- Oxford Library of Psychology
- Oxford Library of Psychology
- About the Editors
- Message Encoding
- Syntactically Speaking
- Neural Bases of Sentence Processing: Evidence from Neurolinguistic and Neuroimaging Studies
- Computational Models of Sentence Production: A Dual-Path Approach
- Word Production: Behavioral and Computational Considerations
- Neural Bases of Word Representations for Naming
- Organization and Structure of Conceptual Representations
- Giving Words Meaning: Why Better Models of Semantics Are Needed in Language Production Research
- The Morphology of Words
- Speech Planning in Two Languages: What Bilinguals Tell Us about Language Production
- Bilingual Word Access
- Phonology and Phonological Theory
- The Temporal Organization of Speech
- Phonological Processing: The Retrieval and Encoding of Word Form Information in Speech Production
- Phonetic Processing
- Phrase-level Phonological and Phonetic Phenomena
- Neural Bases of Phonological and Articulatory Processing
- Spontaneous Discourse
- Producing Socially Meaningful Linguistic Variation
- Writing Systems, Language Production, and Modes of Rationality
- Representation of Orthographic Knowledge
- The Role of Lexical and Sublexical Orthography in Writing: Autonomy, Interactions, and Neurofunctional Correlates
- The Structure of Sign Languages
- Sign Language Production: An Overview
- Monitoring and Control of the Production System
- Language Production and Working Memory
- Production of Speech-Accompanying Gesture
- Perception-Production Interactions and their Neural Bases
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter addresses a question at the intersection of language production and semantic memory: what are representations of word meanings like? An important problem this raises is how the abstractions used in thought and language make contact with the world accessed through the senses. Proposals from embodied cognition deny the distinction between sensory representations and processes and conceptual ones. Evidence about the neural basis of conceptual knowledge is reviewed to critically assess the claims of the embodied view, and to support the opposing conclusion that conceptual representations are in part distinct from sensory-motor representations. Furthermore, any shared neural resources drawn on by perceptual and conceptual tasks are not interpretable until their representational properties are described. Instead, research that specifically characterizes supramodal representations in the brain may be the best route to understanding the neural basis of conceptual knowledge.
Anna Leshinskaya is a graduate student in the Cognitive Neuropsychology Lab in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University.
Alfonso Caramazza is Daniel and Amy Starch Professor of Psychology at Harvard University.
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