective means of alleviating energy poverty while avoiding adoption of centralized generation and transmission systems. The following examples illustrate how policy has responded to (or, thus far, ignored) these points: German grid operators’ and utilities’ struggles to adjust to growing volumes of wind and solar; utility business model reform in the United Kingdom; and off-grid electrification in parts of rural Bangladesh, Tanzania, and elsewhere.

The significant growth in Germany’s off- and on-shore wind installations and rooftop solar panels has challenged grid operators’ ability to maintain the necessary minute-to-minute balance between electricity generation and load.234 To balance large influxes of power from wind farms or deficits as clouds suddenly prevent solar panels from generating, German grid operators would routinely either ‘dump’ surfeit power into the Polish or Czech grids or call on generators in those countries to ramp up—that is, until 2014, when Polish and Czech grid operators began installing specially designed transformers on their national borders to prevent the practice.235 Thus, Germany did not so much craft policies to deal thoroughly with renewables’ disruptions to grid operations as seek to develop transmission capacity for the longer term while solving the immediate problem by exporting those disruptions as they arose.

In 2010, the United Kingdom’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets announced that it would overhaul the traditional utility regulatory model and replace it with one called (p. 565) RIIO—short for Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs.236 Under RIIO, electric utilities’ performance obligations include GHG emissions reductions and efforts to fashion a ‘smart grid’ that is better able to integrate electricity from utility-scale renewables and to accommodate distributed generation resources.237

Rural communities in Bangladesh, Tanzania, and dozens of other countries are in some instances turning to off-grid renewables—often in combination with diesel generators238—for electrification instead of developing connections to a centralized electric grid. Adoption of these freestanding power systems often follows from a combination of national policy support and at least partial financing from foreign governments or NGOs.239 Those policies often include tax exemptions for off-grid system components, collaborations with domestic or international financing organizations, and in rare instances—as with Peru’s National Photovoltaic Household Electrification programme—direct provision of solar photovoltaic systems to qualifying households.240 Fossil Fuels

The range of policy approaches countries are currently taking to fossil fuels encompasses, at one extreme, incremental steps towards phase-out (Norway), and, at the other, active, unlimited development (Kuwait). Most countries fall somewhere in between. Even in countries like Germany or France, where an energy transition is being implemented through a comprehensive suite of legislative and regulatory provisions, efforts to shift away from emissions-intensive fossil fuels have been balanced against other priorities. In countries with less forcefully articulated energy transition policies, like India or Pakistan, the weight of other priorities (energy security, rapid economic growth) tips the balance even more in favour of maintaining or further developing capacities to produce and/or consume fossil fuels. Importantly, however, not all fossil fuels are alike, and policies that encourage switching from coal to natural gas and from automotive gasoline to biofuel mixtures reflect an effort to reduce the emissions intensity of fossil fuel use if not fossil fuel use as such. Meanwhile, countries across the spectrum noted above, including Australia, China, the EU, and the United States,241 are pursuing the development of carbon capture, sequestration, and utilization technologies, which would theoretically neutralize or confine the GHG emissions from at least some forms of fossil fuel consumption. The rest of this section elaborates on this (p. 566) summary description, highlighting salient interactions between energy transition policies, other policies not born of an energy transition agenda, and fossil fuels. Ongoing Development

Pakistan’s development of the enormous Thar coal field holds promise for Pakistani energy security and economic development.242 Pakistan’s INDC, submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2015, says little that would constrain the Thar’s development, and even presages it—paragraph three begins: ‘Pakistan’s development needs are expected to grow necessitating the requirement of affordable sources of power generation … .’.243 Similarly, in Indonesia, the government in 2015 responded to repeated energy shortages attendant to urbanization and industrial development by announcing plans to build 35 GW of generating capacity—20 GW (57 per cent) coal-fired, 13 MW (37 per cent) gas-fired, and 3.7 MW (11 per cent) renewable.244 This breakdown reflects Indonesia’s access to large, undeveloped domestic coal reserves and a lack of strong countervailing pressure from policies informed by climate-related and energy transition goals.245 Australia, which in 2014 repealed its carbon tax and other components of the 2011 Clean Energy Future Plan,246 shows little sign of moving its electricity or export sectors away from heavy reliance on coal.247 It thus offers a third example of persistent coal production and consumption in a country with large coal reserves, which serves to illustrate the importance of exploitable natural resource endowments relative to other economic opportunities in developed as well as developing countries. Nuclear Phase-Out First

In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, Japan shuttered a number of its nuclear plants temporarily,248 Chile concluded that its susceptibility to earthquakes and tsunamis ruled out nuclear development,249 and Germany accelerated its plans for nuclear phase-out.250 Because renewables and energy conservation cannot be made to offset the resulting electricity generation deficit in Germany fast enough, Fukushima pushed it to ramp up coal-fired plants to satisfy demand, effectively delaying their phase-out until after the 2022 phase-out of nuclear.

(p. 567) Incidental Constraints

Non-GHG-focused air pollution policies are playing a significant if incidental role in energy transitions in China and the United States. In China, where coal-fired electricity generating units (EGUs) have made urban air quality notoriously bad, policy has responded with efforts to curtail coal emissions in the near-term and to substitute other resources for coal in the medium- and long term.251 These efforts also include, but are not limited to, building coal-gasification facilities away from major cities that will render coal into a cleaner-burning fuel.252 In the United States, the federal EPA included climate benefits in its tally of public health and other benefits accruing from regulations of mercury, arsenic, ozone precursors, and particulate matter emitted by coal-fired EGUs.253 Because these regulations were issued in a period of very low natural gas prices and late in the useful life of many coal-fired EGUs, their indirect impact on GHG emissions from coal-fired EGUs has been especially large. Fuel-Switching

The US government’s efforts to facilitate the extraction and transmission254 of natural gas while also regulating fugitive methane releases255 are consistent with the premise that natural gas serves as a ‘bridge fuel’ to a low- or zero-GHG-emissions economy.256 However, the fuel-switching currently underway in the US electricity sector does not include requirements that new natural gas-fired power plants be designed to incorporate CCS/U technology,257 (p. 568) even though the useful life of natural gas infrastructure is long enough to strongly imply that it will become relatively emissions intensive before it is decommissioned.258 Carbon Capture and Sequestration/Utilization

Carbon capture and sequestration or utilization (CCS/U) technologies hold promise for two very different purposes: whereas advocates for continuing to use fossil fuels as a primary energy source look on it as a means of decoupling such usage from the GHG emissions responsible for climate change, others (including the EU) look on it chiefly as a means of containing the damage wrought by existing fossil-fueled facilities while developing their replacements.259 Thus research into CCS/U technologies, which is being conducted in numerous countries and making slow gains,260 currently serves two purposes that will likely diverge once it becomes commercially viable. In the meantime, several countries have made either CCS/U or the ability to integrate CCS/U a compulsory design element for qualifying sources of GHGs—in the United Kingdom (consistent with EU requirements),261 all ‘combustion power plants’ with a capacity of 300MW or greater must be ‘carbon capture ready’;262 in the United States, new or modified coal-fired EGUs must incorporate CCS technologies.263 These requirements raise the cost of EGU construction, in many instances making those costs prohibitive. Fossil Fuel Subsidies

In December 2014, Indonesia took the exceptional step of repealing subsidies for fossil fuel consumption and redirecting funds towards health and welfare programmes.264 Even though the G7 and G20 have made several statements about coordinated subsidy reform since 2009,265 and even though thirteen countries listed subsidy reform in the INDC they (p. 569) submitted to the UNFCCC in 2015,266 few have followed Indonesia’s lead, leaving myriad national subsidies in place and prospectively secure.267 Nuclear

As has already been noted, Germany is retreating from nuclear power and Chile has suspended its exploration of it, but many other countries are establishing or increasing their nuclear generating capacity,268 and several governments are actively supporting R&D in pursuit of reactors that are safer, smaller, and/or generate less high-level waste. The examples discussed below from France, India, and the United States highlight key issues arising from the development and maintenance of nuclear reactors for electricity generation.

The French fleet of fifty-eight reactors has long produced more than three-quarters of the country’s electricity, and has provided the basis for substantial electricity exports and a small industry related to the reprocessing of high-level nuclear waste generated in reactors located not only in France but in other countries as well.269 France plans to scale back the nuclear share of nationwide electricity generating capacity, even though it has managed to avoid controversies over long-term waste storage such as have arisen in Germany and the United States.270 As France’s reactor fleet has been critical to its low GHG emissions profile, (p. 570) plans to close and not replace aging reactors without increasing the electricity sector’s emissions intensity rely on achieving a substantial degree of energy conservation, efficiency, and renewables targets.

India is home to twenty-one power reactors, and six more are under construction there.271 Although nuclear reactors have operated in India since the 1970s, over half of the twenty-one currently in operation first switched on after India signed a civil nuclear agreement (the ‘123 Agreement’) with the United States in 2008.272 India’s ambitious plans call for 63 GW of nuclear generating capacity by 2032 (its current capacity is 5.6 GW) to keep pace with burgeoning demand for energy by industrial, commercial, and residential consumers.273 In addition to increasing the size of its fleet, India is also developing reprocessing capacity and capacity to enrich its domestic supplies of thorium, a fissionable fuel less volatile than conventional enriched uranium and not useful for nuclear weapons.274 This combination will allow India to avoid the accumulation of a large volume of volatile, high-level waste, and to do so in a way that does not raise international concerns about the accumulation of high volumes of weaponizable plutonium from fuel reprocessing.

The United States is home to an aging, shrinking fleet of about 100 reactors that are experiencing increasing levels of financial stress amid low natural gas prices. It has no civilian reprocessing capacity, so that the fleet generates large volumes of high-level waste. The legislative solution devised in 1982 and 1988 to that waste’s accumulation has run into a series of political stumbling blocks, and plans for how to safely store or dispose of it are now uncertain.275 That uncertainty further undermines the prospect of new reactor development, which is made all but impossible anyway by a combination of enormous capital costs, plentiful and project-slowing safety regulations, and wholesale electricity capacity markets’ preference for smaller generation projects with higher rates of return.276 The four new reactors currently under construction in the United States are exceptions that prove the rule: all four are backed by billions of dollars of federal loan guarantees and have been (p. 571) authorized for early cost recovery by public service commissions in Georgia and South Carolina—jurisdictions where electricity prices are regulated rather than set by market fluctuations.277 Recognizing that advanced designs, including small modular reactor (SMRs), could theoretically solve most of the problems currently making new reactor development so difficult, the US Department of Energy has recently coordinated or directly funded multiple R&D initiatives.278

25.4 Role of International Agreements in National Activities

International agreements play important roles in the implementation of the climate change and energy transition policies described above. As described briefly here, they support efforts by developing countries to decouple GHG emissions intensity from economic growth; they address the production, use, and disposal of F-gases; and they seek to address emissions from aircraft and ships.

