This chapter discusses the relationship between comparative law and economic analysis of law. After providing an overview of the characteristics of the economic analysis of law, it explains how one of the two disciplines can operate as an ancillary discipline to the other; this has been termed ‘Comparative Law and Economics’. The next section describes how comparative law and economic analysis of law can be brought together by making one discipline the subject matter of the other. It suggests that the role of economic analysis of law may be greater in case law systems than in codified systems and that this role may vary according to the subject of legislation. The section concludes with considerations on the role comparative law plays and should play in different contexts. Finally, it is argued that comparative law and economics should not be considered a discipline on its own.
The story of comparative law in the field of sales contracts is inextricably linked to Ernst Rabel. Rabel not only prepared the basis for any comparative study of the modern law of sales in his epochal treatise ‘Das Recht des Warenkaufs’, but also initiated the process of world-wide harmonization of the law of international sales. This process has not only led to one of the most important international conventions in the field of private law (the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods—CISG) but has also become a highly influential factor in the field of comparative sales law in the twentieth century. The article first outlines the most important projects in this area and their interaction with comparative law. It then goes on to discuss selected characteristic features of the law of sales which are interesting from a comparative point of view.
This Chapter examines controversial issues surrounding the design of supervisory institutions for financial markets. It begins by considering the main institutional models identified in the literature and those implemented in selected countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the US. It then discusses the significance of institutional design, the public character of supervision and the role of self-regulation, and the role of central banks in financial supervision. It also analyses the mandates and powers of supervisory agencies, together with supervisory accountability, governance, and transparency. The Chapter concludes by focusing on supervisory costs and funding models, and suggesting that there is no single ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ institutional model for financial supervision.