Alcide de Gasperi and Palmiro Togliatti were the two pivotal figures of the early postwar period. Despite their different political outlook, the two collaborated during the last phase of the war and in the period just after its end. The tenor of postwar politics, with the Communist Party never straying from the ground of democratic confrontation, was due both to Togliatti’s moderation and to De Gasperi’s determination to maintain the “constitutional pact.” Co-operation enabled the successful setting up of democratic institutions and the drafting of the constitution. However, the relationship between the two politicians was always fraught with mistrust and deteriorated as the international situation evolved toward confrontation and as economic policy aims diverged. By the 1948 elections the split was evident, and from then on their political outlook became more and more incompatible.
Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti played a leading role in Italy’s political life in the 1980s. Andreotti rose to prominence as Defense Minister in the 1960s, developing close links with Washington. In 1976 he became prime minister, confirming his political acumen and his commitment to Atlanticism, while also pursuing European integration. Craxi became leader of the Socialists in 1976 and was able to establish his leadership and to renew the image of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), presenting himself as a radical reformer. Craxi led several cabinets in the 1980s, with Andreotti as foreign minister. The two successfully balanced loyalty to the US with an often independent stance on regional interests. Domestically, Craxi defeated inflation but, despite significant growth, was unable to carry out broader economic or constitutional reform. In 1989 Andreotti formed a new government, but soon after the eruption of the Tangentopoli scandal engulfed both him and Craxi, ending their careers.
Charlie Jeffrey and Carolyn Rowe
Analysis of the ‘regional dimension’ of the EU has long since noted how the European integration process reframes the space for political action that regions can access. Clearly, integration has expanded the coalitional possibilities of sub-national and national actors beyond the nation state, allowing both national and sub-national actors to be outflanked. What remains less clear, however, is whether the conditions under which European integration, understood here as a new space for political action, provide an opportunity for regional governance actors, or a threat? This article seeks to unpack what is broadly understood as ‘the regional dimension’ of EU politics, by considering these varying strategies and understandings of Europe as an opportunity space for autonomous political action or as a threat to independent political capacities, as provided for by domestic constitutional and legal arrangements. The picture painted here is one of a much more complex and varied pattern of regional engagement in the EU than the most common metaphors of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ or the EU's ‘Third Level’ would lead us to believe.
References to ‘burden-sharing’, ‘responsibility-sharing’, or what the Lisbon Treaty now prefers to call ‘solidarity between the member states’ are frequently heard in the context of EU policy making. Most recently, such references have been prominent in the fields of financial bailouts in the context of the EMU, EU climate change policy, and member states' defence collaboration. This article aims to contribute to the nascent debate on European burden-sharing by addressing the following questions: Why and under what conditions does burden-sharing among the member states take place? Why are ‘burdens’ so unequally distributed and how can one explain existing patterns of burden distribution among states? Why are effective and equitable burden-sharing arrangements so difficult to achieve? These questions are addressed by first providing on overview of the theoretical debate on the motivations and mechanisms of EU burden-sharing; and second, by illustrating some of the challenges and limitations of equitable burden-sharing in the case of EU refugee management.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was the European Economic Community's (EEC) first (and for a long time only) common policy. Following the trauma of World War II, it was based partly on the idea that the EEC should if possible be self-sufficient in food. Though building on pre-war national agricultural policies, the CAP was an essential part of post-war European welfare states; it extended the welfare state to farmers. In the early years of European integration, the CAP also had political objectives; in France its welfarist orientation was intended partly to guarantee rural political stability. These features were clearly visible in the concept of ‘agriculture’ that was elaborated in CAP law. Its basic idea was that public policy should support agricultural production and regulate access to agricultural markets. By the mid-1980s, however, the CAP was no longer central to the politics of European integration. Since then, due to both endogenous and exogenous factors, its policy objectives, fundamental rules, and organizational structures have largely been transformed. This article traces its evolution, discusses major reforms, and identifies future challenges. It emphasizes the impact of the international context, changes in regulatory goals and instruments within a stable Treaty framework, the interpretative role of the European Court of Justice, and the need for further reform.
This article examines the political challenges of the European Union (EU). It explains that political theorists and scientists alike have viewed European integration as a laboratory for exploring how far the nation state, and the forms of domestic and international politics to which it gave rise, has been affected by the various processes associated with globalization. It discusses the Charter of Rights and Constitutional Treaty of the EU and suggests that the EU can be plausibly characterized as an intergovernmental organization of an advanced kind, a nascent federation of states, and a new form of post-national and post-state entity.
