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Alcide de Gasperi and Palmiro Togliatti were the two pivotal figures of the early postwar period. Despite their different political outlook, the two collaborated during the last phase of the war and in the period just after its end. The tenor of postwar politics, with the Communist Party never straying from the ground of democratic confrontation, was due both to Togliatti’s moderation and to De Gasperi’s determination to maintain the “constitutional pact.” Co-operation enabled the successful setting up of democratic institutions and the drafting of the constitution. However, the relationship between the two politicians was always fraught with mistrust and deteriorated as the international situation evolved toward confrontation and as economic policy aims diverged. By the 1948 elections the split was evident, and from then on their political outlook became more and more incompatible.

This chapter follows the evolution of Alexis Tsipras’ radical Left political leadership in its shift from an inclusive to a personalized model as well as from a maverick to a mainstream style. Drawing on an institutionalist approach to leadership, it analyses the historical factors that shaped Tsipras’ ideas and actions as well as the structural constraints that circumscribed his attempt to put forward and implement his progressive policy programme. The policy project he pursued is argued to have become broader over time, as Tsipras was transformed from figurehead of alternative youth politics to representative of the interests of the wide array of social strata that lifted SYRIZA to government power. A brief attempt to discuss Tsipras’ legacy highlights his contribution to Greece’s party system and democracy as well as the consequences of his leadership for the future of the international left.

This study is concerned with the political discourse and practice of Andreas Papandreou both as prime minister of Greece (1981–9, 1993–6) and as the founder and ‘charismatic leader’ of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). More specifically, it discusses Papandreou’s political discourse and critically presents the PASOK administrations’ work with a view to identifying and evaluating the ideological–political orientation and modalities of the ‘modernization’ experiment that took place in Greece, particularly in the 1980s. The study is thus focused on the ‘populist character’ instilled in PASOK by Andreas Papandreou: to begin with, it offers a critical overview of the formative ‘moments’ of Papandreou’s approach to the Greek ‘political problem’, as formulated first before 1974 and then during PASOK’s years in opposition (1974–81). The discussion of the governmental populist decade 1981–9 (and the three years between 1993 and 1996)—in terms of both the so-called ‘social issue’, the state, and nationalist rhetoric—examines Papandreou’s political legacy, as well as some possible continuities and discontinuities between an oppositional ‘before’ and a governmental ‘after’. Moreover, it proposes a comparative analysis of the Greek case against a setting of social-democratic politics and populist mobilization, aimed at offering an overall understanding of the particular phenomenon. Viewing Αndreas Papandreou as a ‘charismatic’ national-populist leader, the study presents the general directions and internal tensions of his political discourse between ‘populism’ and ‘modernization’.

Bettino Craxi and Giulio Andreotti played a leading role in Italy’s political life in the 1980s. Andreotti rose to prominence as Defense Minister in the 1960s, developing close links with Washington. In 1976 he became prime minister, confirming his political acumen and his commitment to Atlanticism, while also pursuing European integration. Craxi became leader of the Socialists in 1976 and was able to establish his leadership and to renew the image of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), presenting himself as a radical reformer. Craxi led several cabinets in the 1980s, with Andreotti as foreign minister. The two successfully balanced loyalty to the US with an often independent stance on regional interests. Domestically, Craxi defeated inflation but, despite significant growth, was unable to carry out broader economic or constitutional reform. In 1989 Andreotti formed a new government, but soon after the eruption of the Tangentopoli scandal engulfed both him and Craxi, ending their careers.

Analysis of the ‘regional dimension’ of the EU has long since noted how the European integration process reframes the space for political action that regions can access. Clearly, integration has expanded the coalitional possibilities of sub-national and national actors beyond the nation state, allowing both national and sub-national actors to be outflanked. What remains less clear, however, is whether the conditions under which European integration, understood here as a new space for political action, provide an opportunity for regional governance actors, or a threat? This article seeks to unpack what is broadly understood as ‘the regional dimension’ of EU politics, by considering these varying strategies and understandings of Europe as an opportunity space for autonomous political action or as a threat to independent political capacities, as provided for by domestic constitutional and legal arrangements. The picture painted here is one of a much more complex and varied pattern of regional engagement in the EU than the most common metaphors of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ or the EU's ‘Third Level’ would lead us to believe.