25.4.1 Supporting Low-Emissions Development

Numerous vehicles offer connections between investors in developed countries and projects in developing countries that would foster low- or no-emissions development in developing, but two in particular predominate: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established by the Kyoto Protocol, and REDD+ refined by the 2007 Bali Action Plan and the 2010 Cancun Agreements. A CDM project in Morocco, and a REDD+ project in Vietnam provide illustrative examples.

Like a cap-and-trade programme, the Kyoto Protocol’s imposition of emission limits caused emissions to take on economic value. The CDM was devised so that emitters in developed countries could, instead of reducing their own GHG emissions, sponsor projects in developing countries that would foster development but in a way that avoided GHG emissions. The marginal cost of emissions reduction in the developing country being lower, and the cost of capital to the entity in the developing country being higher, the exchange would provide a more efficient means of emissions reduction than either party could accomplish on its own. For example, through CDM Project 0042, ‘the Tétouan Wind Farm Project for Lafarge Cement Plant’, a French firm sponsored installation of a 12-turbine, 10.2 MW wind (p. 572) farm at a Moroccan cement plant.279 In 2012, after seven years of operation, the wind farm was estimated to have avoided 158,354 tons of CO2 emission by substituting for the purchase of electricity through the transmission grid, which drew on oil-, coal-, and gas-fired power plants.280 Though the project preceded passage of Morocco’s renewable energy law in 2010 and its framework sustainable development law in 2014,281 should a similar CDM project establish another wind farm in Morocco, it would thereby help achieve compliance with those laws’ renewables targets using financing from abroad.

REDD+ recognizes that forests provide important and roughly quantifiable carbon sinks, and that the monetized value of such sinks to potential project sponsors often exceeds what local farmers can get from clearing those forests to gain access to arable land. Thus, as with the CDM, connecting sponsors in developed countries to project participants in developing countries provides an efficient way to reduce atmospheric GHG emissions—in the case of REDD+, by avoiding deforestation or forest degradation, managing forests sustainably, or conserving or enhancing forest stocks. Vietnam’s 2012 REDD+ National Action Program implements land use and environmental protection laws adopted from 2003 to 2005.282 One Vietnamese REDD+ project, ‘Mangroves and Markets: supporting mangrove protection in Ca Mau Province, Vietnam’, ran from 2012 to 2016.283 It involved training roughly 2,700 farmers in shrimping techniques that do not involve industrial chemicals, restored abandoned shrimp ponds, and thereby alleviated pressures that might otherwise have led farmers to deplete existing ponds and clear mangrove forests to gain access to new ones.284 The project thus protected Ca Mau’s mangroves, which act both as a carbon sink and a source of resilience to coastal storms.

25.4.2 Dealing with F-gases

The UNFCCC and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer overlap in their goals of protecting the climate, and also more specifically in their address of high-GWP fluorinated gases (F-gases). The Vienna Convention’s Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which entered into force in 1989, provided basic coordination (p. 573) for the rapid phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) through the combined efforts of governments, manufacturers, and retailers.285 As noted in section, that phase-out prompted manufacturers to develop substitute refrigerants using HFCs, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and other F-gases, which do not damage the ozone layer if released but have extremely large GWPs, making their release damaging to the climate in a different way.

While a number of national governments have taken steps to regulate the manufacture, sale, and disposal of F-gases,286 there is general agreement that, as with CFCs, only international coordination and commitments can ensure the effective regulation and eventual phase-out of F-gases—and that the Montreal Protocol offers a suitable legal vehicle for the purpose.287 Preliminary negotiations in 2015 yielded several proposals for such regulations,288 none of which were adopted at the July 2016 conference of the parties to the Montreal Protocol.289 As with negotiations over other GHG emissions, the sticking point (articulated most forcefully by India) relates to developing countries’ argument that they should either have temporary licence to emit for the sake of development or, if they adopt the tighter timeframe sought by developed countries, that they should receive substantial support to find and deploy alternative means of promoting development.290

25.4.3 Controlling Aircraft and Marine Shipping Emissions

Over 3 per cent of GHG emissions originate with the aircraft and marine ships that traverse national boundaries daily,291 but these emissions are growing apace,292 are not subject to the UNFCCC, and are subject to few national regulations that bite—the inclusion of aircraft emissions in the EU ETS is the notable exception.293 The UNFCCC defers their regulation to the ICAO and the IMO, which have moved slowly and have only recently begun to move (p. 574) in that direction. The ICAO announced aspirational goals for emissions reductions in 2010,294 and then struck a deal with the EU in 2012 to develop emissions regulations in return for suspension of the EU’s application of its ETS to international aircraft emissions.295 The ICAO issued the current draft of those regulations in February 2016;296 it would impose emissions limits on new aircraft and cap aircraft emissions generally at 2020 levels—but allow for compliance via offsets.297 For its part, the IMO issued mandatory efficiency requirements in 2010, and will phase in the Energy Efficiency Design Index to implement those requirements between 2013 and 2025.298 Assuming the ICAO adopts its proposed emissions cap, maritime shipping would be the sole emissions source category not subject to GHG emissions limits. Given the ease with which ships can seek a flag of convenience and thereby avoid national regulations, this is perhaps not surprising.

25.5 Evaluation

The brief analytical discussion in this section takes note of the effectiveness (and limits) of particular policy techniques. It also notes an example of policies imitated across jurisdictions and discusses opportunities and limits for such imitation.

25.5.1 Effectiveness Performance of Energy Efficiency Measures

Energy conservation and efficiency programmes that combine performance standards and labeling requirements have generally been effective.299 This is true for equipment and (p. 575) appliances, as well as for buildings. Of course, quality matters to the success of EE-promoting policies, as does the targeting of interventions.300 Another caveat to EE’s effectiveness is the ‘rebound effect’ or just ‘rebound’, which the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change has also referred to as ‘comfort taking’.301 Rebound is the increase in energy consumption that follows a reduction in the marginal cost of a particular energy service as a result of EE improvement; economists continue to debate how frequently and to what degree rebound follows EE improvements.302 Policy measures have only begun to address rebound, and their effectiveness—like that of EE policies—depends on how well they have been shaped to the circumstances in which they intervene.303 The Role of Circumstance

Some successes owe a great deal to circumstance. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and Germany’s feed-in-tariff for rooftop solar are both examples of policies that succeeded in their principal aims in no small part because they benefited from fortuitous timing and circumstances. In the case of RGGI, making GHG intensity costly coincided with clear reductions in GHG emissions. This owed in part to the timing of the Great Recession, which reduced economic activity and emissions levels, and in part to displacement of demand for electricity away from coal-fired plants located in RGGI-states’ borders to natural gas plants located just outside those borders.304 That displacement led to a significant reduction of aggregate emissions from RGGI states, but would not have done so had several years of low natural gas prices not led to the construction of new, efficient natural gas plants in adjacent states.305 The success of Germany’s feed-in-tariff at spurring renewables development similarly relied on coincident circumstances outside Germany’s borders: as described in section, German grid operators were able to take advantage of their relationships with grid operators and fossil-fuelled facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic to deal with the hard-to-predict variability of electricity generated by its new wind and solar resources. Without access to neighbours willing to accommodate (or unable to prevent) sudden changes in grid balance, the net benefits of Germany’s renewables programme would have appeared lower.

(p. 576) Replacing Coal is Not the Same as Decarbonizing

The shuttering of coal-fired power plants eliminates a key source of GHG emissions, but the replacement of those power plants with gas-fired ones has the potential to ‘lock in’ substantial future GHG emissions by creating new plants with a thirty- to fifty-year useful life as well as the import/export terminals, pipelines, and compressors needed to transport natural gas to those plants. The United States is the leading example—but not the only one306—of a jurisdiction that will achieve substantial GHG reductions by weaning off of coal while simultaneously committing itself to natural gas. As the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project has pointed out, and as EU ‘carbon capture ready’ requirements for new gas plants reflect, this risk can be addressed by (i) mandating that all new natural gas facilities be married to a carbon capture and sequestration or utilization facility, and (ii) developing the technologies required to economically capture and sequester or utilize carbon. Until such mandates are firm and such technologies readily available, however, natural gas cannot be considered a certain improvement over coal, and mere reduction in coal usage cannot be considered an unequivocally effective energy transition policy goal.

25.5.2 Transferability of Techniques

A policy implemented successfully in one legal and institutional context cannot simply be transplanted to another, but it can be imitated. Efforts to encourage drivers to buy EVs (whether battery-powered or plug-in hybrids) instead of petroleum-fuelled vehicles powered by internal combustion engines provide an especially good example of this point. Such efforts face the same trio of basic problems everywhere: high direct costs, inconvenience, and ‘range anxiety’ owing to sparse or absent charging infrastructure, and long charging times even where charging points are available. These problems are all rooted in the fact that vehicles and their supporting infrastructure are subject to strong network externalities, meaning that until critical masses of both EVs and charging stations accumulate, the costs of owning an EV will be relatively high.

Jurisdictions have taken varied approaches to these problems: the Netherlands, for instance, has created strong incentives for corporate buyers to add EVs to their fleets; Norway has made the installation of charging stations a public priority (which is feasible in a small, wealthy country where hydropower generating capacity can quickly scale up to handle additional electricity load); and Germany has developed demonstration regions to work out the kinks of EV infrastructure deployment rather than—or possibly before—undertaking a subsidized nationwide rollout.307 Jurisdictions have also paid attention to each other’s approaches and outcomes. British Columbia recently commissioned a study of what had worked so well in Norway.308 That study highlighted key programmatic features but also (p. 577) pointed out that British Columbia simply could not imitate some of them, such as adjustments to national tax policy.309

Differences between jurisdictions’ approaches tend to reflect their particular circumstances and constraints rather than disparate theories of what works. California’s recent decision to restrict its subsidies for EV buyers did not result from the California Air Resources Board concluding that Yang et al. (2016) was wrong to list ‘durability’ among the characteristics of more successful policy.310 Rather, those subsidies flow from revenues gathered through California’s cap-and-trade scheme, and negotiating for the political survival of the cap-and-trade scheme and of California climate policy generally, resulted in a jostling the existing EV scheme.311

25.6 Concluding Remarks

Efforts to address climate change through regulation and other policy measures are deeply and variously entwined with efforts to effectuate an energy transition away from fossil fuels. This chapter has sketched a rough map of both categories, highlighting the roles played by actors at different levels and in different segments of government, and identifying the tools and approaches those actors are employing. That map necessarily offers only superficial treatment of these efforts, which tend to be complex in their formulation and still more complex in their implementation. This chapter’s brief analytic observations about particular policy tools highlight the inescapable relevance of legal, institutional, and geographic circumstances to policy outcomes.