This chapter aims to characterize the French administrative system and its contemporary transformations, by identifying the dynamics and diversity of the research conducted on this subject in the disciplines of sociology, political science, and in history. Adopting a comparative perspective, it emphasizes the richness of research programs on the French bureaucracy, its institutions, regulation, reforms, and agents. Four pillars of the French administrative system are identified (centralization, territoriality, administrative law, and administrative elites). The chapter emphasizes the renewal of academic studies of French public administration, exploring the various dimensions and effects of neo-managerial reforms (policy elites, street-level bureaucrats, professional groups). The chapter also characterizes the “French touch” in the study of French public administration and claims that French scholars of the bureaucracy, influenced by stimulating sociological perspectives, offer an interesting dialogue with the approaches that are currently dominant at the international level, and might sometimes even reinvigorate them.
Since 1954, when the six founding European member states of the European Coal and Steel Community chose not to create a European Defence Community (EDC), the member states of the EU (previously the European Community) have been striving to find an effective way of working together on foreign and security policy matters. Had the EDC gone ahead, it would have been legitimized by a European Political Community directed by a European executive (government) that would have been accountable to an elected European Parliament. Such a construction would have been far more state-like than the present EU and there is a sense in which this proposal proved to be ‘too much integration too soon’. The search has been on ever since for an institutional format or political superstructure that could underpin an effective EU foreign and security policy whilst at the same time preserving the ‘national sovereignty’ of the member states. This article describes these efforts, first of all via the European Political Cooperation process that the European Community member states developed from 1969.
Comparative regional integration has emerged over the last decade as an exciting area of research. Interest was sparked, in part, by a new wave of integration in Asia, Africa, and the Americas that grew in strength in the 1990s. Like earlier waves, this one generated integration schemes that show puzzling differences and variations. Some integration schemes fail to attain most or any of their objectives, whilst others are highly successful. Some integration schemes confer significant authority on supranational agencies, encourage the use of qualified or simple majority in joint decision making, and make provisions for strong dispute settlement procedures, powerful enforcement tools, as well as extensive common monitoring. Other schemes, however, are strictly intergovernmental in character and shy away from any institutional elements that weaken or undermine national sovereignty. These striking differences in outcomes and in regional governance have prompted scholars to search for comprehensive analytical frameworks of comparative regional integration. This article, which reviews three such frameworks – neo-functionalism, externality theory, and contracting theory – considers their strengths and weaknesses, and raises key issues for future research.
Competition policy is a highly technical policy field, which plays a role in wider EU constitutional and governance developments. It is inextricably linked to the internal market, making it a touchstone for popular (and political) opposition to EU integration. How competition law is governed also reflects recent trends in EU governance, and arguably, the field more successfully incorporates new governance methods, with networks and soft law a hallmark of law enforcement. This article first outlines competition law and policy before examining these two themes. It explores the significance of EU competition law and policy for constitutionalization by analysing how the Treaties have been repeatedly revised to reflect the changing relationship between the state and the market. The governance of competition policy, including the emergence of an important enforcement network and prevalence of soft law, is then discussed.
This article examines the EU's failed attempt to approve the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) and its successful replacement by the Treaty of Lisbon. It discusses the negotiation and ratification process of the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU's functioning, political science perspectives on the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, and recommendations for the EU's treaty reform process.
There is a temptation to suppose that the creation and maintenance of an integrated trading area in the EU brings with it a need for a general regulatory competence vested in the EU institutions. The Treaties, however, do not so provide. The competences and powers of the EU are no more than those conferred upon it by its Treaties, and are limited to and by that mandate. That it may seem desirable for the EU to act in a particular way may collide with the constitutional point that its Treaties do not permit such action. In this sense all choices and preferences about the nature and scope of policy making in the EU are underpinned by constitutional constraints that are particular to the EU. This article presents an account of those constitutional constraints in law and in practice.
This chapter presents the intriguing puzzle of French constitutional politics: a spectacular increase in judicialization of French politics in the context of a flexible constitution and a politicized Constitutional Council. The state of the art is reviewed first at the international level and then within France in terms of both theory-building and empirical understanding of amending constitutions, judicialization of politics, and politicization of constitutional review. The French case, thus, provides an important case for developing comparative theory on constitutional politics and will remain a promising area of inquiry for many years to come. The chapter points to three promising areas of inquiry: the relationships between the types of government control and constitutional amendments, the patterns of judicialization, and the legitimacy of the role of constitutional review.
