- Consulting Editors
- The Oxford Handbook of Managerial Economics
- Managerial Economics: Introduction and Overview
- Managerial Economics: Present And Future
- Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?
- Advances in Cost Frontier Analysis of the Firm
- Supply Chain Design for Managing Disruptive Risks
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Game and Information Theory in Modern Managerial Economics
- Issues in the Analysis of Time, Risk, and Uncertainty
- Behavioral Economics and Strategic Decision Making
- Advances in Pricing Strategies and Tactics
- Product Distribution and Promotion: An Analytical Marketing Perspective
- Market Imperfections and Sustainable Competitive Advantage
- The New Managerial Economics of Firm Growth: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities
- Strategies for Network Industries
- Internalization Theory as the General Theory of International Strategic Management Past, Present and Future
- Competitive Strategy in the Nonprofit Sector
- Organizational Design and Firm Performance
- Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance
- Vertical Merger
- The Evolving Modern Theory of the Firm
- Financing the Business Firm
- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
- Managing Workplace Safety and Health
- Merger Strategies And Antitrust Concerns
- On the Profitability of Corporate Environmentalism
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter explains the application of antitrust law to merger and acquisitions, especially horizontal transactions, which involve direct competitors. The chapter outlines the analysis the U.S. enforcement agencies set out in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines―a fact-intensive analysis focusing on the precise competitive interaction between the merging firms and the competitive environment in which they operate. The chapter focuses mainly on unilateral effects, which arise from the elimination of head-to-head competition between the merging firms. Several distinct unilateral effects are distinguished and illustrated with real-world examples. In particular, the chapter explains how modern economic analysis identifies the relatively few horizontal mergers and acquisitions found to violate antitrust law.
Gregory J. Werden is a member of the Senior Economic Counsel in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Luke Froeb, William C. Oehmig Chair of Free Enterprise and Entrepreneurship, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.
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