Bastien Irondelle, Jean Joana, and Frédéric Mérand
This chapter examines what the international literature tells us about French security and defense policy, but also what the French case teaches us about this literature. French scholarship on security and defense policy has demonstrated three main trends: the legacy of Charles de Gaulle’s vision and policies, a strongly policy-oriented production, and the influence of sociological approaches in French political science more generally. These trends have given the impression that the Fifth Republic’s security and defense was unique among Western democracies. The chapter tries to bring together the main elements of a research agenda that can connect the French case to the international literature, including: expanding the sociology of security and defense policy actors and institutions; analyzing the changing articulation between defense policy and war; and tracking the reaction of the French “strong state” to the the privatization of defense functions, the civilianization of the military, and growing international cooperation.
Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann
Germany is increasingly expected to behave like a “normal” international actor, that is, one who assumes international responsibility in accordance with its international stature and whose involvement in international affairs is not—or to a lesser degree than during the Cold War—circumscribed by its past. Those changes in the expectations in particular from its transatlantic and European partners have strained Germany’s international self-conception. So have changes in the domestic environment, where the constraints on German foreign policy decision-makers have grown stronger in recent years. As a result, the “civilian power” role, which shaped Germany’s foreign policy during the Cold War, has been increasingly called into question, and it is not yet clear whether it will be replaced by a new master role for the country in international affairs.
Richard J. Aldrich
This article begins by examining recent intelligence developments within the EU. Its initial focus is institutional, asking why the intelligence activities of the EU are relatively weak, despite the strong tradition of intelligence cooperation within Europe. The article argues that while intelligence activities which might strictly be described as belonging to the EU remain limited, there have nevertheless been some significant pan-European developments. It also considers the controversial efforts of European institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to generate oversight and accountability at the European level for multinational intelligence operations that lie beyond the capacity of national systems of inquiry.
The term ‘justice and home affairs’ (JHA) denotes a policy-making domain of the EU covering asylum and immigration policy, external border management, judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters, and police cooperation. Although the JHA domain emerged as an EU policy-making domain formally only in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, it has developed into one of the fastest-growing fields of EU action, with well over a hundred new texts having been adopted every year by the EU ‘Justice and Home Affairs Council’ during the decade 2000–2010. This article first explores the origins, obstacles, and driving factors of the EU JHA domain. It then provides a critical assessment of progress and deficits of the main fields of EU action, i.e., asylum and immigration policy, external border management, internal security, and judicial cooperation in civil matters. The conclusions provide an overall assessment and consider key challenges for the further development of this domain.
Armin von Bogdandy
This article contends that the EU is neither an international organization nor a state. Rather, it represents a new kind of polity, here conceived of as a supranational federation. The article sketches this understanding not in terms of political theory but from a legal perspective, studying the principles concerning the relationship between the Union and its member states.
Jonathon W. Moses
Schengen has come to symbolize the very apex of Europe's integration ideal and ambition. In abolishing border controls between signatory states, the Schengen Agreement made it easier to travel across the breadth of Europe, and prodded a discussion about the need to create a common door to the outside world. However, in practice, the sort of free mobility associated with Schengen represents a number of challenges to further integration in Europe. This shadow of Schengen extends over three distinct areas of research, each of which is relatively sceptical of Europe's capacity to integrate. First, Schengen prompts us to consider the role of labour migration within Europe's larger ambitions for economic and monetary union. Second, it prompts a discussion about citizenship, identity, and belonging in an integrated Europe. Finally, Schengen highlights the practical difficulties of getting once-sovereign states to agree on how to face the world beyond its borders. This article examines the literature on European migration as it relates to these three crosscutting challenges.