25.7 Select Bibliography

M. B. Gerrard and J. Dernbach (eds.), Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States (ELI Press forthcoming 2018).Find this resource:

Publications of the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, including Synthesis Reports and 15 Country Reports, available at:

Burger, M. and J. Gundlach, The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (New York: UN Environment, 2017).Find this resource:

Nachmany, M. et al., The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries (London: London School of Economics, 2015).Find this resource:

Harrison, K., ‘The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax’, OECD Environment Working Papers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013).Find this resource:

The Law of Clean Energy: Efficiency and Renewables (Gerrard, M. B. ed., American Bar Association, 2011).Find this resource:

World Bank, Carbon Tax Guide: A Handbook for Policy Makers (Washington D.C.: World Bank 2017).Find this resource:


(1) See e.g. the German Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme, also called the ‘Meseburg Programme’ of 27–8 August 2007. The programme consisted of measures relating to energy efficiency, renewable energy, biofuels, the alignment of the gas tax rate to fuels’ GHG-intensities, and requirements for labeling and recovery of refrigerants. Background Paper: Costs and Benefits of the German Government’s Energy and Climate Package (Berlin: Federal Environment Ministry, October 2007), available at:

(2) Please note also, this chapter is up to date through early 2017. Developments since then are not reflected in its contents.

(3) Other catalogues of climate change-related legislation have used ‘flagship’ or ‘framework’ to refer to legislation that provides a ‘comprehensive, unifying basis for climate change policy’. M. Nachmany et al., 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: Summary for Policymakers (London: London School of Economics, 2015), 28.

(4) Ibid., at 13 (noting that of the ninety-nine countries surveyed, only seventeen lack any framework laws; fifty-eight have framework laws that address both mitigation and adaptation, eighteen have framework laws that address mitigation only, and six have framework laws that address adaptation only).

(5) [Brazil] Lei Nº 12.187, de 29 de Dezembro de 2009, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.], Edição Extra, 29.12.2009, Página 109 (establishing the National Policy on Climate Change); Decreto Nº 7.390, de 9 de Dezembro de 2010, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 10.12.2010, Página 4 (implementing National Policy on Climate Change).

(6) [Mexico] Ley General de Cambio Climático [General Law on Climate Change], as amended, 2 de april de 2015, Diario Official de la Federación [DO], 6 de junio de 2012.

(7) [New Zealand] Climate Change Response Act 2002, Pub. Act 2002 No, 40; Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act 2004, Pub. Act 2004 No. 2.

(8) [South Korea] Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, Act No. 9931, 13 January 2010.

(9) [UK] Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27.

(10) [China] National Climate Change Program (Beijing: National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). The Commission has released updated versions of the National Climate Change Program each year since 2007, with the exception of 2010. See also People’s Republic of China, 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011–2015) (2011) (legislation adopted by the National People’s Congress incorporating carbon-intensity targets first announced in advance of COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen). Formally speaking, China has yet to adopt legislation that expressly pursues climate change mitigation goals. See A. L. Wang, ‘Climate Change Policy and Law in China’ in C. P. Carlene et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 635–69, at 651.

(11) Republic of Fiji, National Climate Change Policy (Suva: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2012), available at:

(12) [India] Prime Minister’s National Council on Climate Change, National Action Plan on Climate Change (New Dehli: Government of India, 2008), available at:

(13) [Pakistan] Ministry of Climate Change, National Climate Change Policy (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2012), available at:; Government of Pakistan, Climate Change Division, Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014–2030) (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2013), available at: National Climate Change Policy (2012), available at:

(14) [Netherlands] Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, National Climate Agenda: Resilient, Prosperous and Green (The Hague: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2013).

(15) Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, (A.S.P. 12) (setting matching overarching emissions reduction target).

(16) [UK] Climate Change Act 2008, ch. 27, paras. 4–10.

(17) Ibid., paras. 32–43.

(18) Ibid., para. 9.

(19) Committee on Climate Change (CCC), Scope of Carbon Budgets: Statutory Advice on Inclusion of International Aviation and Shipping (London: The Stationery Office, 2012); [UK] Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), International Aviation and Shipping Emissions and the UK’s Carbon Budgets and 2050 Target (London: DECC, 2012), para. 3.

(20) See G. Kaminskaitė-Salters, Constructing a Private Climate Change Lawsuit Under English Law: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2010), 93; see also R. (Hillingdon LBC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWHC 626 (rejecting approval of third airport runway at Heathrow Airport because its environmental review had failed to consider GHG emissions impacts and instructing the government to conform aviation policy that allowed for such approvals to Climate Change Act 2008).

(21) [UK] Climate Change Act 2008, para. 56; see also e.g. CCC, UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 Synthesis Report (London: CCC, 2016), available at:; Department of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA), UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report (London: The Stationary Office, January 2012), available at:

(22) See [UK] DECC, DEFRA, and Environment Agency, Policy Paper: 2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Energy Demand Reduction in Industry, Business and the Public Sector (2012; updated February 2016), available at:

(23) [India] Prime Minister’s National Council on Climate Change, National Action Plan on Climate Change (New Dehli: Government of India, 2008), 2, available at:

(24) Government of India, Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) (New Dehli: India Planning Commission, 2013), 228, para. 7.112, available at:

(25) A. Since, ‘Four New Missions to Boost Response to Climate Change’ India Express, 3 January 2015, available at:; Government of India, Twelfth Five Year Plan, at 118, 228–9 (noting addition of National Wind Energy Mission).

(26) See generally R. Pandey et al., The National Clean Energy Fund of India: A Framework for Promoting Effective Utilization (New Dehli: Springer India, 2014).

(27) [Argentina] Ley No. 24.295, 11 de enero de 1994, [LIV-A] A.D.L.A. 1994, página 56; [Argentina] Ley No. 25.438, 20 de junio de 2001 [LXI-D] A.D.L.A. 4022, página 1.

(28) [Argentina] Ley No. 26.331, 19 de diciembre de 2007 [LXVIII-A] A.L.D.A., página 29 (Minimum Standards for the Environmental Protection of Native Forests).

(29) [Argentina] Ley No. 26.190, B.O. 2.1.2007 (Framework for the National Promotion for the Production and Use of Renewable Sources of Electric Energy); Ley No. 27.191, B.O. 21.10.2015 (same).

(30) [Argentina] Art. 41 Constitución Nacional, This provision was added in 1994. Ibid., Sixteenth Temporary Provision.

(31) [Argentina] Ley No. 25.675, B.O. 28.11.2002 (General Environmental Act).

(32) [Argentina] Decreto No. 2213/2002 (Designating Secretary of the SAyDS Implementing Authority for Law No. 24.295 (UNFCCC ratification)); see also [Argentina] Consejo Federal del Medio Ambiente, Resolución No. 166 de 1 de april de 2009, available at: (making SAyDS responsible for preliminary steps toward compliance with UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol commitments, and creating Ad Hoc Committee on Climate Change within SAyDS).

(33) [Argentina] Decreto No. 822/1998.

(34) [Argentina] Decreto No. 1070/2005.

(35) [Argentina] Resolución No. 195 de 4 de septiembre de 2010, available at:

(36) For a discussion of the political context that informs Canadian regulatory and legislative steps toward (and away from) addressing climate change directly, see J. M. Glenn and J. Otero, ‘Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable’ in J. Hollo et al. (eds.), Climate Change and the Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 489–508.

(37) UN, Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC, Depositary Notification Ref. No. C.N.1313.2002.TREATIES-56 (17 December 2002) (Ratification: Canada); UN, Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC, Depositary Notification Ref. No. C.N.796.2011.TREATIES-1 (15 December 2011) (Canada: Withdrawal), available at:

(38) Canada Emission Reduction Incentives Agency Act, S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 87, available at:; UNFCCC, ‘Kyoto Protocol: Targets for the First Commitment Period’, available at:

(39) Canadian Department of Finance, Budget 2007: A Stronger, Safer, Better Canada, available at: (last updated 19 Mar. 2007).

(40) Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c 33; Order Adding Toxic Substances to Schedule 1 to the 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SOR/2005-345, Canada Gazette: Part II, Vol. 139, No. 24, 30 November 2005; see also Environment and Climate Change Canada, ‘Carbon dioxide (CO2)’, (last updated 10 Dec. 2015): Carbon dioxide was added to Sch. 1 CEPA in November 2005 through subs. 90(1).

(41) See P. Becklumb, Background Paper No. 2013-86-E: Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction to Regulate Environmental Issues (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Publications, September 2013), available at:

(42) See ‘Canada’s Clean Air Act’ [changed to ‘Canada’s Clean Air and Climate Change Act’ in committee], Bill C-30, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, 2006, Part 1.

(43) See [Canada] Passenger Automobile and Light Truck GHG Emissions Regulations, SOR/2010-201; Regulations Amending the Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2014-207; Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, SOR/2012-167.

(44) [U.S.] Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515.

(45) See e.g. US EPA & National Transportation Highway Safety Administration, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (7 May 2010); US EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (3 June 2010); US EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35823 (3 June 2016); US EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64509 (23 October 2015); US EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 205 (23 October 2015) (so-called ‘Clean Power Plan’ or CPP). In some cases, the legal basis of such regulation has been challenged and its implementation stayed, as for the CPP: Order in pending case, West Virginia et al v EPA et al (9 February 2016), 577 US.

(46) Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

(47) See e.g. [U.S.] Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100–707, 102 Stat. 4689 (23 November 1988), codified at 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207; Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112–2, 127 Stat. 4 (29 January 2013).

(48) [U.S.] Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110–40, 121 Stat. 1492 (7 December 2007); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–61, 121 Stat. 1844 (27 December 2007).

(49) [U.S.] EISA §§ 202(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (renewable fuels); 712(b)(3)(C) (GHG capture and sequestration research); 922(b)(2), 923(4) (establishing International Clean Energy Foundation); 1101(g) (establishing Office of Climate Change and Environment within Department of Transportation).

(50) [US] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, tit. II, 121 Stat. 2128.

(51) US EPA, Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260, 56260 (30 October 2009) (citing Clean Air Act § 307(d)), codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98.

(52) For an example of legislation drafted specifically to facilitate receipt of CDM and REDD+ funds, see Guatemala’s Climate Change Framework Law of 2013, Decreto No. 7–2013, D.O. 4.10.2013 (defining ownership rights of emissions reductions creditable under REDD+ and establishing public office to steer CDM and REDD+ financing to project managers).

(53) National Policy on Climate Change (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Malaysia, 2010), available at:

(54) Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2011–15 (Putrajaya, Malasia: Economic Planning Unit, Malaysian Prime Minister’s Department, June 2010), available at:, 300.

(55) Ibid., at 302–5.

