Christa Davis Acampora
Ecce Homo offers Nietzsche’s own interpretation of himself, his thoughts, and his works. This article analyzes how the text bears on his ideas about agency, fate, and freedom. It presents an account of “how one becomes what one is.” For Nietzsche, a person is a set of drives ordered or ranked a certain way; there is no will or subject separate from these that could carry out the work of becoming. What is most important is that one’s drives be coordinated in a single entity. Through these tactics some of us can become what we are.
Because of the obstacles to experimentation and because of the complexity of the social world, the social sciences present fertile grounds for investigating issues surrounding causation. This article aims to sketch a number of issues and only secondarily argues for particular positions. It approaches the issues that are discussed with some general background assumptions that frame the issues and are also supported by the topics discussed. Those assumptions concern the nature of causal claims in general, more specifically, questions about the extent to which our understanding of causation can be perfectly general. It presents a number of issues about the ontology and epistemology of causation in the social sciences. The general theme is that these issues cannot be decided in the abstract but must pay careful attention to the empirical presuppositions made and the kinds of evidence for them.
This chapter examines traditional and nontraditional views about the morality aspect of killing in war, explaining that these views are derivative of deeper nonconsenqualist perspectives in ethics. It analyzes some aspects of standard just war theory, discusses the concept of jus in bello and collateral harm to noncombatants, and also offers alternatives to the standard jus in bello, including the equality thesis and moral equality or conventional equality.
This article focuses on Nietzsche’s views about women. It describes the emergence of Nietzsche’s antifeminism and misogyny in 1883 with Thus Spoke Zarathustra; before this Nietzsche was a ‘cautious feminist’. His attitudes changed following his disastrous experience with Lou Salomé; it was this biographical event, and not his philosophical thinking, that explains his ‘turn’ against women. The article also considers why Nietzsche’s women friends and other feminists often found his writings congenial despite his misogynistic remarks.
R. Lanier Anderson
This article explores various conceptions of Nietzsche’s thoughts on autonomy. It distinguishes six main interpretive approaches, each with its own conception of autonomy: (1) autonomy as spontaneous self-determination, in the sense of traditional free will; (2) a “standard model” interpretation counting actions as autonomous when they are caused by rationalizing beliefs and desires; (3) a view that traces autonomy to a Kantian transcendental subject; (4) constitutivist theories that seek to explain the source of normativity by “deriving ethics from action”; (5) “hierarchical model” interpretations arguing that complex, higher-order attitudes “speak for the agent,” and thereby constitute her autonomy; and (6) conceptions of autonomy as an ethical ideal.
Traditional Libertarian Self-Ownership views suffer from the Conflation Problem—they fail to adequately distinguish serious from trivial infringements on our rights. Eric Mack has responded to this general concern. He argues that if we properly understand the point of rights, we can successfully distinguish between boundaries that it is morally crucial that we not cross from boundaries that are more flexible. This chapter argues that Mack’s proposed understanding of the point of rights—allowing people to live their own lives in their own way, uninterfered with—is ambiguous. Either we understand Mack’s notion of the point of rights in a moralized way or we do not. Either way, Mack’s view is inadequate, and thus he has not solved the general problem of distinguishing serious and trivial infringements on rights.