References to ‘burden-sharing’, ‘responsibility-sharing’, or what the Lisbon Treaty now prefers to call ‘solidarity between the member states’ are frequently heard in the context of EU policy making. Most recently, such references have been prominent in the fields of financial bailouts in the context of the EMU, EU climate change policy, and member states' defence collaboration. This article aims to contribute to the nascent debate on European burden-sharing by addressing the following questions: Why and under what conditions does burden-sharing among the member states take place? Why are ‘burdens’ so unequally distributed and how can one explain existing patterns of burden distribution among states? Why are effective and equitable burden-sharing arrangements so difficult to achieve? These questions are addressed by first providing on overview of the theoretical debate on the motivations and mechanisms of EU burden-sharing; and second, by illustrating some of the challenges and limitations of equitable burden-sharing in the case of EU refugee management.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was the European Economic Community's (EEC) first (and for a long time only) common policy. Following the trauma of World War II, it was based partly on the idea that the EEC should if possible be self-sufficient in food. Though building on pre-war national agricultural policies, the CAP was an essential part of post-war European welfare states; it extended the welfare state to farmers. In the early years of European integration, the CAP also had political objectives; in France its welfarist orientation was intended partly to guarantee rural political stability. These features were clearly visible in the concept of ‘agriculture’ that was elaborated in CAP law. Its basic idea was that public policy should support agricultural production and regulate access to agricultural markets. By the mid-1980s, however, the CAP was no longer central to the politics of European integration. Since then, due to both endogenous and exogenous factors, its policy objectives, fundamental rules, and organizational structures have largely been transformed. This article traces its evolution, discusses major reforms, and identifies future challenges. It emphasizes the impact of the international context, changes in regulatory goals and instruments within a stable Treaty framework, the interpretative role of the European Court of Justice, and the need for further reform.

The Centre originated from the Liberals, led by Eleftherios Venizelos, who embarked on a project of Greece’s modernization in the early twentieth century and the interwar period. After 1945, parties of the Centre were pressed in between the resurgent royalist Right and the communist Left, but in the 1960s, under George Papandreou’s ‘Center Union’, took centre stage in Greek politics. Since the 1974 transition to democracy, the Centre supported Europeanism and social democracy, but was overshadowed by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The new Centre of the twenty-first century emerged in the form of various, relatively small and short-lived parties, such as ‘To Potami’ (the River party). It was a progressive ‘bourgeois’ force, reminiscent of its liberal legacy, which aspired to relieve the Greek economy from statism and support Greece’s anchoring on the eurozone. Its political profile was constructed in opposition to SYRIZA, the radical Left party claiming to have inherited the once PASOK-dominated Centre-Left. Overall, the Centre is a political space in the making and consists of politicians who may attract the vote of segments of the middle classes earning incomes above the median line and possessing skills suitable for a globalized economy.

This article examines the political challenges of the European Union (EU). It explains that political theorists and scientists alike have viewed European integration as a laboratory for exploring how far the nation state, and the forms of domestic and international politics to which it gave rise, has been affected by the various processes associated with globalization. It discusses the Charter of Rights and Constitutional Treaty of the EU and suggests that the EU can be plausibly characterized as an intergovernmental organization of an advanced kind, a nascent federation of states, and a new form of post-national and post-state entity.

This chapter aims to characterize the French administrative system and its contemporary transformations, by identifying the dynamics and diversity of the research conducted on this subject in the disciplines of sociology, political science, and in history. Adopting a comparative perspective, it emphasizes the richness of research programs on the French bureaucracy, its institutions, regulation, reforms, and agents. Four pillars of the French administrative system are identified (centralization, territoriality, administrative law, and administrative elites). The chapter emphasizes the renewal of academic studies of French public administration, exploring the various dimensions and effects of neo-managerial reforms (policy elites, street-level bureaucrats, professional groups). The chapter also characterizes the “French touch” in the study of French public administration and claims that French scholars of the bureaucracy, influenced by stimulating sociological perspectives, offer an interesting dialogue with the approaches that are currently dominant at the international level, and might sometimes even reinvigorate them.