(56) Laws of Malaysia, Act 725, Renewable Energy Act 2011 (2 June 2011), available at:

(57) Hugo Chávez Frías, Proposal of the Candidate of the Homeland, Commander Hugo Chávez, for the Socialist Bolivarian Government, 2013–2019 (June 2012), available at:

(58) See e.g. Kuwait, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, 25 November 2015. The UNFCCC collects and makes available all INDCs at ‘INDCs as Communicated by Parties’, available at: Hereinafter, citations to INDCs indicate the country that submitted them, that they are INDCs, and the date of their submissions to the UNFCCC.

(59) See e.g. Art. V Treaty on European Union (TEU), available at:

(60) See generally K. M. Holland et al. (eds.), Federalism and the Environment: Environmental Policymaking in Australia, Canada, and the United States (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996).

(61) Two comparisons illustrate the point, one from the United States and another in India. In the United States, California is an unquestioned leader on climate change mitigation. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 89 (codified as Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–99 (West 2010)) (articulating ambitious climate change and energy transition policy goals). By contrast, Florida has avoided climate or energy transition policies, even though it is highly susceptible to sea level rise and is an outstanding candidate for substantially replacing thermal power plants cost-effectively with rooftop solar power. See T. Dickinson, ‘The Koch Brothers’ Dirty War on Solar Power’ Rolling Stone, 11 February 2016, available at:; M. Chediak, ‘Cloudy Prospects for Rooftop Solar’s Growth in Florida: Energy’ Bloomberg, 16 February 2015; Union of Concerned Scientists, ‘The Truth about Florida’s Attempt to Censor Climate Change’ Got Science?, April 2015, available at: In India, one can make a similar comparison between Gujarat and Orissa. Compare Government of Gujarat, Climate Change Department, State Action Plan on Climate Change (Government of Gujarat, 2014), 3, available at: (‘Gujarat is the first State in India, the first in Asia and fourth in the world to form an independent Department for Climate Change’), with Government of Orissa, Orissa Climate Change Action Plan: 2010–2015—Draft (Government of Orissa Department of Forest and Environment, 2010), available at: (planning for development of 58 GW of new coal-fired generating capacity from 2010 to 2018).

(62) [British Columbia] Carbon Tax Act, 2008 S.B.C., ch. 40 § 157.

(63) British Columbia Ministry of Finance, ‘Tax Reduction Funded by the Carbon Tax’, available at: (last visited 28 July 2016).

(64) See K. Harrison, ‘The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax’, OECD Environment Working Papers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), paras. 14–16, available at:

(65) C. Komanoff and M. Gordon, British Columbia’s Carbon Tax: By the Numbers (New York: Carbon Tax Center, December 2015), 2, available at:

(66) Hydro Quebec v Canada, R., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, 215, 286.

(67) Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo Metropolitan Environmental Master Plan (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, March 2008), available at:

(68) H. Roppongi, ‘The Role of Sub-National Actors in Climate Change Policy: The Case of Tokyo’ (June 2016) 86 Asie. Visions 13.

(69) Bureau of Environment Tokyo Metropolitan Government, ‘Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program’ for Large Facilities (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2012), 1(2), available at: The programme includes a reporting requirement for ‘large business facilities’, meaning office buildings and industrial facilities that consume an equivalent of 1.5 million litres of crude oil. All buildings and facilities that have satisfied the criteria for ‘large business facilities’ for at least three consecutive years are considered ‘compliance facilities’ subject to the declining cap.

(70) Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report of Japan (Ibaraki, Japan: National Institute for Environmental Studies, 2014), available at:

(71) International Carbon Action Partnership, ‘ETS Detailed Information: Japan-Saitama Target Setting Emissions Trading System’ (updated 12 August 2016), available at: (‘Saitama’s ETS was established in April 2011 as part of the Saitama Prefecture Global Warming Strategy Promotion Ordinance. Saitama’s ETS is bilaterally linked to Tokyo’s.’); Japan Ministry of the Environment, Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), (Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment, 2012), available at:

(72) Heidelberg Bahnstadt, ‘Weltweit größte Passivhaustagung: Exkursion in die Heidelberger Bahnstadt’ [World’s Largest Passivhaus Conference: Exploring the Heidelberg Bahnstadt District], 4 April 2013, available at:

(73) See [Germany] Energieeinsparverordnung [Energy Efficiency Regulation], 24 July 2007, BGBl. I S. 1519. Those code requirements were updated for a second time in 2013. Zweite Verordnung zur Änderung der Energieeinsparverordnung [Second Enactment of Amendments to the Energy Efficiency Ordinance], 18 November 2013, BGBl. I S. 3951.

(74) City of Heidelberg, Concept for the Master Plan 100% Climate Protection for the City of Heidelberg (City of Heidelberg, April 2014), available at:

(75) Indonesia, INDC, 24 September 2015, available at:

(76) S. Butt et al., Climate Change and Forest Governance: Lessons from Indonesia (London & New York, Routledge: 2015), 111–12 (describing the mismatch between Indonesia’s 1,000 or more regional law-makers and the national government’s staff responsible for conducting the consistency review process prescribed by the 2004 Regional Government Law and 2004 Autonomy Law).

(77) Ibid., at 115–17 (discussing Indonesian Supreme Court decisions 03 G/HUM/2002 and 24P/HUM/2002).

(78) Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

(79) West Virginia v EPA, D.C. Cir. Case No. 15–1363 (en banc), _stayed_, Order in pending case, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016).

(80) For a complete list, see Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, ‘Climate Change Litigation in the U.S.’, available at:

(81) P. Rincon, ‘Government Axes Climate Department’ BBC, 14 July 2016, available at:

(82) [U.S.] Exec. Order No. 13,693, Federal Leadership on Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability, 80 Fed. Reg. 15871 (19 March 2015); Exec. Order 13690, Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, 80 Fed. Reg. 6425 (30 January 2015); Exec. Order 13677, Climate-Resilient International Development, 79 Fed. Reg. 58229 (26 September 2014); Exec. Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, 78 Fed. Reg. 66817 (6 November 2013); Exec. Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (8 October 2009).

(83) [U.S.] Federal Acquisition Regulation: Public Disclosure of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Reduction Goals-Representation, 81 Fed. Reg. 33192 (25 May 2016).

(84) Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, ‘Non-US Climate Litigation Chart’, available at: The Sabin Center has documented cases in the following jurisdictions: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, the European Union, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

(85) Petition, VZW Klimaatzaak v Kingdom of Belgium, Tribunal of First Instance, Brussels, filed 4 December 2014.

(86) Leghari v Federation of Pakistan (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015, Lahore High Court.

(87) RB-Den Haag [Hague District Court] 21 juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (Stichting Urgenda/Nederlanden) [Urgenda Foundation v Netherlands].

(88) Statement of Claim, Thomson v Minister for Climate Change Issues, HCNZ, CIV-2015-__, 10 November 2015.

(89) See M. B. Gerrard and M. Wilensky, ‘The Role of the National Courts in GHG Emissions Reductions’ in M. Faure (ed.), Climate Change Law (Cheltenham; Northhampton M.A.: Edward Elgar, 2016), 359–71, at 366–8.

(90) Ibid., at 360; see also Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, ‘US Climate Change Litigation’, available at:

(91) See J. Dupuisa and R. Biesbroek, ‘Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Dependent Variable Problem in Comparing and Evaluating Climate Change Adaptation Policies’ (2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 1476, at 1476–87 (describing measurement problems arising from conceptual indistinctness and heterogeneity among adaptation efforts).

(92) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9, fig. SPM.5. Although it is generally recognized that an increase of more than 1.5ºC would pose an existential threat to low-lying and small island nations, most international and national policies build on the 2ºC threshold. See UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21, available at: (inviting ‘IPCC to draft Special Report by 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways’).

(93) See e.g. Under2 °, ‘Subnational governments are partnering to advance a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Subnational Global Climate Leadership’, available at: (listing 135 jurisdictions that have signed or endorsed MOUs and linking to MOU text stating commitment to work to prevent a rise in global average temperatures or 2°C).

(94) See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

(95) Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 11 December 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at:

(96) Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Dec. I/CP.17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/201 1/9/Add.l, at 2 (15 March 2012).

(97) See e.g. US INDC, 31 March 2015, at 1–2, EU INDC, 6 March 2015, at 1–2.

(98) See e.g. India INDC, 1 October 2015, at 8.

(99) See e.g. China INDC, 30 June 2015, at 5.

(100) See e.g. Japan INDC, 17 July 2015, pt. 3 (listing targets and policies by sector).

(101) See e.g. India INDC, at 9.

(102) See e.g. [UK] Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Environment Agency, Guidance: HFC phase down in the EU: how it works and exemptions, 31 December 2014, available at:, European Commission, EU legislation to control F-gases, available at: (updated 17 August 2016); [US] EPA, Phaseout of Ozone-Depleting Substances, available at: (updated 12 January 2016).

(103) See e.g. Mexico INDC, 30 March 2015, at 3.

(104) See European Commission, Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Change, 16 April 2013, available at: (discussing various approaches to adaptation but not setting targets).

(105) See e.g. [U.S.] Department of Homeland Security, Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG), ‘Draft Concept Paper: Draft Interagency Concept for Community Resilience Indicators and National-Level Measures’ (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 17–21, available at: (noting quantitative measures employed by federal and state agencies).

(106) California Air Resources Board, First Update to the Climate Change Scoping Plan (May 2014), 66–9 (describing components of waste sector’s GHG inventory and listing emissions reduction measures); see also Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 17 §§ 95460–95476 (2009), available at: (addressing methane emissions from municipal solid waste landfills).

(107) See e.g. City of San Diego, Climate Action Plan (City of San Diego, December 2015), available at:; Yolo County, Yolo County Climate Action Plan (Yolo County Board of Supervisors, March 2011), available at:

(108) See generally C40 Cities & Arup, Climate Action in Megacities 3.0 (London: C40 Cities & Arup, Dec. 2015) (describing coordinated efforts in dozens of cities).

(109) See Cornell University, ‘Climate Action Plan 2013 Update and Roadmap for 2014–15’ (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2013), available at:; Berlin & Freie Universität Berlin, Klimaschutzvereinbarung zur gemeinsamen Umsetzung der energie- und klimaschutz-politischen Ziele des Landes Berlin und der Freien Universität Berlin [Climate Protection Agreement regarding collaborative implementation of energy and climate policy goals of the Berlin Region and the Free University of Berlin] 2011–15 (Berlin & Freie Universität Berlin, May 2011), available at:

(110) CDP, Putting a Price on Risk: Carbon Pricing in the Corporate World (New York: CDP, September 2015), available at:; see also Keidanren [Japan Federation of Economic Organizations], 経団連低炭素社会実行計画 [Keidanren Low Carbon Society Action Plan] (Tokyo: Keidanren, 2014), available at: (describing Voluntary Action Plan 2020).

