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date: 22 July 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter provides a survey of the economics literature on multisided platforms with particular focus on competition policy issues, including market definition, mergers, monopolization, and coordinated behavior. It provides a survey of the general industrial organization theory of multisided platforms and then considers various issues concerning the application of antitrust analysis to multisided platform businesses. It shows that it is not possible to know whether standard economic models, often relied on for antitrust analysis, apply to multisided platforms without explicitly considering the existence of multiple customer groups with interdependent demand. It summarizes many theoretical and empirical papers that demonstrate that a number of results for single-sided firms, which are the focus of much of the applied antitrust economics literature, do not apply directly to multisided platforms.

Keywords: Platform, multisided, market, merger, exclusion, two-sided

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