- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- The Multifaceted Concept of Transparency
- Constitutional Transparency
- Monetary Policy Transparency
- Fiscal Policy Transparency
- Transparent and Unique Sovereign Default Risk Assessment
- Transparency and Competition Policy in an Imperfectly Competitive World
- Transparency in International Trade Policy
- Transparency of Climate Change Policies, Markets, and Corporate Practices
- Transparency of Human Resource Policy
- Transparency of Innovation Policy
- Labor Market Transparency
- Transparency of Financial Regulation
- Price Transparency and Market Integration
- Transparency and Inward Investment Incentives
- Transparency and Corruption
- Multinational Corporations’ Relationship with Political Actors: Transparency versus Opacity
- Corporate Governance and Optimal Transparency
- Transparency Differences at the Top of the Organization: Market-Pull versus Strategic Hoarding Forces
- Governance Transparency and the Institutions of Capitalism: Implications for Finance
- Transparency and Executive Compensation
- Transparency and Disclosure in the Global Microfinance Industry
- Accounting Transparency and International Standard Setting
- Transparency of Fair Value Accounting and Tax
- Transparency of Corporate Risk Management and Performance
- Stress Testing, Transparency, and Uncertainty in European Banking: What Impacts?
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
Transparency is one of the core issues in competition policy. High or low transparency as well as information asymmetry occur at several levels, as indicated in this chapter: Level of firms that compete within the same relevant market; Level of firms and other firms located upwards or downwards; Level of producers/sellers and consumers; Level of firms and antitrust/regulation authorities. The chapter shows that a high level of transparency may in fact deserve some categories of economic agents. In these cases, optimal transparency seems to be a more efficient alternative than “maximal transparency.” Regarding antitrust procedures, it is up to the authorities to find the right level of transparency and therefore to apply an “optimal transparency” regime. Some industries are more transparent than others and cannot be artificially regulated in such a way as to reduce transparency. Any attempt to reduce transparency could generate negative side effects that may cause more damages than benefit to the society.
Philippe Gugler, Professor, Center for Competitiveness and Chair of Economic and Social Policy at the University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland.
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