(111) See R. S. Pindyck, The Use and Misuse of Models for Climate Policy (Cambridge M.A.: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2015) (cautioning against presenting numeric thresholds as supported per se by climate models); G. Schmidt, ‘Agree to Disagree: Climate Models Produce Projections, Not Probabilities’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26 November 2007, available at:

(112) [U.S.] EPA, Fact Sheet: Social Cost of Carbon (Washington, D.C.: EPA, December 2015), available at:; see also UK Department for Trade and Industry, Our Energy Future—Creating a Low Carbon Economy (London: Department for Trade and Industry, 2003) (concluding that the United Kingdom should reduce CO2 emissions by 60 per cent from a 1990 baseline by 2050 based on SCC calculation).

(113) See generally, UNFCCC, Reporting of the LULUCF Sector by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, available at:

(114) See World Bank & Ecofys, Carbon Pricing Watch: An Advance Brief from the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2016 report, to be released late 2016 (Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2016), available at: (surveying carbon taxes and ETSs).

(115) CDP, Putting a Price on Risk.

(116) Presidential Carbon Charge Task Force, Report to the President and Provost of Yale University: Findings and Recommendations on a Carbon-Charge Program at Yale (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, April 2015), available at:; A. Hall et al., Internal Carbon Accounting at a Small Liberal Arts College (Arlington, New York: Vassar College, September 2015).

(117) Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program for Large Facilities (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, March 2012), 3(1) (‘Covered Gases’), available at:

(118) [EU] Council Directive 2003/87/EC, O.J. (L 275), 25.10.2003, 32 (establishing scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC), available at:

(119) [Northeast US] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Program Overview, available at:

(120) British Columbia, Carbon Tax Act, 2008, pt. 3; Climate Action Secretariat, Consultation Backgrounder—Carbon Pricing (British Columbia Ministry of Environment, 2012), 2, available at:

(121) World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Emerging Practices in Internal Carbon Pricing: A Practical Guide (Geneva: World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2015), 5.

(122) Ibid.

(123) [Austria] Fluorierte-Treibhausgase-Gesetz [Fluorinated GHG Law] 2009 Bundesgesetzblatt No. 103/2009 (requiring registration of actors in supply chain and imposing fines for non-compliance); Verordnung des Bundesministers für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft über Verbote und Beschränkungen teilfluorierter und vollfluorierter Kohlenwasserstoffe sowie von Schwefelhexafluorid [Regulation of the federal minister for land management, forestry, environment, and water regarding prohibitions and restrictions on partly and fully fluorinated volatile organic compounds and sulfur hexafluoride], BGBl. II Nr. 447/2002 (10 December 2002), as amended in 2007, BGBl. II Nr. 139/2007, § 4 Abs. 8 (21 June 2007).

(124) New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, Synthetic greenhouse gases in the ETS, available at: (reviewed 18 May 2016).

(125) [US] 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (CAFE standards); 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (PSD programme requirements); 80 Fed. Reg. 205 (Clean Power Plan).

(126) [U.S.] 80 Fed. Reg. at 64887–894.

(127) Peru’s National Forestry and Climate Change Strategy, Decreto No. 007-2016-MINAM (21 July 2016), available at:

(128) Peruvian Ministry of the Environment, ‘Peruvian Business and Biodiversity Initiative’, available at:

(129) International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook: Fossil Fuel Subsidy Database, available at:

(130) For statements of the G7, G20, and the United States regarding subsidy reduction commitments, see G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, 26–7 May 2016, available at:; Progress Report to G20 on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (2014), available at: For estimates of the current scale of subsidies, see International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook: Fossil Fuel Subsidy Database, available at:; David Coady et al., ‘How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies?’, IMF Working Paper WP/15/105 (May 2015).

(131) R. L. Wilby and R. Keenan, ‘Adapting to Flood Risk Under Climate Change’ (2015, 36 Progress in Physical Geography 348–78, at 352–7 (collecting examples of government-led efforts to collect and provide information about flood risk in South Asia, Germany, the United Kindom, and the United States).

(132) West of Wales Shoreline Management Plan 2: Cardigan Bay and Ynys Enlli to the Great Orme Coastal Groups (June 2012); see also Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, Shoreline management plan guidance Volume 1: Aims and requirements (March 2006), available at: For a news article summarizing the confrontation, see ‘Welsh village to sue government over “alarmist” rising sea level claim’ The Telegraph, 11 February 2016, available at:

(133) S. Childress and K. Worth, ‘How Federal Flood Maps Ignore the Risks Of Climate Change’ Frontline, 26 May 2016, available at:

(134) [France] Décret n° 2015–1850 du 29 décembre 2015 pris en application de l’article L. 533-22-1 du code monétaire et financier [decree adopted pursuant to Article L. 533-22-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code], Journal Officiel de la République Française n°0303 du 31 décembre 2015 page 25282, text no. 80 (implementing Art. 173 Energy Transition for Green Growth Law).

(135) [EU] Council Directive 2014/95, O.J. (L 330), 15.11.2014, 1 (amending Council Directive 2013/34/EU regarding disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups).

(136) [US] Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6294 (9 February 2010).

(137) Compare Xcel Energy Inc., Form 10-K (31 December 2014), 39–40 (describing direct environmental and indirect regulatory risks arising from climate change), with Peabody Energy Corporation 10-K (31 December 2016), 18–19, 33–4 (describing risks from regulation responsive to climate change and acknowledging only that ‘Numerous reports, such as the Fourth (and, more recently, the Fifth) Assessment Report of the [IPCC], have also engendered concern about the impacts of human activity, especially fossil fuel combustion, on global climate issues.’).

(138) Financial Stability Board, Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Phase 1 Report, 31 March 2016, available at:

(139) See e.g. [New Zealand] Ministry for the Environment, The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme Evaluation 2016 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2016), 9, 34 (noting that ETS excludes agriculture); Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand GHG Emissions Inventory 1990–2014 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, May 2016), viii (reporting that agriculture accounts for 49 per cent of New Zealand’s annual GHG emissions).

(140) [UNFCCC] Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Sixth compilation and synthesis of initial national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention: Inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, FCCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2, 25 October 2005, 7–8 (LULUCF portion of total GHG emissions reported in 2005 for Brazil is 55.4 per cent and for Indonesia 43.7 per cent).

(141) See UNFCCC, Decision 11/CP.7, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (defining LULUCF).

(142) P. Smith, M. Bustamante et al., ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)’ in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 811–922, at 816.

(143) See e.g. [New Zealand] Climate Change (Agriculture Sector) Regulations 2010, SR 2010/335 regs. 4–14 (requiring detailed recording and reporting of GHG emissions attributable to agricultural assets and activities); Teagasc and Bord Bia (Irish Food Board), The Dairy Carbon Navigator: Improving Carbon Efficiency on Irish Dairy Farms (Teagasc and Bord Bia, 2013), available at: (suggesting techniques to reduce carbon intensity and tools for estimating GHG emissions for particular activities).

(144) See e.g. C. L. Walthall et al., USDA Technical Bulletin 1935: Climate Change and Agriculture in the United States: Effects and Adaptation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2012), available at:

(145) See e.g. [Chile] Ley No. 20.283, 11 de julio de 2008, Diario Official [D.O.], sobre Recuperación del Bosque Nativo y Fomento Forestal [Law of Recuperation of Native Forest and Promotion of Forests].

(146) [UNFCCC] Decision 1/CP.18 (deciding to undertake REDD+ work programme); Art. V Paris Agreement (referring to forestry as a means of climate change mitigation). The UNFCCC now maintains a thorough catalogue of national policies and UN documents on the REDD+ Web Platform, available at:

(147) [UNFCCC] Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 1/CP16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para. 70 (2010) (‘Recognizing that the following activities ‘contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector: a. Reducing emissions from deforestation; b. Reducing emissions from forest degradation; c. Conservation of forest carbon stocks; d. Sustainable management of forests; e. Enhancement of forest carbon stocks;’).

(148) [Brazil] Lei No. 12.805, de 29 de Abril de 2013, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.], Seção 1, 30.04.2013, Página 1 [National Policy on Farming-Livestock-Forest Integration].

(149) Instruction of President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 10/2011, 20 May 2011 (Delay on New License Issuance and Perfection of Governance of Primary Natural Forest and Peat Lands), available at:

(150) [Vietnam] Decision No. 7991QD-TTg (27 June 2012), approving the national action programme on ‘reducing green-house gas emissions through efforts to mitigate deforestation and forest degradation, sustainable management of forest resources, and conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks’ during 2011–20, Issue nos. 08-10/June 2012, Cong Bao nos. 417-418/6 July 2012, available at:

(151) IPCC AR5 § (Waste) at 385; [US] EPA, Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases: Wastewater, available at: (updated 9 August 2016).

(152) [EU] Council Directive 1999/31/EC, O.J. (L 182), 16.7.1999, 1–19 (landfill of waste); Council Directive 2008/98/EC, O.J. (L 312), 22.11.2008, 3–30 (waste).

(153) [US] EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59331 (29 August 2016); Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59275 (29 August 2016).

(154) e.g. C. Schulze, ‘Municipal Waste Management in Berlin (Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment, December 2013), 32, available at:; R. Dahl, ‘A Second Life For Scraps: Making Biogas From Food Waste’ (2015) 123 Environmental Health Perspectives A180, at A180–A182, available at: (discussing New York City plans for adding food waste to waste stream processed by Newtown Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant).

(155) [China] Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peoples Cong., 28 February 2005, effective 1 January 2006), St. Council Gaz. Issue 11, Serial No. 1154, translated at:, amended by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Renewable Energy (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 26 December, 2009, effective 1 April 2010), 2009 China Law LEXIS 671; Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Thailand: Renewable Energy Policy Update (Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer internationalie Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 2015), 3–4 (describing Thai feed-in-tariffs for small biogas facilities).

(156) The four F-gases and their GWPs are: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 12–14,800; perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 7,390–12,200; sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 17,200; and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), 22,800. IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in O. Edenhofer et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Art. 5 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 15 U.N.T.S. 29.

(157) [EU] Council Directive 2006/40/EC, O.J. (L 161/12), 12–18, 17.05.2006 (regulating emissions from air conditioning systems in motor vehicles); see also European Commission, EU Legislation to Control F-gases: 2014 F-gas Regulation, available at: (listing Regulations and Implementing Regulations and Decision issued by the EU Parliament and European Commission).

(158) (EU) Regulation 517/2014, O.J. (L 150), 20.5.2014, 195–230 (regulating fluorinated greenhouse gases and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 842/2006); Regulation (EC) No. 842/2006, O.J. (L 161), 17.05.2006, 1–11 (regulation of certain fluorinated greenhouse gases).

