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date: 18 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The point of departure of this chapter is G. E. Moore’s theory of intrinsic value. Different kinds of recent doubts about intrinsic value are considered: doubts about the fundamentality of intrinsic value to ethical theory, doubts about the property of intrinsic value, doubts about the concept of intrinsic value. It is argued that the doubts considered can be put to rest. Special attention is given to the unanalyzability and the alleged redundancy of intrinsic value, and to recent challenges from Richard Kraut and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Throughout the chapter, the focus is exclusively on arguments that target intrinsic value specifically. General arguments to the effect that there are no moral or evaluative properties or facts, or that no moral or evaluative judgments are true, are not discussed.

Keywords: intrinsic value, Kraut, Moore, redundancy, Thomson, unanalyzability

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