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date: 28 May 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article discusses the models of multiparty bargaining and determines the impact of who speaks to whom and when on bargaining outcomes. It also describes some recent models of coalition formation, identifying the predictions they generate (and how they could be tested in future empirical work), highlighting their assumptions (and how they could be relaxed in future theoretical work). There are incentives for parties to form coalitions before an election to prevent a minority group from winning. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Sjostrom identified a number of variables that affect pre-electoral coalition formation. Models of coalition bargaining have the potential to give testable predictions in multilateral bargaining settings and to help better understand a variety of real-world bargaining settings.

Keywords: multiparty bargaining, bargaining outcomes, coalition formation, election, incentives, models

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