(159) See e.g. [Germany] Verordnung zum Schutz des Klimas vor Veränderungen durch den Eintrag bestimmter fluorierter Treibhausgase, die zuletzt durch Artikel 5 Absatz 6 des Gesetzes vom 20. Oktober 2015 geändert worden ist [Regulation for the protection against climate change due to the introduction of certain fluorinated greenhouse gases, lately amended in part by Articles 5 and 6 of the law of 20 October 2015], BGBl. I S. 1739.

(160) [Japan] Ministry of the Environment, Office of Fluorocarbons Control Policy, Act on Rational Use and Proper Management of Fluorocarbons (Tokyo: Government of Japan, March 2016), available at: (describing HFCs law adopted in 2013).

(161) See Indian Council for Enviro-legal Action (ICELA) v Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Application No. 70/2014, National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Dehli, 10 December 2015 (hearing claims related to Indian manufacturers’ sale of HCFC-22 and venting of HCF-23 and encouraging Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, other government agencies to take action).

(162) [France] Loi No. 2015–992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte [law relating to the energy transition for green growth], Journal Officiel de la République Française no.0189 du 18 août 2015 page 14263, texte no. 1.

(163) Ibid.

(164) [Germany] Regierungserklaerung [Government Statement] of 17 März 2011 (formalizing announcement of 15 March—four days after the tsunami struck Fukushima—that eight of Germany’s older nuclear reactors would be shuttered); Atomausstiegsgesetz [law on the orderly termination of nuclear energy for commercial electricity generation], 22 April 2002, BGBL. I, S. 1351 (calling for phase out of German nuclear reactors by 2022).

(165) [Germany] Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) [Renewable Energy Sources Law], 21. Juli 2014, BGBL. I, S. 1066, S. 1218, Art. 4; Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) [German Energy Act], 21. Juli 2014, BGBL. I S. 1066, Art. 6 (amending 2005 version); Anreizregulierungsverordnung (ARegV) [Incentive Regulation Ordinance], 21. Juli 2014, BGBL. I, S. 1066, Art. 9 (amending 2007 version); Stromnetzzugangsverordnung (StromNZV) [Electricity Grid Access Ordinance], 21. Juli 2014, BGBL. I, S. 1066, Art. 8 (amending 2005 version); Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) [Electricity Grid Charges Ordinance], 21. July 2014, BGBL. I S. 1066, art. 7 (amending 2005 version); Stromeinspeisungsgesetz [Electricity Feed-In-Tariff Law], 29. März 2000, BGBl. I 2000, S. 305 (superseding 1990 and 1998 versions).

(166) See e.g. [Germany] Gesetz zur Bevorrechtigung der Verwendung elektrisch betriebener Fahrzeuge (Elektromobilitätsgesetz) [Law incentivizing use of electric vehicles (electro-mobility law)], 5. Juni 2015, BGBl. I S. 898 (creating subsidies valid until 2026, and providing for construction of new charging stations).

(167) [US] Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2866 (24 October 1992), tit. VI (electric motor vehicles), tit. XII (renewable energy), tit. XIII (coal), tit. XX.A (oil and gas supply enhancement); Energy Policy Act of 2005, tit. II (renewable energy), tit. III (oil and gas), tit. IV (coal).

(168) P. Criqui et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in 2050 in France (Paris: Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2015), 50–2; K. Hillebrandt et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in 2050 in Germany (Paris: Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2015), 72–6; M. Kainuma et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in 2050 in Japan (Paris: Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2015), 4, 10, 14, 24–5.

(169) E. L. La Rover et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in 2050 in Brazil (Paris: Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2015), §§ 3.2 (biofuels), 3.3 (hydropower).

(170) U. W. R. Siagian et al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in 2050 in Indonesia (Paris: Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2015), 21–2 (describing scenarios involving heavy investments in renewable electricity generation, renewables and CCS, or de-industrialization).

(171) See e.g. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5 § 410(a)(2), 123 Stat. 115, 146–8 (17 February 2009) (conditioning receipt of stimulus funds on formal assurance by state governors that their states would revise state building codes). California provides a notable example of a sub-national government that has long led rather than following its national government in developing ambitious EE policies for buildings. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act of 1974, AB 1575, codified at Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25000–25990. For the 2016 update to California’s building EE requirements, see 2016 Building Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential and Nonresidential Buildings, available at:, codified at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 24, pt. 6.

(172) See e.g. Japan Energy Conservation Handbook 2013 (Tokyo: The Energy Conservation Center, 2013), 22–3 (describing requirements of Energy Conservation Law as amended, which requires annual reporting of energy use, 1 per cent annual reductions in energy intensity, use of Qualified Energy Managers, development of long-term energy efficiency investment plans, establishment of energy management manuals for major energy-consuming equipment).

(173) But see T. Parejo-Navajas, ‘A Legal Approach to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency Measures for the Existing Building Stock in the United States Based on the European Experience’ (2016) 5 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 341, at 385 (noting low compliance rates among some EU Member States).

(174) See European Commission, ‘2020 Climate and Energy Package’, available at: (last updated 22 July 2016).

(175) [EU] Council Directive 2010/31, O.J. (L 153), 18.6.2010, 13–35 (regarding the energy performance of buildings (EPBD)); Council Directive 2002/91, O.J. (L 1), 4.1.2003, 65–71.

(176) [EU] Council Directive 2012/27 [hereinafter 2012 EE Directive] (amending Council Directives 2009/125 and 2010/30 and repealing Directives 2004/8 and 2006/32).

(177) Ibid; see also [EU] Commission Delegated Regulation 244/2012, O.J. (C. 115) 19.4.2012, 1–28 (supplemental regulation providing a cost-effectiveness analysis methodology for choosing EPBD-compatible options that are optimal for a particular jurisdiction).

(178) [EU] Council Directive 2012/27/EU, O.J. (L 315), 14.11.2012, 1–56.

(179) For information about each Member State’s conformance efforts, see European Commission, Buildings, available at: (last updated 30 July 2016).

(180) See [Denmark] Danish Transport and Construction Agency, Building Regulations 2015 (Copenhagen: Danish Transport and Construction Agency, 2015); Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, Building Regulations 2010 (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, December 2010). These are only the latest examples of Denmark’s efforts in relation to building energy performance. Denmark first adopted prescriptive building energy efficiency requirements in 1961, and first added performance-based compliance requirements to that code in 1982.

(181) [South Africa] Government Notice R711/2011 of 9 September 2011, amending National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977; see also National Building Regulation, SANS 10400 pts. X (environmental Sustainability) and XA (energy usage in buildings); Energy Standard for Buildings with mechanically assisted ventilation systems, SANS 0204 (2007).

(182) [South Africa] SANS 10400 pt. XA2; SANS 204 para. 4.5.2 (‘Hot Water Services’).

(183) [South Africa] SANS 1944 (2016).

(184) See South Africa Green Building Council, ‘Green Star Rating System’, available at:

(185) [South Africa] Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended) § 12L.

(186) Y. Ito, ‘Importance and the Points at Issue over Top-Runner Method’ (1999) 29 Environment and Pollution (in Japanese) (discussing June 1998 amendment to Japan’s Law on Rational Use of Energy).

(187) [US] 42 U.S.C. § 6294a(a).

(188) The CLASP Global S&L [standards and labeling] Database collates the performance standards and labelling requirements of fifty-six countries for seventeen product categories. See:

(189) See N. Zhou et al., International Comparison of Product Certification and Verification Methods for Appliances (Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2012), available at:

(190) Australian Department of Industry, Energy Standards and Labelling Programs Throughout the World in 2013 (Canberra: Australian Department of Industry, May 2014), viii, available at:

(192) [US] EPA, Finding that Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air Pollution that May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public Health and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg. 54422 (15 August 2016); [EU] Regulation 2015/757, O.J. (L 123), 19.5.2015, 55–76 (on the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16).

(193) See International Maritime Organization, MEPC 62/24/Add.1, Annex 19, Resolution MEPC.203(62) (15 July 2011) (establishing Energy Efficiency Design Index; formally, ‘Inclusion of regulations on energy efficiency for ships in MARPOL Annex VI’); ICAO, Press Release: Recommended standard for aircraft CO2 emissions (8 February 2016), available at:; International Council on Clean Transportation, Policy Update: International Civil Aviation Organization’s CO2 Certification Requirement for New Aircraft (Berlin: International Council on Clean Transportation, August 2013), available at:

(194) [Brazil] Decreto No. 7.819, de 3 de October de 2012, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 3.10.2012, Página 1 (establishing ‘Inovar-Auto’ program).

(195) [Canada] Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2010-201 (implementing Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999).

(196) [China] GB 27999–2011 (imposing per-vehicle emissions limits and corporate average fuel consumption standard).

(197) [EU] Regulation 443/2009, O.J. (L 140), 5.6.2009, 1–15 (setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles).

(198) [India] Ministry of Power (fuel economy) Regulations, 2015, Gazette of India, section 3(ii) (23 April 2015) (imposing CO2-based fuel economy requirements on light-duty vehicles); see also Energy Conservation Act, 2001, No. 52, Acts of Parliament, 2001 (legislative basis for fuel economy regulation).

(199) [Japan] General Resources Energy Investigation Committee, Energy Savings Standards Section, Automobile Standards Judging Subcommittee LPG Car Fuel Efficiency Standards Evaluation Group, Final Report.

(200) [Mexico] Norma Official Mexicana [NOM] [Official Standards of Mexico], Diario Oficial, 21 de junio de 2013 (imposing limits on CO2 emissions and equivalents from internal combustion engines in new automotive vehicles weighing at least 3857 kg.).

(201) Singapore Land Transport Authority, Press Release: Revised Carbon Emissions-Based Vehicle (CEVS) Scheme from 1 July 2015 (23 February 2015), available at: (listing tightened emissions requirements for motor vehicles).

(202) [South Korea] Vehicle Average Fuel Economy and GHG Emission Standards (2012–15), Notification No. 2011–89 of the Ministry of Environment; see also Vehicle Average Fuel Economy and GHG Emission Standards (2016–20), Notification No. 2014–235 of the Ministry of Environment.

(203) [U.S.] Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25323 (7 May 2010). See also 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 (15 October 2012).

(204) See e.g. [Canada] Heavy-duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2013-24; China [China] GB XXXXX-2016, Fuel consumption limits for heavy-duty commercial vehicles [Stage 3] (4 April 2016), available at: (updating GB 30510–2014, Fuel consumption limits for heavy-duty commercial vehicles [Stage 2]).

(205) See e.g. 75 Fed. Reg. 25323 (US), Regulation 443/2009, O.J. (L 140), 5.6.2009, 1–15.

(206) [New Zealand] Ministry for the Environment, The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme Evaluation 2016 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2016); [British Columbia] Carbon Tax Act, 2008 S.B.C., ch. 40 § 157.

