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date: 09 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter provides an account of the Kantian theory of value, showing how a plurality of incommensurable values, namely the fundamentally heterogeneous values of morality and prudence, can be integrated into a complete ordering by appealing to the conditionality of the value of happiness, which allows us to explain how the claims of prudence can be silenced by the claims of morality, thereby solving the Sidgwickian problem of the dualism of practical reason. Moreover, it establishes that the Kantian understanding of silencing is the only way of rendering dualism coherent, given that the question as to what one ought to do, considering all the normative demands to which one is subject, requires either that these demands be commensurable, which presupposes monism, or that these demands never conflict, which can only be ensured in principle by means of conditional value structures.

Keywords: Kantian axiology, dualism of practical reason, value pluralism, incommensurability, conditional value, silencing

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