Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines the complete-concept theory central to Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686. It argues that this doctrine lies at the intersection of three great layers of thought: his reflections on individual history and destiny, his ontological intuition of what is considered a “complete being,” and his logically minded unified theory of concepts and truth. In addition, the chapter considers the relevance of the doctrine of complete concepts to Leibniz's concerns about theodicy, and argues that the complete-concept doctrine was never abandoned by Leibniz, even though it was sidelined after 1686 in favour of other approaches to the theory of substance.
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