(207) See Transport Policy.nex, ‘Global Comparison: Fuel Efficiency Labeling’, available at: (last updated 10 December 2014) (listing summaries of labeling requirements for over a dozen jurisdictions).

(208) See e.g. [US] 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, and 537 (CAFE programme); China’s State Council, Development Plan of Energy-Efficient and New-Energy Vehicles (2012–20) (Beijing: China’s State Council, 2012), available at:

(209) The proposal features in Norway’s draft 2018–29 Transport Plan. Grunnlagsdokument for Nasjonal transportplan 2018–29. Agreement by political leaders to codify it in legislation was reported in a leading Norwegian newspaper in June 2016. ‘Frp vil fjerne bensinbilene’ Dagens Næringsliv, 2 June 2016.

(210) ‘Only electric cars should be sold in Netherlands from 2025’ DutchNews.NL, 30 March 2015, available at:

(211) Amsterdam Roundtables Foundation, Electric Vehicles in Europe: Gearing up for a New Phase? (Amsterdam: McKinsey & Amsterdam Roundtables Foundation, 2014), 17.

(212) For a tabulated list of policy types across countries, see REN21, Renewables 2016 Global Status Report (Paris: REN21 Secretariat, 2016), 119–21, available at:

(213) A. Boekhoudt and L. Behrendt, Taxes and Incentives for Renewable Energy (KPMG International, September 2015), 2, available at:

(214) See K. Lo, ‘A Critical Review of China’s Rapidly Developing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Policies’ (January 2014) 29 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 508–16.

(215) The EU issued guidance in 2014 instructing Member States to cease using feed-in-tariffs like those employed by Germany and Spain by 2017. One reason for the guidance was the disruption renewables growth in those countries had caused in their neighbors’ electricity grids and marketplaces, which is discussed later in this ssection.

(216) H. Wirth, Recent Facts about Photovoltaics in Germany (Freiburg: Frauenhofer ISE, Apr. 2016), available at:

(217) See M. Fulton et al., ‘The German Feed-in Tariff: Recent Policy Changes’ (New York: Deutsche Bank, September 2012), 18–20 (describing tariff rate changes), available at:

(218) Y. Chen, EU-China Solar Panels Trade Dispute: Settlement and Challenges to the EU (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, June 2015), 2–3 (summarizing trade dispute over alleged dumping of cheap Chinese PV in EU markets), available at:

(219) See Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Phase II: Policy Document (New Dehli: Ministry of New & Renewable Energy, 2012), 18–19 (listing regional targets imposed by Electricity Act 2003 and consistent with Solar Mission).

(220) [India] Ministry of Power, Tariff Policy, Gazette of India, Part I, Section I, Resolution No. 23/2/2005-R&R (Vol. III) (6 January 2006).

(221) Ibid.

(222) [US] Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1212.

(223) These shorthand titles refer to the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit, the Business Energy Investment Tax Credit, and the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit.

(224) [US] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, Div. Q, 129 Stat. 2242 (18 December 2015).

(225) C. Zichella and J. Hladik, ‘Siting: Finding a Home for Renewable Energy and Transmission’ (October 2013) 26 Electricity Journal 125–38 (reporting estimated land area required in different US renewables development scenarios).

(226) For a general description of Chile’s renewable generation potential and the impediments presented by geography and existing institutional structures, see S. Woodhouse and P. Meisen, Renewable Energy Potential of Chile (San Diego: Global Energy Network Institute, August 2011), available at:

(227) [Chile] Ley No. 20–936, de 20 de julio de 2016, Diario Official [D.O.], establece un Nuevo Sistema de Transmisión Eléctrica y crea un Organismo Coordinador Independiente del Sistema Eléctrico Nacional [establishing a New System of Electricity Transmission and Creating an Independent National Electricity Coordinating Authority], available at:, amending in part Ley No. 4/20.018 (General Electricity Services Law) and Ley No. 18.410 (Law Establishing the Electricity and Gas Authority).

(228) Ibid; see also Carey y Cía. Ltda., News Alert: Law establishes new Power Transmission Systems and Creates an Independent Coordinating Body for the National Power System (Law No. 20. 936), available at: (summarizing key provisions).

(229) F. Kahrl and X. Wang, Integrating Renewables into Power Systems in China: A Technical Primer—Electricity Planning (Beijing, China: Regulatory Assistance Project 2015), 28–32.

(230) Ibid.

(231) X. Lu et al., ‘Challenges Faced by China Compared with the US in Developing Wind Power’ (June 2016) 1 Nature Energy 1–6, available at:

(232) California Wilderness Coal. v U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that Energy Policy Act of 2005 change to Federal Power Act § 216 gave Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over transmission line siting if responsible state agencies withheld approval for more than one year); Piedmont Envtl. Council v FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 2009) (similar).

(233) See e.g. [U.S.] Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.537(c); Mont. Code Ann. § 75-20-301(2); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 35-A, § 3132(6).

(234) dena [German Energy Agency], Grid Study II: Integration of Renewable Energy Sources in the German Power Supply System from 2015–2020 with an Outlook to 2025 (Berlin: German Energy Agency, 2010), 270–2 (indicated modeled instances of ‘nontransmissible power’, i.e. where surfeit generation or deficits in transmission capacity led to imbalances in the grid crossing two or more regions).

(235) World Nuclear Association, Germany’s Energiewende (updated 25 August 2016), available at:

(236) [UK] Ofgem, RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks; Final Decision (London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, October 2010), available at:

(237) [UK] Ofgem, Environment Report Guidance Document (London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, February 2016), available at: (specifying regulated entities’ reporting obligations for environmental performance standards).

(238) G. Léna, Rural Electrification with PV Hybrid Systems: Overview and Recommendations for Further Deployment (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013), available at:

(239) See e.g. Government of India, 12th Five Year Plan (New Dehli: Government of India, 2012), 121 (noting that National Solar Mission calls for 2000 MW of off-grid solar by 2022); see also E. Baldwin et al., ‘Electrification and Rural Development: Issues of Scale in Distributed Generation’, 4 WIREs Energy Environment (2015), 196–211 (surveying projects and noting role of government policies in project success).

(240) REN21, Renewables 2016 Global Status Report (Paris: REN21 Secretariat, 2016), 95.

(241) See H. Rütters et al., State of Play on CO2 Geological Storage in 28 European Countries (CGS Europe, June 2013), available at:

(242) See Pakistan Board of Investment, List of Pakistan-China MoUs (22 November 2015), paras. 27–47, available at: (listing energy projects, dominated by but not limited to coal fields and power plants, financed by Chinese private and governmental entities).

(243) Pakistan INDC (12 November 2015).

(244) Enerdata, ‘Recent Energy News: Indonesia Releases its 35 GW Power Capacity Addition Plan’, 6 May 2015, available at:

(245) See Climate Action Tracker, Indonesia (updated 21 October 2015), at:

(246) K. Loynes, Carbon Price Repeal Bills: Quick Guide (Parliament of Australia), available at: (updated 20 November 2013) (providing annotated record of policy changes and links to key documents).

(247) World Nuclear Association, Australia’s Electricity (July 2016), available at:

(248) World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Japan (August 2016), available at:

(249) [Chile] Ministry of Energy, National Energy Strategy 2012–2030 (Santiago: Government of Chile, February 2012), 13, available at:

(250) [Germany] Regierungserklärung der Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel zur aktuellen Lage in Japan (Mitschrift) [Government Statement of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel regarding current situation in Japan (prepared remarks)] (17 March 2011), available at:

(251) [China] 13th Five Year Plan (English translation) (Beijing: Government of China, March 2016); Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Congress of the People’s Republic, 29 August 2015, effective 1 January 2016); Beijing Municipal Government, Five-Year Clean Air Action Plan 2013–17 (Beijing Municipal Government, 2013) (restricting coal-usage to less than half of 2012 levels).

(252) W. J. Kelly, ‘China’s Plan to Clean Up Air in Cities Will Doom the Climate, Scientists Say’ InsideClimate News, 13 February 2014, available at:

(253) [US] EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil–Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil–Fuel–Fired Electric Utility, Industrial–Commercial–Institutional, and Small Industrial–Commercial–Institutional Steam Generating Units, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (16 February 2012); EPA, Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (8 August 2011).

(254) Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 322 (exempting hydrofracture drilling from permitting requirements under the Safe Drinking Water Act); Z. Wang and A. Krupnick, A Retrospective Review of Shale Gas Development in the United States—What Led to the Boom? (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2013), 6–14, available at: (describing federally supported R&D that led to development of hydrofracture technologies); EarthReports, Inc. v FERC, No. 15–1127, 2016 WL 3853830 (D.C. Cir. 15 July 2016) (upholding FERC position that new pipelines and export terminal will not have foreseeable upstream or downstream GHG emission impacts).

(255) [US] EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35823 (3 June 2016), codified at 40 C.F.R. 60; EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Request for Information, Emerging Technologies, 81 Fed. Reg. 46670 (18 July 2016).

(256) [US] Executive Office of the President, The All-of-the-Above Energy Strategy as a Path to Sustainable Economic Growth (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, May 2014), 31–5, available at:

(257) See EPA, Final Carbon Pollution Standards for New, Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, 80 Fed Reg 64510, 64529–43 (23 October 2015), codified at 40 CFR pts 60, 70, 71.

(258) See Z. Hausfather, ‘Bounding the Climate Viability of Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel to Displace Coal’ (2015) 86 Energy Policy 286–94 (identifying key uncertainties that inform whether natural gas can provide a ‘bridge’ to zero-emissions energy generation technologies).

(259) See [EU] Council Directive 2009/31 O.J. (L 315), 14.11.2012, 1–56, at para. 4 (on the geological storage of carbon dioxide) (‘Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage (CCS) is a bridging technology that will contribute to mitigating climate change. It consists of the capture of carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial installations, its transport to a storage site and its injection into a suitable underground geological formation for the purposes of permanent storage. This technology should not serve as an incentive to increase the share of fossil fuel power plants. Its development should not lead to a reduction of efforts to support energy saving policies, renewable energies and other safe and sustainable low carbon technologies, both in research and financial terms.’).

(260) Z. Kapetaki et al., ‘European Carbon Capture and Storage Project Network: Overview of the Status and Developments’ (2016, 86 Energy Procedia 12–21; J. Gaede and J. Meadowcroft, ‘Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstration and Low-Carbon Energy Transitions: Explaining Limited Progress’ in T. Van de Graaf et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 319–40.

(261) See [EU] Council Directive 2009/31, para. 47.

(262) UK Electricity Act of 1989 as amended, s. 36. Department of Energy and Climate Change, Carbon Capture Readiness (CCR): A guidance note for Section 36 Electricity Act 1989 consent applications (London: Department of Energy and Climate Change, November 2009), available at:

(263) [US] EPA, 80 Fed Reg 64510, codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71.

