The financial deregulation in major Western economies in the 1970s and 1980s freed banks from many preexisting constraints, facilitating competition and greater risk-taking and eventually leading to prudential regulation and supervision as a specific, well-defined area of regulatory activity. It was codified in the Basel Accord, which allowed banks considerable discretion in how they met broadly specified regulatory requirements and was focused primarily on individual bank safety. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 highlighted numerous weaknesses in the design and application of this approach. The previous micro-orientation has been complemented by a macroprudential focus, suggesting a strengthened case for central bank involvement in prudential regulation. Microprudential regulation has been strengthened, with changes reflecting less confidence in the previous market-oriented approach and more reliance on direct controls. The wheel has turned such that prederegulation approaches and attitudes have been incorporated into the postcrisis design and approach of prudential regulation.
David T. Llewellyn
The most serious global banking crisis in living memory has given rise to one of the most substantial changes in the regulatory regime of banks. While not all central banks have responsibility for regulation, because they are almost universally responsible for systemic stability, they have an interest in bank regulation. Two core objectives of regulation are discussed: lowering the probability of bank failures and minimizing the social costs of failures that do occur. The underlying culture of banking creates business standards and employee attitudes and behavior. There are limits to what regulation can achieve if the underlying cultures of regulated firms are hazardous. There are limits to what can be achieved through detailed, prescriptive, and complex rules, and when, because of what is termed the endogeneity problem, rules escalation raises issues of proportionality, a case is made for banking culture to become a supervisory issue.
Ruben Enikolopov and Sergey Stepanov
The essay describes the current state of corporate governance in Russia and the dynamics of recent years. Important features of the environment that affect corporate governance include weak legal institutions that lead to high private benefits to control, underdeveloped capital markets, high levels of ownership concentration, and significant state involvement in business. In this situation, the main conflict of interest is not between a manager and many dispersed shareholders but between large and small shareholders, different large shareholders, and minority shareholders and managers/board members in state-owned companies. Many of these features are similar to other emerging markets but are substantially different from conditions faced by firms in developed countries. Despite substantial improvement during the 2000s, the quality of corporate governance in Russia is much lower than in developed countries, primarily because of the low quality of Russian institutions.
Both Jewish law and U.S. Federal tax law define interest broadly as a payment for the use of money. Nonetheless, the two systems diverge widely when determining whether particular transactions involve interest. This article compares the different approaches to the laws of interest found in these two systems, in an effort to reveal how underlying goals, practical constraints, and the structure of the legal system affects the development of the law. This article explains the laws of interest. The Torah mentions ribbit three times. The first occurs in Exodus the second mention is found in Leviticus and the final occurs in Deuteronomy. Moving forward this article explains the federal taxation of interest which says that interest is not banned under the federal tax laws, but it is often treated differently from other types of payments. A detailed analysis comparing the Jewish and the US approaches to interest concludes this article.
Daniel Z. Feldman
The prohibitions of taking and paying interest are the essence of this article. The prohibition of taking interest, also known as ribbit, is one of the most complex areas of Jewish law. The complexity of this realm is multileveled. At first glance, ribbit and its basic intent seems simple to comprehend. It appears to address the widely condemned practice of usury, also known as predatory lending, where a lender exploits a borrower's desperate need for assistance by lending at rates of interest that are excessive and often unfeasible. However, a close look at the details of the prohibition will reveal that concern for predatory lending is insufficient to explain the Torah's ban against interest. This article also discusses the challenge of categorizing ribbit. This article further elaborates upon the effects of prohibition on monetary regulation. Other applications and extensions of the prohibition are explained and the prohibition is also compared to receive and return interest.
Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb
This chapter explains the application of antitrust law to merger and acquisitions, especially horizontal transactions, which involve direct competitors. The chapter outlines the analysis the U.S. enforcement agencies set out in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines―a fact-intensive analysis focusing on the precise competitive interaction between the merging firms and the competitive environment in which they operate. The chapter focuses mainly on unilateral effects, which arise from the elimination of head-to-head competition between the merging firms. Several distinct unilateral effects are distinguished and illustrated with real-world examples. In particular, the chapter explains how modern economic analysis identifies the relatively few horizontal mergers and acquisitions found to violate antitrust law.
This article presents an example of the use of economic analysis to understand Jewish law. The model used is an application of the economic analysis of law, which has become increasingly prominent in the philosophy and study of law. Economic analysis of law deals not only with those aspects of law that are usually regarded as purely “economic,” but also with more general categories of law, such as property rights, torts, and family law. Indeed, it can be said to deal with all aspects of civil and criminal law. Following this new approach, this article seeks to apply the economic analysis of law to Jewish tort law and, specifically, to laws relating to fire damage. It explains the economies of the laws of fire damage followed by proper care and due care as well as efficient care. This article enumerates a graphical illustration of the unilateral care model; an analysis of differential care concludes the article.
Jewish tradition recognizes that communal institutions cannot function without financing: “If there is no flour, there is no Torah.” This article focuses on the principles of ethical and communal investment in Judaism from the perspective of the Jewish law. This article begins with financial governance in Jewish traditions. It devotes significant attention to the topic of appropriate financial management of public funds. This article further explains the practice of finance through concepts such as prudential investment and its procedure. Section II of this article discusses the principles of ethical investment in Judaism with an elaborate introduction on Jewishly responsible investment, also known as socially responsible investment. Idea of condoning wrongdoing, abetting wrongdoing and default of duty according to the Talmud are described in details. One Talmudic example of aiding wrongdoers in the ritual sphere is selling items whose only use is for pagan worship. A detailed analysis of various ethical practices concludes this article.
Steven M. Davidoff
This article studies the question of the private equity contract in the post-2007 financial crisis. It considers the causes and consequences of the private equity contract during periods of financial crisis. It then argues that the private equity contract is a relevant part of the past success of private equity, and outlines the development and origins of the private equity contract and its structure. From there the article examines the effect of the financial crisis on the private equity contract, where it emphasizes the role that the private equity contract has had in the private equity industry. This article also presents the failures of the private equity contract and its ability to limit the development of private equity.
Jeffrey L. Callen
The purpose of this article is to analyze the conceptual treatment of the Iska by the Talmud and medieval post-Talmudic scholars (Rishonim), especially as it relates to risk and incentives. What follows is a discussion on the Talmudic concepts of Biblical and rabbinic interest, known as ribbit and avak ribbit, respectively, since these are central to the Talmudic formulation of the Iska. Modern economics and finance scholars view interest on a loan as being composed of three components: a component that reflects the real time value of money and a component that reflects the credit risk of the loan. This article also explains the biblically proscribed interest known as ribbit. Risk and incentives in the Iska is explained in detail. The Talmud still saw a potential interest problem with the fifty/fifty allocation, since the active partner would be working for the silent partner's equity portion in addition to the work undertaken for his own capital input. A discussion on incentive contracts concludes this article.
Every legal system needs mechanisms to resolve disputes over the value of legal entitlements, and Jewish law is no exception. Tort damages, restitution for the conversion or theft of property and the calculation of a redemption price for tithed or consecrated property are just a few of the many cases in Jewish law where a dispute as to the value of a legal entitlement might arise and when, if so, a valuation adjudication becomes necessary. The pervasiveness of such disputes, however, does not always make them easy to resolve. Valuation procedures in Jewish laws are described in details. The size of the valuation panel is expanded from three to ten in cases of complex sacred obligations, such as the redemption of consecrated real property, and the rules governing the types of individuals who may serve or who must be included on the panel are relaxed or tightened depending on context.