The chapter examines the formation of a Greek national Church and its role in the political life of the country. The emergence of an independent (autocephalous) Orthodox Church in the kingdom of Greece is considered in connection with the issue of autocephaly in canon law and the debates it provoked. It is pointed out that Greek autocephaly set a precedent for the subsequent emergence of other autocephalous churches in the Orthodox communion as part of the nation- and state-building projects of the respective national societies. The multiplicity of ecclesiastical jurisdictions in the Greek state are discussed as a record bearing the traces of the unification and national integration of Greece. Penultimately, the role of the Orthodox Church of Greece as national Church and the interplay of ecclesiastical and secular politics is examined. The close connection of Church and politics in Greek society is illustrated by pointing out that periods of political instability and subversion of constitutional government in twentieth-century Greece have provoked ‘archiepiscopal questions’ in ecclesiastical life. Lastly, the main issues in Church–State relations in post-1974 Greece are surveyed and appraised.

In the post-1974 era Greek society suffered from low levels of civic engagement, associational density, and volunteering. Non-governmental and civil society organizations were relatively few and poorly organized, relying mostly on state and European Union funds. This, in turn, compromised their autonomy and diminished their capacity to act as a check on state power. However, Greek civil society has been changing since the early 1990s. Several new NGOs have appeared, focusing mainly on environmental issues, their activities have been strengthened and widened, and people have been devoting more time and money to social activism. There are several reasons that explain this development: apart from wider cultural shifts, an important factor has been that political parties have loosened their grip on the associational sphere, leaving more space for voluntary organizations. The change of stance of a significant part of the Greek Left, which previously regarded NGOs with suspicion, was crucial. The receding welfare state in the last decade encouraged civic engagement and mobilized citizens. The number of volunteers increased, new organizations were formed, and older ones became more active in providing social services to impoverished Greeks and migrants. Importantly, the new forms of activism and engagement that are on the rise are not linked to the state. The crisis seems to have strengthened Greek civil society: the dependency on EU and state funds of previous years that had constrained NGO independence and autonomy may at last have started to wane.

Since 1954, when the six founding European member states of the European Coal and Steel Community chose not to create a European Defence Community (EDC), the member states of the EU (previously the European Community) have been striving to find an effective way of working together on foreign and security policy matters. Had the EDC gone ahead, it would have been legitimized by a European Political Community directed by a European executive (government) that would have been accountable to an elected European Parliament. Such a construction would have been far more state-like than the present EU and there is a sense in which this proposal proved to be ‘too much integration too soon’. The search has been on ever since for an institutional format or political superstructure that could underpin an effective EU foreign and security policy whilst at the same time preserving the ‘national sovereignty’ of the member states. This article describes these efforts, first of all via the European Political Cooperation process that the European Community member states developed from 1969.

This chapter attempts to provide an understanding of the Greek Communist Party’s (KKE’s, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας) physiognomy across time and in comparative perspective through an approach whereby ideological narratives, schemes of mobilization, and political tactics interact. This framework allows for an exposition of the inter-relationship between ideology, organization, and strategy in the case of Greek communism. In order to synthesize perspectives, revisit contested points, and close gaps in the study of contemporary Greek communism, the chapter’s reflections cut across five thematic sections: introduction; historical trajectory, ‘critical junctures’ and evolving opportunity structures with a focus on the KKE’s strategic behaviour; the KKE’s ideological and programmatic profile; the organizational form of the party in terms of mobilization structures and decision-making processes; and a conclusion which briefly considers future research avenues into Greek communism and its relevance for wider literatures.