(264) R. Pradiptyo et al., Financing Development with Fossil Fuel Subsidies: The Reallocation of Indonesia’s Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies in 2015 (Winnipeg, Canada: IISD 2016), available at:

(265) G7 Ise-Shima Summit, 26–7 May 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, 28, available at:; G20, Pittsburgh Declaration (2009), para. 24; G20, St. Petersburg Declaration (2013), para. 94; see also International Monetary Fund, Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform—Lessons and Implications (Washington D.C.: IMF, 2013) (finding that many reform efforts fail or cause significant political and economic disruption).

(266) A. Terton et al., Fiscal Instruments in INDCs: How Countries are Looking to Fiscal Policies to Support INDC Implementation (Geneva: Global Subsidies Initiative, December 2015).

(267) For a survey of existing subsidies, see OECD, Inventory of Estimated Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 2013 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), available at: For a discussion of proposals for phase-out, see IEA, OECD, and World Bank, The Scope of Fossil Fuel Subsidies in 2009 and a Roadmap for Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Subsidies (Paris: IEA, OECD/Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2010).

(268) World Nuclear Association, Plans For New Reactors Worldwide (updated April 2016), available at: (reporting that sixty reactors are under construction in the following fifteen countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Finland, France, India, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States).

(269) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Power Reactor Information System: France, available at: (updated 25 August 2016); (IAEA), Country Nuclear Fuel Cycle Profiles, 2nd edon; Technical Reports Series No. 425 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005), 17, available at: (noting that French reprocessing facilities handle waste from reactors in France, Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland).

(270) Political disputes have dogged both the Gorleben and Yucca Mountain repositories. J. Thurau, ‘Germany to Dump Nuclear Waste for Good—But Where?’ DeutscheWelle, 5 July 2016, available at: (‘A few years ago, the government decided to give up on the idea of Gorleben as the sole option for a final nuclear waste depository site, and to look for options throughout the entire country.’); German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Final Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste in Germany—The Gorleben Repository Project (Berlin: German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, October 2008), 3 (‘Exploration work has been underway at the Gorleben salt dome since 1979 for this very purpose.’); Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, January 2012), vi (‘America’s nuclear waste management program is at an impasse’), available at:; J. Stewart and R. Stewart, Fuel Cycle to Nowhere: US Law and Policy on Nuclear Waste (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2011), 4 (‘The history shows that the most important and difficult challenges are not technical but political, institutional, and social.’). France has had less difficulty for a combination of reasons: (i) French nuclear waste reprocessing reduces the country’s volume of high-level waste by about 50 per cent (though it also yields 200 per cent more low-level waste than would a direct disposal system); (ii) France stores high-level waste above ground for several decades, allowing it to cool, then vitrifies it in borosilicate (a highly stable form of glass), which facilitates transport and disposal; and (iii) in contrast to Germany and the United States, France also lacks regional authorities that can easily challenge national directives about repository siting or disposal plans.

(271) IAEA, Power Reactor Information System: India, available at: (updated 25 August 2016).

(272) Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement), available at:; World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in India (updated 17 August 2016), available at:

(273) World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in India (updated 17 August 2016), available at:

(274) Ibid.

(275) Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2201 (7 January 1983), as amended Pub. L. No. 100–203, Title V, Subtitle A (22 December 1987) and Pub. L. No. 100–507 (18 October 1988), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10134; see also Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, January 2012), viii (listing proposed legislative changes).

(276) J. Deutsch et al., Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative, 2009), available at:

(277) Energy Policy Act of 2005 tit. XVII; Georgia Public Service Commission, Certification Order, Docket No. 27800, Georgia Power’s Application for the Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, 7–9; Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, 2009 Ga. Laws 39 (authorizing recovery of costs of developing two new reactors, including Construction Work In Progress payments before any electricity is generated); South Carolina Base Load Review Act, S.C. Ann. §§ 58-33-210 to -298, 2007 Act No. 16, § 2; see also M. Holt, Nuclear Energy Policy (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 2014), 23–5, available at:

(278) World Nuclear Association, Small Nuclear Power Reactors: US Support for SMRs, available at: (updated June 2016).

(279) [UNFCCC] CDM Project Design Document: Tétouan Wind Farm Project for Lafarge Cement Plant (UNFCCC, October 2012), available at: (describing project, baseline emissions avoided, and grounds for extension of initial seven-year project duration for an additional seven-year period).

(280) Ibid., at 27–8.

(281) [Morocco] Loi no. 13–09 relative aux énergies renouvelables [Renewable Energy Law], promulguée par Dahir no. 1-10-16 du 26 Safar 1431 (11 février 2010) publiée au Bulletin officiel no. 5822 du 1er rabii II 1431 (18 mars 2010); Dahir n 1-14-09 du joumada I 1435 (6 mars 2014) portant promulgation de la loi cadre n 99–12 portant charte nationale de l’environment et du développement durable [Framework Law 99–12 regarding the National Charter of the Environment and Sustainable Development].

(282) [Vietnam] Decision No.799/Q-TTg, On Approval of the National Action Program on Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions through Efforts to Reduce Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Sustainable Management of Forest Resources, and Conservation and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks 2011–2020 (Hanoi, 27 June 2012), available at:

(283) ‘Mangroves and Markets: supporting mangrove protection in Ca Mau Province, Vietnam’, the REDD desk: a collaborative resource for REDD readiness, available at:

(284) Ibid.

(285) UNEP Ozone Secretariat, Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Vienna: UN Environment Program, 2012), available at:

(286) See D. Brack, National Legislation on Hydrofluorocarbons, 11 September 2015, available at: (surveying HFC regulations and policies).

(287) UNEP Ozone Secretariat, 37th OEWG, Briefing Note on Legal Aspects in the context of HFC Management under the Montreal Protocol, Geneva, Switzerland, 4–8 April 2016, available at:

(288) UNEP, Summary of the HFC amendment proposals submitted by Canada, Mexico and the United States (North American proposal), India (Indian proposal), the European Union and its Member States (European Union proposal) and some island States (Island States proposal), see:

(289) C. Davenport, ‘A Sequel to the Paris Climate Accord Takes Shape in Vienna’ New York Times, 23 July 2016, available at:

(290) Ibid.

(291) International Energy Agency, IEA Statistics Highlights: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 2015 Edition (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2015), available at:

(292) Ibid., at 11 (noting that aviation and shipping emissions rose even faster than road emissions from 1990–2013).

(293) [EU] Council Directive 2008/101, O.J. (L 8), 13.1.2009, 3–21 (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community); see also [US] EPA, ‘Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated To Endanger Public Health and Welfare’, 81 Fed. Reg. 54422 (15 August 2016) (concluding that aircraft emissions require regulation); Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s [EPA’s] Motion to Dismiss, Center for Biological Diversity v EPA, Case 1:16-cv-00681-ABJ (19 August 2016) (arguing that EPA has not unreasonably delayed issuance of regulations on GHG emissions from aircraft).

(294) International Civil Aviation Organization, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices Related to Environmental Protection- Climate Change (Montreal, Canada: ICAO, 2010).

(295) F. Pearce, ‘After Paris, A Move to Rein In Emissions by Ships and Planes’ envrinment360, 19 May 2016, available at:

(296) ICAO, Press Release: New ICAO Aircraft CO2 Standard One Step Closer to Final Adoption, 8 February 2016, available at:

(297) ICAO, Draft Assembly Resolution Text on a Global Market-Based Measure (GMBM) Scheme, 2016, para. 4, available at: (‘Decides to implement a GMBM scheme in the form of the Carbon Offsetting Scheme for International Aviation (COSIA) to address any annual increase in total CO2 emissions from international aviation (i.e. flights that depart in one country and arrive in a different country) above the 2020 levels, taking into account special circumstances and respective capabilities; {GMBM is Carbon Offsetting Scheme for International Aviation (COSIA)}.’)

(298) IMO, Mandatory energy efficiency measures for international shipping adopted at IMO environment meeting Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)—62nd session: 11–15 July 2011; Resolution MEPC.203(62), Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto, Adopted on 15 July 2011, MEPC 62/24/Add.1 Annex 19.

(299) P. S. Mallaburn and N. Eyre, N., ‘Lessons from Energy Efficiency Policy and Programmes in the UK from 1973 to 2013’ (2014) 7 Energy Efficiency 23–41; H. Geller et al., ‘Polices for Increasing Energy Efficiency: Thirty Years of Experience in OECD Countries’ (2006) 34 Energy Policy 556–73.

(300) K. Gillingham and K. Palmer, ‘Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence’ (2014) 8 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 18–38; L. W. Davis and G. E. Metcalf, Does Better Information Lead to Better Choices? Evidence from Energy Efficiency Labels (Cambridge M.A.: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2014).

(301) [UK] Department of Energy and Climate Change, The Energy Efficiency Strategy: The Energy Efficiency Opportunity in the UK (London: Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012), 9–12.

(302) K. Gillingham et al., ‘The Rebound Effect and Energy Efficiency Policy’ (2016) 10 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 66–88 (cautioning against overestimates of rebound); J. Linn, The Rebound Effect for Passenger Vehicles (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2013) (arguing that rebound is significant for passenger vehicles).

(303) D. F. Vivanco et al., ‘How to Deal with the Rebound Effect? A Policy-oriented Approach’ (2016) 94 Energy Policy 114–25, at 123.

(304) H. Fell and P. Manilof, Beneficial Leakage: The Effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Aggregate Emissions (Golden, Colorado: Colorado School of Mines, June 2015), available at:

(305) Ibid; see also B. C. Murray et al., Why Have Greenhouse Gas Emissions in RGGI States Declined? An Econometric Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy Factors (Duke Environmental and Energy Economics Working Paper Series, No. EE 14–01, May 2014).

(306) See Wood Mackenzie, Coal-to-gas Switching in Europe—What’s the Potential for Increased Gas Demand? (January 2016) (identifying fuel-switching in the EU as likely response to combination of low natural gas prices and GHG emissions prices made directly or indirectly higher through regulation).

(307) U. Tietge et al., Electric Vehicle Policy and Deployment in Europe (Berlin: ICCT, May 2016), 63, 65, available at:

(308) See e.g. L. Phillips, Norway’s Electric Vehicle Revolution: Lessons for British Columbia (Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions, October 2015), available at:

(309) Ibid., at 4–5.

(310) Z. Yang et al., Principles for Effective Electric Vehicle Incentive Design (Washington D.C.: International Council on Clean Transportation, June 2016), iv, available at:

(311) M. Mason and L. Dillon, ‘Gov. Jerry Brown, state lawmakers reach last-minute deal on spending cap-and-trade revenues’ L.A. Times, 31 August 2016, available at: