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date: 12 December 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The question of what relation holds between values and emotions ramifies into several questions. This chapter focuses on the relation between evaluative concepts and emotions. The relation between concepts such as admirable or disgusting and emotions can be expressed by propositions of the form “Something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it.” The first section discusses interpretations of such equivalences, such as the fitting attitude analysis, and suggests a particular way to interpret such equivalences, which is well supported by a plausible account of emotions, that is, the perceptual theory of emotions. The second section considers whether concepts such as admirable and disgusting are evaluative and argues that arguments showing that thick concepts are not inherently evaluative can be resisted.

Keywords: evaluative concept, fitting attitude analysis, thick concept, emotion, perceptual theory of experience, perceptual theory of emotions

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