Comparative regional integration has emerged over the last decade as an exciting area of research. Interest was sparked, in part, by a new wave of integration in Asia, Africa, and the Americas that grew in strength in the 1990s. Like earlier waves, this one generated integration schemes that show puzzling differences and variations. Some integration schemes fail to attain most or any of their objectives, whilst others are highly successful. Some integration schemes confer significant authority on supranational agencies, encourage the use of qualified or simple majority in joint decision making, and make provisions for strong dispute settlement procedures, powerful enforcement tools, as well as extensive common monitoring. Other schemes, however, are strictly intergovernmental in character and shy away from any institutional elements that weaken or undermine national sovereignty. These striking differences in outcomes and in regional governance have prompted scholars to search for comprehensive analytical frameworks of comparative regional integration. This article, which reviews three such frameworks – neo-functionalism, externality theory, and contracting theory – considers their strengths and weaknesses, and raises key issues for future research.

Competition policy is a highly technical policy field, which plays a role in wider EU constitutional and governance developments. It is inextricably linked to the internal market, making it a touchstone for popular (and political) opposition to EU integration. How competition law is governed also reflects recent trends in EU governance, and arguably, the field more successfully incorporates new governance methods, with networks and soft law a hallmark of law enforcement. This article first outlines competition law and policy before examining these two themes. It explores the significance of EU competition law and policy for constitutionalization by analysing how the Treaties have been repeatedly revised to reflect the changing relationship between the state and the market. The governance of competition policy, including the emergence of an important enforcement network and prevalence of soft law, is then discussed.

The chapter provides a presentation of the creation and development of the New Democracy party (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) in Greece, after the restoration of democracy, in 1974. Smooth transition and the establishment of a truly democratic regime with all political parties able to contest on equal grounds, the drafting and adoption of a genuinely democratic Constitution in 1975, the disentanglement of the Conservatives, under Karamanlis guidance from the monarchy, as well as the accession of Greece into the European Union in 1981, should be considered as some of the party’s most important achievements. On the other hand, the party’s failure to dissociate itself from the state and the spoils system, persisting personalistic antagonisms, its limited progress as regards its organizational development, its vagueness concerning its ideological identity, and the lack of a concrete plan concerning the country’s future course are some of its most serious and enduring weaknesses.

This chapter discusses the impact of Constantinos Karamanlis on Greek politics. Karamanlis, leader of the Greek Right, served as prime minister for fourteen years (1955–63 and 1974–80), and as president of the republic for ten (1980–5 and 1990–5). A major (and, at times, dominant) figure from the mid-1950s until the mid-1990s, he was pivotal in the attainment of economic development and the founding of an established democracy in 1974–75, as well as Greece’s association with the EEC (1961) and its eventual succession (1979–81). The chapter discusses his long political career, his popular support base and the evolution of the Greek Right from the early 1950s until the late 1970s. It also evaluates Karamanlis’ political methodology: it disputes the assumptions of older bibliography which focused on his personal impact only, and puts forward the more contemporary thesis that Karamanlis was the leader of a team that expressed a wider ideological trend and the need to adjust to Western governance in the post-war era. Last but not least, Karamanlis’ legacies are discussed, mostly on the European identity of the country; arguably, this legacy allowed the Greek Right to survive the grave economic and social crisis of the 2010s.

This article examines the EU's failed attempt to approve the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) and its successful replacement by the Treaty of Lisbon. It discusses the negotiation and ratification process of the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU's functioning, political science perspectives on the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, and recommendations for the EU's treaty reform process.

There is a temptation to suppose that the creation and maintenance of an integrated trading area in the EU brings with it a need for a general regulatory competence vested in the EU institutions. The Treaties, however, do not so provide. The competences and powers of the EU are no more than those conferred upon it by its Treaties, and are limited to and by that mandate. That it may seem desirable for the EU to act in a particular way may collide with the constitutional point that its Treaties do not permit such action. In this sense all choices and preferences about the nature and scope of policy making in the EU are underpinned by constitutional constraints that are particular to the EU. This article presents an account of those constitutional constraints in law and in practice.