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date: 22 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Transparency is one of the core issues in competition policy. High or low transparency as well as information asymmetry occur at several levels, as indicated in this chapter: Level of firms that compete within the same relevant market; Level of firms and other firms located upwards or downwards; Level of producers/sellers and consumers; Level of firms and antitrust/regulation authorities. The chapter shows that a high level of transparency may in fact deserve some categories of economic agents. In these cases, optimal transparency seems to be a more efficient alternative than “maximal transparency.” Regarding antitrust procedures, it is up to the authorities to find the right level of transparency and therefore to apply an “optimal transparency” regime. Some industries are more transparent than others and cannot be artificially regulated in such a way as to reduce transparency. Any attempt to reduce transparency could generate negative side effects that may cause more damages than benefit to the society.

Keywords: antitrust, competition, competition policy, information asymmetry, regulation, transparency

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