This chapter discusses how Canadian constitutional issues come before the courts. Its primary focus is on litigation arising under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Since the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter in 1982, traditional legal process doctrines, such as standing, intervention, costs, and reference opinions have seen significant expansion. Though initially cautious, Canadian courts have recognized that the ability to initiate constitutional claims is integral to the principle of legality. The mechanisms by which constitutional issues are judicially reviewed, and decisions regarding who may participate and how such litigation may be supported, are crucial determinants of substantive constitutionalism in Canada.
Key debates in administrative law often play out within the contours of ‘accountability’. This chapter suggests that the concept of accountability is normatively and analytically useful in comparative administrative law, provided that there is clarity as to the level of abstraction at which the term is used. The chapter proposes a three-tier approach to the concept of accountability—accountability as a political ideal (‘level 1 accountability’), as a specific set of normative commitments (‘level 2 accountability’), and as an empirical phenomenon (‘level 3 accountability’). It argues that the usefulness (and contestability) of comparative approaches will vary as one moves from one tier to the next. Next, it discusses three case studies that illustrate specific institutional manifestations of accountability and demonstrate how the operation of accountability differ based on the background constitutional structure. Finally, the chapter presents certain key challenges to accountability that implicate different tiers of accountability.
T. V. Somanathan
This chapter explores how India’s constitutional law has addressed the administrative and regulatory State as it has evolved outside the traditional branches of government, and how judicial review is exercised over it. It begins by providing a background on constitutional issues relating to the administrative State as it functions within the executive branch, before turning to a discussion of the major regulatory bodies that either are explicitly called ‘regulatory’ or exercise regulatory functions. It then considers the constitutional position of the administrative and regulatory State based on judicial decisions and on the Indian Constitution. It also examines the conceptual underpinnings of, and justification for, the regulatory State, along with some specific concerns arising from the regulatory State such as legal uncertainty and excessive delegation. The chapter concludes by analysing some of the issues associated with the emerging constitutional jurisprudence on the regulatory State.
Simon Halliday and Colin Scott
Administrative justice receives varying emphasis in different jurisdictions. This article explores empirical legal studies, which fall on either side of the decision making-and-review dividing line. It then seeks to link research on the impact of dispute resolution and on-going administrative practices. The article also highlights limitations in existing impact research, focusing on the tendency to examine single dispute resolution mechanisms in isolation from others. Furthermore it suggests some future directions for empirical administrative justice research. It also explores the potential of legal consciousness research for empirical administrative justice scholarship, and suggests new territories for administrative justice researchers: criminal justice processes and administrative activities of private agencies. It concludes by presenting an argument that a mapping of administrative justice institutions, both historically and cross-jurisdictionally, can reveal much about how relationships between citizens and administrative agencies may shift across time and space.
This chapter focuses on important debates at the intersection of regulatory law, constitutional structure, technical competence, and public participation. It concentrates on the representative democracies that are at the heart of this volume. In such polities, delegation of policy-making authority to the executive branch is inevitable as the state confronts the social and economic problems of modern life. Statutory and constitutional language is incapable of eliminating policy discretion given the complexity of these problems and the need to respond quickly to changed circumstances. Such delegation, however, appears to violate democratic norms that view the legislature as the only source of legitimacy. Even in a system with a popularly elected president, executive-branch policy choices must confront the issue of democratic legitimacy. These choices may bear little or no relationship to promises made during the electoral campaign, and they may involve only minimal legislative involvement. Thus, although policy delegation is inevitable, it is also democratically problematic. To further the democratic credentials of executive policy-making, this chapter defends the use of administrative procedures that require transparency, citizens’ input, and public reason-giving.
Giacinto della Cananea
This chapter focuses on the changing relationship between administrative law and the nation-state. The starting point is, simply, that the nation-state now operates in an increasingly complex web of national, transnational, and supranational legal processes. The chapter asserts that this is no mere incremental change. Arguably, it requires us to reconsider, both normatively and empirically, the traditional paradigm according to which administrative law is a sort of national enclave. Normatively, it is important to understand that at the basis of this paradigm there is not just a set of ideas and beliefs about the particularities of each national legal culture or tradition, but there is a certain vision of the state. Empirically, there are various forms of interaction between national, international, and supranational legal orders that are worth considering. As such, the chapter draws upon some case studies and argues that the jurisprudence of international and supranational courts can help us to understand both why the general principles shared by most, if not all, legal orders are relevant for the public authorities that act beyond the states and why such principles must be taken into account within national systems.