Constructivism claims that social ideas and discourses matter for European integration. In the constructivist perspective, European integration is at its core a process of community building. Communities are groups or associations based on shared ideas. They share a collective identity, causal and normative beliefs, and structures of meaning. Over time, community building and institutional integration mutually influence and potentially reinforce each other. This article first presents empirical findings on integration preferences, then moves on to ideational effects on collective integration decisions. Finally, it reports results regarding the effects of institutional integration on identities and ideas.
In creating and sustaining an internal market, EU governments have confronted an enduring governance dilemma, namely how to minimize barriers to international economic exchange without undermining national designs that are highly valued domestically. The governance dilemma has presented governments with trade-offs between securing a share of the growing collective benefits of an integrated market and a reduction in national discretion with respect to how markets are regulated nationally and how losers from integration are compensated. This article, which explains how the manner in which governments jointly managed these trade-offs evolved over time as domestic economic priorities changed, more states became members of the EU, and new global economic challenges emerged, is organized as follows. The first three sections cover distinct phases in the evolution of the EU and document how capitalist diversity, or what is at times termed the EU's internal clash of capitalisms, shaped the content of major intergovernmental bargains and the specific mechanisms that governments have introduced to resolve the governance dilemma. A conclusion speaks to the lessons that a focus on capitalist diversity holds for the future study of the EU.
B. Guy Peters
Effective policy coordination is a central challenge for any government, including the governing institutions of the EU. Both the underlying policy issues being confronted by governments and the institutions of government pose these problems. Policy ideas and approaches may not be compatible and organizations within the public sector want to maintain their own autonomy and control over policy. This article confronts the special case of the EU and determines how those special conditions shape the coordination capacity within that political system.
The EU's Council system is designed to represent national interests and make joint decisions. Descriptively, the Council is a composite organization of committee governance made up of multiple parts, from the heads of state and government who constitute European Council summits to national ministers meeting in different policy configurations of the Council of the European Union, down to the national experts who comprise working groups and discuss the minutiae of legislative proposals. This article is organized as follows. Section 23.1 looks at the hybrid institutional qualities of the Council in greater detail and examines the deliberate efforts to instil a consensus-inducing environment for joint decision making. Section 23.2 analyses how the Council has evolved internally, in relations with other key EU institutions such as the European Parliament, and in the wake of Eastern enlargement. Finally, a brief conclusion reiterates key themes, and underscores the value of pluralistic theories and methods in Council research.
Bastien Irondelle, Jean Joana, and Frédéric Mérand
This chapter examines what the international literature tells us about French security and defense policy, but also what the French case teaches us about this literature. French scholarship on security and defense policy has demonstrated three main trends: the legacy of Charles de Gaulle’s vision and policies, a strongly policy-oriented production, and the influence of sociological approaches in French political science more generally. These trends have given the impression that the Fifth Republic’s security and defense was unique among Western democracies. The chapter tries to bring together the main elements of a research agenda that can connect the French case to the international literature, including: expanding the sociology of security and defense policy actors and institutions; analyzing the changing articulation between defense policy and war; and tracking the reaction of the French “strong state” to the the privatization of defense functions, the civilianization of the military, and growing international cooperation.
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is one of the most widely discussed areas of EU activity. Since its inception, the EU has used this new instrument to deploy missions to all parts of the world in a flurry of diplomatic, civilian, and military activity. This article examines the ESDP by discussing, in turn, its origins, development, accomplishments, and, finally, the attempts made by scholars to apply theoretical insights to these. It argues that the Union has, to date, failed to live up to the hopes inspired by the creation of the ESDP. Equally, however, a burgeoning theoretical literature about it holds out the prospect of many interesting theoretical debates to come.
Vivien A. Schmidt
This article examines the quality of democracy and legitimacy of the EU. If the EU can be considered democratic in terms of its institutional set-up, it is so in ways unlike those of nation-state democracies. While democracies in nation states have established governments, the EU has ‘governance’, in which governing occurs without an established government through multiple authorities in highly complex sets of interrelations with state as well as societal actors. Scholars remain divided over whether a complicated set of institutional arrangements has engendered a democratic deficit for the EU and/or its member states, and also differ in the analytic framework deployed. They tend to summarize their main arguments using concepts borrowed from systems theory, as they analyse the interrelationships between output legitimacy, judged in terms of the effectiveness of the EU's policy outcomes for the people; input legitimacy, judged in terms of the EU's responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by and representation of the people; and ‘throughput’ legitimacy, building upon yet another term from systems theory, judged in terms of the accountability, transparency, and efficacy of the EU's decision-making processes along with their openness to pluralist consultation with the people.