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date: 06 December 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Since China has modeled its antitrust regime on that of the EU, there are essentially two antitrust regime types: the United States and the EU. This chapter is a brief comparative study of the two regimes. I focus on three categories in which fundamental differences are observed: enforcement, legal standards, and procedure. Within each of the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. With respect to enforcement, the EU imposes gain-based penalties, while the United States imposes harm-based penalties. In predation law, the United States has a marginal cost standard and the EU has an average cost standard. With respect to procedure, the United States is a common law system, while the EU’s procedure is closer to the civil law system in its allocation of power between the courts and the enforcement agency. These differences have profound implications for the welfare consequences of global antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: economics of law enforcement, global competition law, gain-based penalty, harm-based penalty, optimal deterrence, monopolization, cartelization, predatory pricing

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