Administrative Law Values and National Security Functions: Military Detention in the United States and the United Kingdom
Laura A. Dickinson
This chapter focuses on the case of extraterritorial military detention by the US and the UK—two countries that quickly deployed and then repeatedly refined their detention policies during the nearly two decades following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Military detention is arguably one of the quintessential national security functions where deference to executive discretion is strongest. As such, it is an activity that differs markedly from the types of practices that form the core work of many domestic administrative agencies, and administrative law scholarship tends to ignore the national security domain. Yet even here, in a realm seemingly so insulated from administrative law norms, agencies in both the US and the UK have implemented a variety of administrative rules and procedures, as well as non-judicial administrative tribunals to assess the status of detainees. Although the US and the UK followed different pathways, both countries have ultimately come to embrace administrative law frameworks for military detention. And both countries have gradually moved to protect, at least to a limited extent, the core administrative law values of rationality, transparency, participation, and procedural protection even as they have rejected fully judicialized detention processes. This comparative case study therefore illustrates the significance of administrative law values in the area of national security and points toward the need for further scholarship at the intersection of national security law and administrative law.
This chapter compares the respective roles of administrative institutions and administrative power on the one hand, and other governmental institutions and powers on the other, in dealing with drug use, possession, and trafficking in China and Victoria (Australia). Comparison of these two jurisdictions provides both opportunities and challenges. Though one is a nation-state, the other a sub-national state within a federation, both have jurisdiction to regulate drug use-related harms and offending. There is thus comparability in terms of jurisdiction. More importantly, the opportunities and challenges for comparison stem from the divergence in fundamental political system; one authoritarian and one liberal democratic, and the nature of the relationship between state and citizen that flows from this. This divergence has implications for selection of both comparative methodology and the subject matter of comparison.
This chapter concerns administrative procedure—the rules governing the process of decision-making. ‘Administrative procedure’ ultimately refers to a how governmental organizations actually conduct business and manage responsibilities. Today there are a bewilderingly large and diverse number of administrative procedures. Whilst the first general administrative procedure acts (APAs) focused on the so-called ‘administrative act’ (typically a unilateral decision made by public bodies), their reach progressively broadened as the responsibilities of the executive branch and public administrations grew. APAs branched out to deal with other legal acts, such as rules and regulations, agreements under public law, guidelines and administrative guidance, as well as setting general principles to which administrative activities would be subject.
This chapter examines the administrative state in relation to modern constitutional theory. To explain the administrative state, it draws on three frameworks that are grounded in constitutional law, democratic theory, and institutional epistemology, respectively. The first framework involves the constitutionality of the administrative state, the second its democratic credentials, and the third its epistemic capacity. The chapter describes each framework before turning to a discussion of how each affects the others. It suggests that constitutionalists, democratic theorists, and epistemic technocrats engage in a never-ending shifting series of alliances. More specifically, each of these camps tends to see the claims of the other camps as side constraints to be complied with at the lowest possible cost, while seeing their own concerns as goals to be pursued to the maximum possible extent. In other words, there will always be competition among law, democracy, and knowledge in trying to control the administrative state.
This article begins with a discussion of the constitutionalization of affirmative action and its side effects. It examines the legal underpinnings of affirmative action in two relatively well-endowed developing countries and former British colonies — Malaysia and South Africa — where the disadvantaged groups that receive the benefits of affirmative action are numerical majorities from the start. It also considers the case of India, where the disadvantaged groups targeted for affirmative action initially are numerical minorities. The discussion then turns to the non-constitutionalization of affirmative action and its side effects. In countries where affirmative action has not been constitutionalized and where the beneficiaries (women excepted) are minority groups, the legal validity of a program of this kind will depend upon whether it meets a set of formal requirements. The most important of those is arguably that the outcome of the decisional process by which scarce goods are being allocated should not be exclusively determined by group membership. The soft, gender-focused, ‘discrimination-blocking’ EU affirmative action model and the (exceptional) US affirmative action regime are examined.
In the past, Canadian constitutional reform has been marked by surprising successes and resounding failures. Indeed, the failures were such that constitutional amendment itself, along with the word “Constitution”, became taboo in the eyes of a large part of the Canadian population. This chapter will commence with a brief history of constitutional reform in Canada from the Constitution Act, 1867 to the patriation of 1982, followed by an analysis of the post-patriation constitutional amendment procedures. It will then discuss the political and legal frameworks which further complicate the already strict requirements of modern constitutional amendment in Canada, and will conclude with an overview of the phenomena favouring paraconstitutional adaptation of the Constitution. Finally, it will point out that the full restoration of the word “Constitution” is of utmost importance in ensuring that constitutional reform itself does not simply become a matter of wishful thinking.
This chapter explores the idea of a ‘tradition’ of comparative administrative law (CAL) in the trans-Atlantic Anglosphere. It first deals with a period from the early eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. At this time, Western comparative public law was predominantly an Anglo-European affair. The chapter next focuses on a period between about 1880 and 1940, a time of heavy intellectual traffic between England and the US, in which the birth of an identifiably Anglo-American tradition in comparative administrative law may be witnessed. Finally, the chapter is concerned with the impact on the Anglo-American tradition of the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA marked the maturation of American administrative law as a legal category concerned above all with judicial control of administrative power.
Various Caribbean countries have established the Caribbean Court of Justice, and have taken steps to ensure its viability. The Court has two jurisdictions. One of these—the Original Jurisdiction—pertains to disputes arising under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the constituent treaty of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy. The other jurisdiction—the Appellate Jurisdiction—was intended from the outset to allow the Caribbean Court of Justice to serve as the final court of appeal for all Caribbean countries. The Appellate Jurisdiction, which forms the basis of this chapter, has been the subject of considerable debate. To date, only four Caribbean countries—Barbados, Guyana, Belize and Dominica—have entrusted their final appeals to the new court, with most former British colonies in the region retaining the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for final appeals. What have been the main elements in the long and circuitous debate concerning the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court? Why have some Caribbean States opted to retain appeals to the Privy Council? And what are the prospects concerning the Appellate Jurisdiction? The chapter considers these issues in light of the passage of more than a decade and a half since Caribbean States signed the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice.
This chapter examines the relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution with respect to freedom of assembly and freedom of association. It begins with a historical background on the restrictions to the freedom to assemble peaceably in colonial India, as well as restrictions under the Criminal Procedure Code covering public meetings and the right of government employees to participate in demonstrations. It then considers the power of the State to curtail the freedom to assemble, the constitutionality of Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the right to strike, and what constitutes unlawful association. It also discusses the jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court with regard to the freedom of association.
Ulrich K. Preuß
Associative rights cover those constitutional guarantees which deal with the joint actions of individuals. The promise of associative rights to individuals is the most effective means of their empowerment in the polity. At the same time, this guarantee gives rise to a decentralized power structure in society which has a major bearing on the modes of how collective decisions are made in the polity. Three constitutional rights are pertinent in this respect, ranging in the order of increasing empowerment and, consequently, structural effects on the polity: the right to petition for the redress of grievances, the right to the freedom of assembly, and the right to the freedom of association. This article presents a comparative overview of associative rights and considers only those constitutions which effectively shape the character of the polity, where, in other words, collective actions of citizens are an inherent element of an entrenched sphere of socio-political autonomy.
This chapter examines the legal status and consequences of the asymmetrically federal provisions included in the Indian Constitution. In particular, it considers constitutional amendments relating to autonomy arrangements in India’s North-eastern region, along with the ‘special status’ of Jammu and Kashmir. After providing an overview of the significance of asymmetric federalism in India, the article discusses the administration of tribal areas under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. It also explores provisions aimed at mitigating intra-State inequalities in the States of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Karnataka; the Indian Supreme Court’s rulings on the asymmetric features of the Constitution; and the role of the courts in upholding asymmetrical provisions and protecting the rights of territorially concentrated minorities in the context of democratic politics.
This chapter offers an account of Australia's engagement with the international legal order, through different aspects of the relationship: designing international institutions, litigating in the World Court, and implementing international standards. These are only fragments of the full picture, but they illustrate both Australia's embrace of and distancing from the international legal order. Australia's relationship with the international legal order overall is marked by a deep strand of ambivalence. It has played both the part of a good international citizen as well as that of an international exceptionalist. In some fields, Australia has engaged creatively in international institution-building, even if with a wary eye to protect certain Australian interests. In other areas, particularly human rights, the relationship is distinctly uneasy, with Australia appearing to believe that international standards should regulate others and that it is somehow above scrutiny.
Po Jen Yap
This chapter examines authoritarian regimes in relation to the configuration of political power/parties that is central to how autocracy is practised and sustained within the respective constitutional system. First, it discusses dominant party democracies—semi-democratic regimes that have been ruled by the same dominant political party or coalition since the nation’s independence or transition to a new constitutional system. Next, the chapter explores independent military democracies. In such democracies, the military is an independent branch of government and is not under the firm control of the civilian government. Finally, there are the communist regimes, where elections are a sham, and all levers of state power—the executive, the legislature, the military, and the judiciary—are subjected to the singular control of the country’s Communist Party. These three regime types are not exhaustive of all the authoritarian configurations of power in the world, but they are the predominant ones in Asia, from which this chapter’s case studies are drawn.
This chapter considers both the foundations for, and the content of, the High Court's authority in Australia. It focuses principally on the current authority of the High Court, but with reference to some aspects of its history. The chapter first explains the Court's constitutional status as Australia's apex court, performing the role of both constitutional court and ultimate appellate court for both federal and State matters. It next outlines the institutional features of the Court that underpin its authority, in particular its composition and independence. The chapter then examines the Court's authority to enforce constitutional limits through judicial review of legislative action. Lastly, the chapter considers the Court's authority to review executive action and the constitutional foundation for that role.